McDowell v. Sheppard

DALE McDOWELL, Plaintiff, v. BERNARD SHEPPARD, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Act. No. 3:20CV839-ECM (wo)

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

September 23, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by Randy Moore (doc. 50), Aris Murphy (doc. 52), Joyce Adams and Lisa Burdette (doc. 54), Bernard Sheppard (doc. 56), an alternative motion for more definite statement filed by Bernard Sheppard (doc. 57), and motions for leave to amend the complaint filed by Dale McDowell (docs. 59, 60, 61 &amp 62).

The Plaintiff, Dale McDowell ("McDowell"), has filed a complaint and an amended complaint in this case. (Docs. 1 & 48). The amended complaint asserts claims for injunctive relief (count one), violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (count two), violation of the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause (count three), violation of the Fourth Amendment (count four), trespass (count five) conversion (count six), and a declaratory judgment (count seven). These claims are asserted against Defendants Bernard Sheppard ("Sheppard"), Randy Moore ("Moore"), and Aris Murphy ("Murphy") in their individual and official capacities, and against Angela Price, James Michael Price, and James Earl Price. McDowell brings only federal claims, specifically counts one, two, and three, against Lisa Burdette ("Burdette"), the Chambers County Circuit Clerk, and her agent, Joyce Adams ("Adams"), a Court Specialist, (collectively "the Clerks"). (Doc. 48).

Sheppard, Moore, and Murphy are all law enforcement officials (collectively "the Officers").^[1] The Clerks and the Officers have moved for dismissal of the amended complaint. Defendants Angela Price, James Michael Price, and James Earl Price answered the original complaint, but the record does not include a response to the amended complaint.

Within his separate responses to the motions to dismiss, McDowell has sought leave to file a second amended complaint.

For reasons to be discussed, the motions to dismiss are due to be GRANTED, but one of McDowell's motion to file a second amended complaint is due to be GRANTED to the extent that McDowell will be given an opportunity to replead his claims against Moore in his official capacity.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be a factual or facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). A factual attack permits the district court to weigh evidence outside the pleadings to satisfy itself of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1237. However, a facial attack merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Id. Under a facial attack, the district court accepts the plaintiffs allegations as true and need not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), a party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed, but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.

Generally, leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) does not require an amendment where "there has been undue delay in filing, bad faith or dilatory motives, prejudice to the opposing parties," or where the amendment would be futile. Local 472 of United Ass 'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting v. Ga. Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1982).

III. FACTS

The facts as alleged in the amended complaint are as follows:

In October of 2008, Angela Price file a claim in the small claims court of Chambers County, Alabama, against her sister Joyce Sprouse, for which she obtained a judgment in the amount of $507.00.

Ten years later, on October 9, 2018, Angela Price filed a request in Chambers County to revive the judgment, and the Chambers County district court entered an order reviving the judgment against Joyce Sprouse. (Doc. 48 at 4). The complaint acknowledges that pursuant to state law, writs of execution may be issued by a party in whose favor a judgment is entered, and that the Clerk of the Court is to issue a writ of execution upon application of a judgment creditor. (Id.). On October 9, 2018, a writ of execution was issued in the Circuit Court of Chambers County, which directed that certain property be seized and "'restored' to Angela Price," (id.), including a miniature donkey, goats, and a large white dog. The writ of execution was prepared by Adams, a Court Specialist employed by the Circuit Clerk, acting as an agent for the Circuit Clerk, Burdette.

In October of 2018, Joyce Sprouse, the judgment debtor, resided with McDowell. The animals identified in the writ of execution were the property of McDowell. (Id. at 5). They were his pets and had never belonged to Angela Price, the judgment creditor. (Id.).

On October 19, 2018, the Officers arrived at McDowell's residence and instructed him to let them take the animals identified in the writ of execution. (Id.). The deputies contacted Angela Price and advised her that she could come to McDowell's property and take the animals. (Id.).

Angela Price and her husband, James Earl Price, and son, James Michael Price, brought a trailer to the property, loaded the animals, and took them. (Id. at 6). On October 20, 2018, McDowell went to the Circuit Clerk of Chambers County and paid the judgment that Angela Price had obtained against Joyce Sprouse. He hired an individual to retrieve his pets. Two small baby goats had been removed from their mother, fell ill, and died when taken by Angela Price. The miniature donkey is alleged to have banged its head in struggling not to go inside the transport trailer and the dog was clearly distressed when he was brought home. (Id. at 7).

In addition to these facts as alleged, Burdette and Adams have provided the Court with a copy of the writ of execution. (Doc. 54-2).^[2] The Writ of Execution directs that any lawful officer of the State of Alabama is to "[s]eize the property described below which is in the possession of Joyce Sprouse and restore to Angela Price." (Id.). It lists 1 miniature donkey, 2 goats, and 1 "large white dog (Great Pyrenees)." (Id.).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court turns first to the grounds for dismissal of McDowell's federal claims, and then will turn to the state-law claims.

A. Federal Claims

Because the Defendants have relied upon substantially the same grounds for dismissal-lack of standing, sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and qualified immunity-albeit in separately filed motions, the Court will address together their arguments.

1. Standing

McDowell seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. When injunctive relief is sought, the "injury-in-fact" demanded by Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to show "a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future." Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)(citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). The Declaratory Judgment Act is said to echo the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III when it "provides that a declaratory judgment may only be issued in the case of an actual controversy." See Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1985)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201). "That is, under the facts alleged, there must be a substantial continuing controversy between parties having adverse legal interests." Id. at 1552. The controversy between the parties cannot be "conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than speculative threat of future injury." Id. In order to demonstrate that there is a case or controversy that satisfies Article Ill's standing requirement, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears that there is a "substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future." Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). There must be a "reasonable expectation that the injury [the plaintiff has] suffered will continue or will be repeated in the future." A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2019). Therefore, for this Court to have jurisdiction, there must be a substantial likelihood of seizure of McDowell's animals in the future.

McDowell argues that Lyons was wrongly decided and that this Court should not follow it, but should instead follow a decision of a United States District Court which he contends supports a finding of standing in this case. This the Court may not do. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Se. Bank N.A., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997)("Only the Supreme Court has 'the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.'")(citation omitted). McDowell has failed to allege facts beyond a past injury which establish a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future. Therefore, the claims for...