McDowell v. Hainesworth

1

REUBEN McDOWELL, #MP7284, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT MS. M. HAINESWORTH, et al. Respondents.

Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01599

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

October 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On September 3, 2020, the court received and docketed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus signed by the petitioner, Reuben McDowell, on August 31, 2020, submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) At the time of filing, McDowell was incarcerated at SCI Laurel Highlands located in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.

I. Statement of the Case

A. Procedural History

On March 16, 2016, following a consolidated jury trial before the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, McDowell was convicted on multiple counts of burglary, robbery, criminal trespass, stalking, theft, and related crimes on evidence that he targeted elderly women returning home from grocery stores and forcibly took their purses and other belongings. On July 6, 2016, the petitioner was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 26 to 64 years in prison. Commonwealth v. McDowell, Docket Nos. CP-41-CR-0000017-2013, CP-41-CR-0000035-2013, CP-41-CR-0000063-2013, CP-41-CR-0001382-2013 (Lycoming Cnty. (Pa.) C.C.P.). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on January 22, 2018. Commonwealth v. McDowell, 183 A.3d 1078 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (table decision); see also Commonwealth v. McDowell, No. 2062 MDA 2016, 2018 WL 494702 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018) (unpublished decision). McDowell petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for allocatur, which was denied on July 31, 2018. Commonwealth v. McDowell, 190 A.3d 580 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). He did not petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.

McDowell filed a pro se PCRA petition in the court of common pleas on or about April 23, 2019. The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent McDowell in state PCRA proceedings. Following a review of the record of state criminal proceedings, and after conferring with McDowell about his case, the court-appointed attorney filed a Finley no-merit letter, advising the PCRA court that he found no meritorious claims for PCRA relief and requesting leave to withdraw from further representation of McDowell. See generally Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). On January 17, 2020, the state PCRA court entered an order providing notice of its intent to dismiss the petition and granting the court-appointed attorney leave to withdraw as counsel. On March 6, 2020, after reviewing McDowell's response to the January 1, 2020, order, the state PCRA court entered an order dismissing his petition. McDowell appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his appeal on procedural grounds.^[1]McDowell did not file a petition for allocatur with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

B. Habeas Claims Presented

Liberally construed, see generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions, particularly when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants), the pro se petition has asserted that McDowell is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the following reasons:

(1)McDowell was denied effective assistance of counsel in initialreview collateral proceedings because his PCRA counsel failed to support McDowell's claims of ineffective assistance by counsel in trial proceedings and on direct appeal;

(2)McDowell was denied effective assistance of counsel in trial proceedings because his trial counsel failed to challenge his initial arrest by state troopers as unlawful, due to a lack of probable cause;

(3)McDowell was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because his appellate counsel conceded appellate questions VI and VII, asserting trial court error in connection with the denial of a motion to suppress based on the failure of a municipal police officer to comply with certain state-law procedural requirements;

(4)McDowell's arrest with respect to conduct occurring within the City of Williamsport was unlawful because the arresting municipal police officer arrested McDowell outside his primary territorial jurisdiction and failed to comply with certain statelaw procedural requirements;^[2]

(5)McDowell was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial under Pa. R. Crim. P. 600 because his trial commenced more than 365 days after his arrest; (6)The trial court erred in denying a pre-trial motion to suppress based on an erroneous finding that McDowell was arrested with respect to the Williamsport offense by a municipal police officer pursuant to a warrant, when the officer testified that he did not have a warrant;

(7)McDowell's initial arrest by state troopers was unlawful because they lacked probable cause to arrest him; and

(8)McDowell's unlawful arrest, without probable cause, violated his rights under the Pennsylvania state constitution.

McDowell raised claims 4, 5, and 7 on direct appeal to the Superior Court, which dismissed claim 4 on procedural grounds and claims 5 and 7 on the merits. McDowell failed to perfect an appeal to the Superior Court from the denial of his PCRA petition. As a consequence, he did not fairly present claims 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 to the Superior Court on PCRA appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Ineffective Assistance of PCRA Counsel

In claim 1, McDowell claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in state court PCRA proceedings. But freestanding claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.”); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987) (no constitutional right to counsel in collateral post- conviction proceedings); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (no constitutional right to counsel on appeal from initial collateral postconviction proceedings). See generally Danner v. Cameron, 955 F.Supp.2d 410, 417 n.7 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (summarizing law with respect to ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel habeas claims).

Accordingly, the petition will be denied with respect to McDowell's ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claim-claim 1-on the ground that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

B. State Constitutional Violation

In claim 8, McDowell claims that his allegedly unlawful arrest, without probable cause, violated his rights under the Pennsylvania state constitution. In his reply, he has expressly withdrawn this claim. Moreover, it is well established that federal habeas relief is not available for perceived violations of state constitutional or legal rights. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

Accordingly, the petition will be denied with respect to McDowell's state constitutional claim-claim 8-on the ground that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

C. Speedy Trial Claim

In claim 5, McDowell claims that he was convicted in violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial under Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure because his trial commenced more than 365 days after his arrest.^[3]But it is well established that a speedy trial claim premised upon state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition. See Holman v. Gillis, 58 F.Supp.2d 587, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) (providing that a federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”); Estelle v McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”); Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41; Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Our review of a federal habeas corpus petition is limited to remedying deprivations of a petitioner's federal constitutional rights. We can take no cognizance of nonconstitutional harm to the defendant flowing from a state's violation of its own procedural rule, even if that rule is intended as a guide to implement a federal constitutional guarantee.”).

Accordingly, the petition will be denied with respect to McDowell's state-law speedy trial claim-claim 5-on the ground that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

D. Municipal Police Jurisdictional Act Violation Claims

In claim 4, McDowell claims that his arrest with respect to offense conduct that occurred within the City of Williamsport by a municipal police officer, Agent Kontz, was unlawful due to various technical violations of the Pennsylvania Municipal Police Jurisdictional Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953. In claim 6, McDowell claims that the trial court erred in denying a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of that same purportedly unlawful arrest, specifically basing its finding on a purportedly erroneous factual finding that Kontz arrested McDowell pursuant to a warrant when none had yet been issued in that case.

These too are state-law issues not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Sampson v. Grace, Civil Action No 06-5331, 2008 WL 687483, at *9 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41; Wells, 941 F.2d at 256. Although Pennsylvania state law may impose limits on the exercise of jurisdiction by municipal police officers, these limits imposed by state law are simply...