McDaniels v. Winstead

AUDREY MCDANIELS, Petitioner, v. WINSTEAD, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL NO. 11-5679

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JULY 1, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUFE, J.

INTRODUCTION

At Petitioner Audrey McDaniels's first trial, she was acquitted of first and third degree murder. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent here, appealed the acquittal of third degree murder, which was reversed. The Commonwealth retried McDaniels; she was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter but convicted of third degree murder. She is currently serving a sentence of incarceration. McDaniels petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition was referred to Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell. Judge Angell recommended that the petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Notwithstanding Judge Angell's careful and thorough analysis, this Court will not approve her recommendation. For the reasons below, the Court holds that McDaniels is in custody in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and that the writ must be granted. Furthermore, because McDaniels has been acquitted of all charges filed against her, the Commonwealth will be ordered to release her forthwith.

I. Overview and Procedural History

This peculiar and troubling case challenges that petitioner Audrey McDaniels is incarcerated in violation of the United States Constitution. Her most substantial claim is that theprotections of the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated when she was tried a second time for the murder of her stepson, Brahim Dukes. She also claims that her second trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call at trial Dukes's treating physician.

Dukes was 18 years old, but he could neither speak nor care for himself. In late December 2001, Dukes's father was incarcerated, and McDaniels was the only adult in charge of him. On December 29, 2001, McDaniels called 911 and reported that Dukes had had a temper tantrum and collapsed on the floor. Paramedics responded and discovered Dukes in a room that measured six feet by four feet nine inches. The room reeked of human waste, and it appeared that Dukes had spent some time scratching the door from the inside. Dukes showed no vital signs and was pronounced dead on his arrival at the hospital. The causes of death were starvation and dehydration.

McDaniels was charged with first degree murder and the lesser included offenses of third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. At trial, after the close of the Commonwealth's case in chief, the court entered a judgment of acquittal on the charge of first degree murder. On July 12, 2004, at the close of the trial, the jury was instructed on third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. As discussed in greater detail below, the foreman reported that the jury was deadlocked, and the judge declared a mistrial. Approximately five minutes later, the judge and counsel for both the defense and prosecution went to the jury room to talk with the jurors. There they discovered, based on notes on a white board, that the jury had intended to acquit McDaniels of third degree murder and that they were only deadlocked with respect to the involuntary manslaughter charge. The judge brought the jury back into court and recorded a verdict of not guilty with respect to third degree murder and again declared a mistrial with respect to involuntary manslaughter.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the entry of acquittal on third degree murder and remanded the case for retrial. McDaniels moved the Superior Court for reconsideration, which was denied, and she petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for allowance of appeal, which was also denied. She was retried for third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter (the Commonwealth did not appeal the acquittal of first degree murder). On May 3, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on third degree murder, but not guilty of involuntary manslaughter.¹ McDaniels, through counsel, appealed to the Superior Court, lost, petitioned the Supreme Court for allowance of appeal, which was denied, filed a counseled petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Review Act ("PCRA"), which was denied, filed an appeal (pro se) to the Superior Court, which was dismissed when she failed to file a brief, and then petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed, and he amended her habeas petition. The petition was referred to Judge Angell, who filed a report and recommendation ("R&R") concluding that the petition should be denied because McDaniels's claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. McDaniels timely objected. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record, and this Memorandum Opinion resolves McDaniels's objections.

The underlying facts and McDaniels's arguments about them must be laid out in some detail because the Commonwealth argues that McDaniels failed to exhaust her claims. As discussed at greater length below, in order to evaluate this contention, the Court will have to conduct a thorough examination of the state courts' records.

II. Background

On July 12, 2004, the jury in McDaniels's first trial began to deliberate. At some point the next day, the jury entered the courtroom, and the following scene played out. The crux of this unusual case will be presented at length:

THE COURT: For the record, the jury sent exhibit number four. "Your Honor, we are hopelessly deadlocked at this time and unable to reach a verdict." Now there were two separate charges in this case . . . . Was there an agreement on any of the two charges?

THE FOREMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There was?

THE FOREMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: What was the agreement?

THE FOREMAN: That we had agreement on involuntary manslaughter—

JUROR: No.

THE FOREMAN: I mean third degree, I am sorry.

THE COURT: You agreed on third degree?

JUROR: No.

THE FOREMAN: No, we did not agree, I am sorry.

THE COURT: You did not agree. And you did not agree on involuntary?

THE FOREMAN: We had—some did agree on involuntary.

THE COURT: All right. The point is, is there any possibility of a verdict in this case?

THE FOREMAN: At this point, Your Honor, I don't think so.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I asked you before, and I will ask you again, if any further deliberations will prove fruitful I will send you back. But if you don't think so then we'll just end it right here. Does anybody on the jury think that further deliberations will be worthwhile? No response.²

THE COURT CRIER: For the record, there is nothing on the verdict sheet.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. This case will have to be retried before another jury. That's the problem. As the foreman, you are telling me there is no hope for a decision in this case?

THE FOREMAN: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. With that, the jury will be discharged. And I thank you for trying, and thank you for your services. This case will have to be retried on another date before probably a different jury, maybe even a different judge. But thank you anyway. With that, you are free to talk about the case when you leave. (Jurors are excused)

THE COURT: We'll declare it a mistrial.

MR. STRETTON [Defense counsel]: Can we go back and talk to the jury?

THE COURT: Sure you can. I have no problem with that at all.³

There followed a brief hearing on a motion for bail. When that concluded, defense counsel reiterated his request to talk to the jury:

MR. STRETTON: Can we go back and knock on the door?

THE COURT: If you want to speak to the jury, yes.

MR. STRETTON: I would like to.

(All Counsel and the Court go to the jury room.)

* * *

THE COURT: On the record. After the jury went to the jury room, there was a conversation concerning the understanding of my question and the jury explained that they did not fully understand what I was asking. And that in fact, they all had agreed that it was not guilty as to third degree murder. The only thing that they could not agree on is whether or not it was involuntary manslaughter. So with that, Counsel requested that the jury be re-established into the jury box where they are now.

And I ask the foreman to rise and announce to the Court what was the decision of the jury on third degree murder?

THE FOREMAN: Third degree?

THE COURT: Yes.

THE FOREMAN: Not guilty.

THE COURT: Did everybody agree to that?

JURORS: Yes.

MR. STRETTON: Judge, call you pole [sic] the jury on that issue.

THE COURT: Everybody just said, yes. Everybody just said, yes.

JURORS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anybody that says, no? (No response from the jury.)

Okay. The jury has unanimously said that it was not guilty as to third degree murder. And as to involuntary could you agree?

THE FOREMAN: Involuntary we had some that agreed.

THE COURT: Some agreed and some did not.

THE FOREMAN: Some did not, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's where the jury was deadlocked. Okay. With that, the jury can retire.

MR. STRETTON: Can they fill out the verdict slip correctly and sign it then.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STRETTON: I would still like to talk to the jury when we're done.

THE COURT: If you want to, go ahead.

MR. STRETTON: Before you leave the bench, could you then record that verdict officially as not guilty as to third degree.

THE COURT: All right. Not guilty of third, and hopelessly deadlocked on involuntary.⁴ There followed further discussion about bail, and proceedings closed shortly thereafter.

After the court recorded a verdict of not guilty of third degree murder, the Commonwealth sought to reinstate the charge. The judge issued an opinion holding that the court "simply correct[ed] a mistake on the record" pursuant to its "'duty' to change defendant's verdict to not guilty of third degree murder once it became apparent that this was the true verdict of the jury at the time the verdict was recorded."⁵ The court stated that it took its actions in the interests of justice and that "[t]he rationale 'in the interests of justice,' employed to rectify errors which...