McDuffie v. Dekalb Cnty. Police Dep't

DARRICK MCDUFFIE, Plaintiff, v. DEKALB COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, JEFF MANN,in his personal capacity and in his capacity as Sheriffof DeKalb County, ROBERT JAMES, in his personal capacityand in his capacity as District Attorney of DeKalb County,and JOHN DOES 1-100, Defendants.

1:16-cv-1430-WSD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

December 14, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant DeKalb County Police Department's ("DKPD") Motion to Dismiss [3]. Also before the Court are Defendant Robert James's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [5] ("James's Motion"), Defendant Jeff Mann's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [9] ("Mann's Motion"), and Plaintiff Darrick McDuffie's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Substitute [8].

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff alleges that, on October 2, 2012, Marcus Tavon Brown was shot at or around 3054 Clairmont Road in DeKalb County, Georgia. (Compl. [1.1] ¶ 8) DKPD and the DeKalb County District Attorney's Office ("DA's Office") became involved in the subsequent investigation. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11). Plaintiff alleges that, while hospitalized and "in a severely compromised mental state," Mr. Brown identified Plaintiff as his shooter. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14). Plaintiff alleges that, based solely on this information, DKPD obtained an arrest warrant pursuant to which Plaintiff was arrested and sent to the DeKalb County jail. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-21). On November 26, 2016, a preliminary hearing was held in the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County. (Compl. ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that, based only on Mr. Brown's identification of him as his shooter, "the case was bound over to Superior Court." (Compl. ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges that, on December 19, 2012, Brown signed an affidavit ("Brown Affidavit") recanting his identification of Plaintiff as the shooter, and Plaintiff claims the Brown Affidavit was provided to both the DA's Office and DKPD. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26). Plaintiff claims that "none of the Defendants took any action to further investigate the case or indict or release" Plaintiff untilFebruary 26, 2014, when Plaintiff claims the DA's Office dismissed the case against him. (Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29). Plaintiff alleges that he was not released from the DeKalb County Jail until April 19, 2014, 52 days after he claims all charges against him were dismissed. (Compl. ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges he spent a total of 529 days in custody, from November 6, 2012, until April 19, 2014. (Compl. ¶ 28) .

B. Procedural History

On February 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the State Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, asserting the following claims: (1) malicious arrest and prosecution, (2) false imprisonment, (3) deprivation of Plaintiff's right to liberty under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (4) deprivation of Plaintiff's right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts claims against Sheriff Jeff Mann and Attorney Robert James in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in damages, as well as attorneys' fees. (Compl. ¶¶ 70, 71). On May 2, 2016, DKPD filed its Notice of Removal [1].

On May 9, 2016, DKPD filed its Motion to Dismiss. DKPD argues it must be dismissed from this action because it is not an entity capable of being sued. In response to DKPD's Motion, on May 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Motion toSubstitute, seeking to substitute DeKalb County for DKCD, and to substitute Officer E. Acosta for John Doe #1 and Detective C.D. Franklin for John Doe #2 .

On May 24, 2016, Defendant James filed his Motion. In it, James argues all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity, among other grounds for dismissal. On May 27, 2016, Defendant Mann filed his Motion. He argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff failed to serve him within ninety (90) days after filing his Complaint.¹

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

"Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Motions for judgment on the pleadings based on allegations of a failure to state a claim are evaluated using the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Sampson v. Washington Mut. Bank, 453 F. App'x 863, 865 n.2 (11th Cir.2011); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila. v. City of Atlanta, 864 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.").

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must "assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual inferences." Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). Although reasonable inferences are made in the plaintiff's favor, "'unwarranted deductions of fact' are not admitted as true." Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (11th Cir. 1996)). Similarly, the Court is not required to accept conclusory allegations and legal conclusions as true. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (construing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Mere "labels andconclusions" are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Am. Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

B. Analysis

1. DKPD's Motion to Dismiss

DKPD argues it must be dismissed from this action because it is not an entity capable of being sued. Plaintiff does not appear to contest that DKPD is not an entity capable of being sued. The Court agrees that DKPD is not an entity that can be sued, and DKPD is dismissed from this action. See Lovelace v. DeKalb Central Probation, 144 F. App'x 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2005) (dismissing suit against DeKalb County Police Department).

2. Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute

Plaintiff seeks to substitute DeKalb County in place of DKPD, and to substitute Officer E. Acosta for John Doe #1 and Detective C.D. Franklin for John Doe #2.

a) Substitution of John Does

With respect to Plaintiff's request to substitute Officer Acosta and Detective Franklin, Defendant DKPD argues that Plaintiff's claims against the substituted parties must be dismissed as untimely under Georgia's two-year statute of limitations for tort violations and violations of Section 1983.

Constitutional claims brought under Section 1983 "are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought." Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff brought his claims in Georgia, where the governing limitations period for injuries to the person is two years after the right of action accrues. Crow, 528 F.3d at 1292 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Plaintiff claims he was incarcerated until April 19, 2014. On February 26, 2016, he filed this action. On May 26, 2016—more than two yearsafter the latest possible date on which Plaintiff's claims could have accrued—he filed his Motion to Substitute. He claims that "[t]his substitution may be related back to the time of filing of the original complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(C)" because "[t]he named officers knew or should have known that they would be sued due to the filing of this lawsuit, naming as John Doe Defendants the officers involved in Plaintiff's case, and when an ante litem notice was served on April 20, 2015, on Interim [DKPD Police] Chief J.W. Conroy." (Mot. to Substitute ¶¶ 10-11).

"A plaintiff's amendment to identify parties previously designated as 'John Doe' defendants in the complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 because the amendment is made to correct the plaintiff's lack of knowledge about whom to sue, not a mistake by the defendant in identifying the proper party." Bloodworth v. United States, 623 F. App'x 976, 979 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103-1104 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Thus, if the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute, the substitution would not relate back to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff's claims against Officer Acosta and DetectiveFranklin are time-barred, and Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute is thus denied with respect to his request to substitute Officer Acosta and Detective Franklin.²

b) Substitution of DKPD

With respect to Plaintiff's request to substitute DeKalb County for DKPD, DKPD argues substitution would be futile because sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's state-law claims, and Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient policy...