McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc.

116 A.3d 99

2015 PA Super 104

Erin McDONALD, Appellee

v.WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, INC., and Whitewater Challengers Outdoor Adventure Center, t/d/b/a Whitewater Challengers, Inc., Appellants.

Erin McDonald, Appellant

v.Whitewater Challengers, Inc., and Whitewater Challengers Outdoor Adventure Center, t/d/b/a Whitewater Challengers, Inc., Appellees.

Nos. 1221 MDA 2013

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued July 30, 2014.

Filed April 29, 2015.

Audrey J. Copeland, King of Prussia, for Whitewater Challengers and Whitewater Challengers Outdoor Adventure.

Robert C. Trichilo, Wilkes Barre, for McDonald.

BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,^* JJ.

Opinion

OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.:

Appellant/Cross–Appellee, Erin McDonald, appeals from the order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion for partial summary judgment adverse to Appellees/Cross–Appellants, Whitewater Challengers, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and Whitewater Challengers Outdoor Adventure Center, trading or doing business as Whitewater Challengers, Inc. (collectively, “Whitewater”). McDonald, a New York resident, suggests the trial court erred by holding Pennsylvania law—and not New York law—applies to this case. Whitewater also appeals from the order denying their motion for summary judgment. Whitewater contends the trial court erred by concluding material issues of fact existed regarding whether McDonald was economically compelled to sign the contract at issue. We hold that when a New York resident signs an exculpatory release with a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business of whitewater rafting in Pennsylvania and is injured while whitewater rafting, Pennsylvania law applies. We further hold that McDonald cannot invoke economic compulsion against Whitewater and that judgment should be entered in Whitewater's favor on liability. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

We state the facts as set forth by the trial court:

[McDonald] filed a complaint on [July] 24, 2008[,] alleging that on May 19, 2006, she was a school teacher employed by [t]he School of [the] Holy Child in Rye, New York.

She alleges that on [May 19, 2006], she and other School faculty members chaperoned seventy-two (72) seventh and eighth grade school children on a whitewater rafting “field trip” down a portion of the Lehigh River conducted by [Whitewater].

[McDonald's] raft struck a large rock situated in the river bed, ejecting [her] from the raft onto the rock, allegedly causing her the injuries alleged in her complaint.

[McDonald's] allegations of negligence, in paragraph 40 of her complaint, are as follows:

40. [Whitewater's] negligence consisted of but was not limited to the following:

a. Failing to provide a river guide/instructor in [McDonald's] boat;

b. Failing to provide a properly inflated raft;

c. Failing to advise [McDonald] on the grade and / or class of the whitewater rapids;

d. Failing to properly instruct [McDonald] on how to safely and effectively maneuver fast and difficult rapids; and

e. Allowing an unsafe number of inexperienced rafters to operate a raft.

[McDonald's Compl., 7/24/08, at 9–10.]

At her place of employment, two (2) days before the excursion, [McDonald] signed [Whitewater's] form “RELEASE OF LIABILITY”....

Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/10, at 1–2.

We reproduce the release in pertinent part:

RELEASE OF LIABILITY—READ BEFORE SIGNING

In consideration of being allowed to participate in any way in the Whitewater Challengers program, its related events and activities, I (print name) Erin L. McDonald the undersigned, acknowledge, appreciate, and agree, that:

1. The risk of injury from the activities involved in this program is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis and death, and while particular skills, equipment, and personal discipline may reduce this risk, the risk of serious injury does exist; and,

2. I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, both known and unknown, EVEN IF ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES or others, and I assume full responsibility for my participation; and

* * *

5. I, for myself and on behalf of my heirs, assigns, personal representatives and next of kin, HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS, WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, their officers, officials, agents and/or employees, other participants, sponsoring agencies, sponsors, advertisers, and, if applicable, owners and lessors of premises used for the activities (“Releasees”), WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, or loss or damage to person or property associated with my presence or participation, WHETHER ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, to the fullest extent permitted by law; and,

6. Any claims or disputes arising from my participation in this program shall be venued in the Luzerne County Court in the town of Wilkes–Barre, PA, or in the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.

I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AGREEMENT. I FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS AND UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND SIGN IT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENT.

Ex. D to Whitewater's Mot. for Summ. J., 12/14/12.

On June 6, 2010, Whitewater filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court denied on September 15, 2010. Further discovery ensued, and a few years later, McDonald filed her motion for partial summary judgment and Whitewater filed a second motion for summary judgment. McDonald requested that the court void the release based on New York law. Whitewater asked the court to hold the release was valid under Pennsylvania law and to enforce the release, thus absolving it of liability.

On April 3, 2013,¹ the trial court denied McDonald's motion for partial summary judgment and Whitewater's motion for summary judgment. Order, 4/3/13. With respect to its holding that Pennsylvania law applied, the court reasoned that our Supreme Court affirmed the validity of such exculpatory releases in inherently dangerous recreational activities, such as downhill skiing. Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/14, at 2–3.² The trial court also refused to permit out-of-state customers of Pennsylvania recreational facilities “to bring their law with them,” because of the increased “financial/liability uncertainty.” Id. at 3. The court, however, refused to enforce the release against McDonald, finding material issues of fact existed regarding whether she was economically compelled to sign the release by the School of the Holy Child. Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/10, at 5.

On April 18, 2013, Whitewater filed a brief in support of their motion for reconsideration or appellate certification.³ On April 25, 2013, McDonald filed a motion for reconsideration or appellate certification. The court granted Whitewater's motion on May 2, 2013,⁴ and granted McDonald's motion on May 28, 2013.⁵

On May 28, 2013, Whitewater filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1311. McDonald, on June 21, 2013, filed a petition to file an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's May 28, 2013 order. This Court granted Whitewater's petition on July 11, 2013, and McDonald's petition on August 5, 2013.⁶

We address McDonald's appeal first, which raises one issue:

Whether New York law should be applied to the facts of this case thereby rendering Whitewater's Release as void and unenforceable under New York's statutory and decisional law, where this case poses a legitimate conflict-of-law question, and New York has a more significant relationship to this controversy and the outcome of this case?

McDonald's Brief, 1400 MDA 2013, at 6.

In support of her sole issue, McDonald argues the trial court erred by incorrectly applying the standard set forth in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). She maintains that because she signed the release in New York, the contract was formed in New York. As a New York resident, McDonald asserts she is entitled to the benefit of New York law. McDonald claims that if Whitewater intended for Pennsylvania law to apply, then it should have included such a clause in its release. She points out that most of her medical treatment occurred in New York and that the New York State Insurance Fund has an interest in recouping her lost wages and medical expenses. We hold McDonald has not established entitlement to relief.

Initially, an order denying summary judgment is ordinarily a non-appealable interlocutory order. See Stewart v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, 7 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa.Super.2010). As noted above, however, the parties requested, and this Court granted, permission to file interlocutory appeals.⁷ Order, 3/12/14.

The standard and scope of review is well-settled:

Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only when the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment. With regard to questions of law, an appellate court's scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 100 A.3d 244, 250 (Pa.Super.2014) (punctuation and citation...