McDill v. State

1

JEREMY MCDILL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 06-24-00105-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana

October 29, 2024

Do Not Publish

Submitted: October 1, 2024

On Appeal from the 76th District Court Titus County, Texas Trial Court No. CR19288

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Charles van Cleef Justice

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy Shad McDill pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine in an amount of less than one gram, a state jail felony,^[1] and, in 2016, he was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for three years. In 2018 the State moved to adjudicate McDill's community supervision, alleging five violations of its terms and conditions. McDill was arrested on the State's adjudication motion, posted bond, but never appeared for his scheduled court dates. Overall, McDill was arrested six times from the filing of the motion to adjudicate until the hearing on that motion. Six years after the State filed its adjudication motion, but two days before the adjudication hearing, McDill filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. McDill pled true to the allegations in the State's motion to adjudicate. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, adjudicated McDill guilty, and sentenced McDill to two years in a state jail facility.

On appeal, McDill argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial because six years had elapsed from the time the State filed its motion to adjudicate guilt until the hearing on that motion. Because we find that the trial court properly overruled McDill's motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, we affirm its judgment.

I. Background

McDill pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1 in an amount less than one gram (methamphetamine), a state jail felony, and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for three years. The terms and conditions of the deferred adjudication community supervision required McDill to report to community supervision "as directed" by his community supervision officer.

On May 17, 2018, the State filed a motion to adjudicate. The State alleged that McDill violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by (1) acknowledging use and possession of methamphetamine and marihuana, (2) failing to report for the "months of June and December, 2017; February, March, April, and May 2018," (3) failing to pay court-ordered fees, (4) failing to successfully complete DOE Safety Education classes, and (5) failing to serve a three-day confinement sanction for a positive drug test. When McDill was arrested five days later, on the adjudication warrant, he was served with the State's motion to adjudicate. However, the record establishes that McDill failed to appear for the trial court's first and second scheduled hearings on the State's adjudication motion.^[2]

The trial court sent a notice to McDill requiring his appearance at the third scheduled adjudication hearing on May 22, 2024. Two days before the scheduled hearing, McDill filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. At the hearing, McDill pled true to the allegations in the adjudication motion. The State did not present any witnesses, and McDill was the only witness that testified on his behalf. After the hearing, which included the issue of punishment, the trial court found all the allegations true in the motion to adjudicate, adjudicated McDill guilty for the underlying felony, denied his motion to dismiss, and revoked his community supervision. The trial court sentenced McDill to two years in a state jail facility.

II. Standard of Review &Relevant Law

"The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Texas is applicable to probation revocation proceedings." Carney v. State, 573 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). "In Texas, the inquiry as to whether the accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated is the same under both the United States and the Texas constitutions." State v. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. "The right attaches once a person becomes an 'accused'-that is, once he is arrested or charged." Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Texas courts "analyze federal constitutional speedy-trial claims 'on an ad hoc basis' by weighing and then balancing the four Barker v. Wingo^[3] factors." Id. (quoting State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). These factors include the (a) "length of the delay," (b) "reason for the delay," (c) "assertion of the right," and (d) "prejudice to the accused." Id.; see Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. No one factor is determinative, and all factors must be considered together along with relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Although "the State has the burden of justifying the length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). "The defendant's burden of proof on the latter two factors 'varies inversely' with the State's degree of culpability for the delay." Id. (quoting Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1993)). "[T]he greater the State's bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial." Id. at 280-81. "In conducting the balancing test, no single factor is determinative, and the conduct of both the prosecutor and the defendant are to be weighed." Blaylock v. State, 259 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd).

"In reviewing the trial court's ruling on [an accused's] federal constitutional speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Review of the Barker factors involves both legal and factual determinations, but "[t]he balancing test as a whole . . . is a purely legal question." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 n.19). Almost total deference is given "to historical findings of fact of the trial court that the record supports," and we "draw reasonable inferences from those facts necessary to support the trial court's findings." Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). "In our deliberation, we do not consider evidence and arguments that were not before the trial court at the time of its ruling." State v. Ritter, 531 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017, no pet.).

III. The State Did Not Violate McDill's Right to a Speedy Trial

In his sole point of error, McDill argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial because six years elapsed from the time the State filed its motion to adjudicate until the adjudication hearing occurred.

A. Length of the Delay

"The length of delay is a double inquiry: A court must consider whether the delay is sufficiently long to even trigger a further analysis under the Barker factors, and if it is, then the court must consider to what extent it stretches beyond this triggering length." Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In an adjudication context, the start date used to measure the length of delay is the filing of a motion to adjudicate. See Martinez v. State, 531 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (revocation). The end date used to measure the length of delay is the date the adjudication hearing occurred or the "demand for a speedy trial." Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

"The Barker [inquiry] is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be [considered] 'presumptively prejudicial.'" Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992)). "In general, courts deem delay approaching one year to be 'unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.'" Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). Because the delay in this case was six years, it meets the minimum requirement to trigger a Barker analysis.

After the Barker analysis is triggered, we must then analyze the second part of the inquiry-"to what extent it stretches beyond this triggering length." Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924.

The complexity of the case is a consideration to determine the weight given to this factor. "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The State moved for the trial court to adjudicate McDill's guilt for possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. The main allegations in the motion to adjudicate involved failures to report. Accordingly, nothing suggested that McDill's case was complex.

Combined with the lack of complexity, the six-year delay stretches "far beyond the minimum needed to trigger the [Barker] enquiry." Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see Wisser v State, 350 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ("four years is an unusually lengthy delay in a probation revocation case"). We find this factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a violation of...