McElhaney v. Thomas

307 Kan. 45

405 P.3d 1214

Emma MCELHANEY, Appellant,

v.Charles THOMAS, Larry Thomas, Susan Thomas, and State Farm, Appellees.

No. 111,590

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed December 1, 2017

Jeremiah Johnson, of Law Offices of Jeremiah Johnson, LLC, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Dana M. Harris, of Harris and Hart, LLC, of Leawood, argued the cause, and Emily A. Yessen, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellees Charles Thomas, Larry Thomas, and Susan Thomas.

Toby Crouse, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Kerwick and Craig W. West, of the same firm, of Wichita, were on the briefs for appellee State Farm.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Stegall, J.:

In 2008, Charles Thomas, then a student at Clay County High School, drove his parents' Ford F-150 truck over fellow-student Emma McElhaney's feet in the high school parking lot. The incident caused significant injury to McElhaney and led to a complex and tangled string of lawsuits, dismissals, refiled claims, venue transfers, and other sundry maneuverings involving Thomas, McElhaney, Thomas' parents, and the assorted insurance companies.

In the end, most of McElhaney's claims were dismissed by the district court; Thomas conceded he was negligent; and the case was submitted to a jury solely on the appropriate measure of McElhaney's actual damages. McElhaney accepted the jury's award of actual damages but appealed the adverse rulings on her other claims. A majority of a Court of Appeals' panel affirmed the district court, and we granted review.

At this stage of the litigation, four issues remain: (1) whether the district court properly dismissed McElhaney's intentional tort claim against Thomas; (2) whether the district court properly denied her request to add a claim for punitive damages against Thomas; (3) whether the district court properly dismissed her negligent entrustment claim against Thomas' parents; and (4) whether the district court properly dismissed McElhaney's uninsured motorist claim against her own insurance company.

We note upfront we have not ventured upon a lengthy untangling of the confusing procedural history behind McElhaney's third and fourth claims on appeal. Such an undertaking is unnecessary because after a thorough review, we conclude the Court of Appeals correctly held: (1) the negligent entrustment claim was barred by res judicata; and (2) the undisputed facts demonstrated that McElhaney was not entitled to recover on her uninsured motorist claim as a matter of law. With respect to these claims, we adopt the Court of Appeals opinion—both its account of the underlying procedural and substantive facts and its analysis of the legal issues—and affirm these holdings.

Avoiding the tortured path of these properly dismissed claims permits us to focus on, and clarify, the issue at the heart of this dispute—did the district court properly evaluate the evidence concerning Thomas' state of mind and its impact on the legal theories and damages properly available to McElhaney pursuant to Kansas law? Here, we conclude the district court erred when it dismissed McElhaney's intentional tort claim and denied her request to seek punitive damages.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the spring of 2008, Thomas and McElhaney were both students at Clay County High School. Thomas, a senior, played on the baseball team, and McElhaney, a sophomore, was the team's manager. The day of the incident, both were in the parking lot headed to the team bus to travel to an away game. Thomas was in the process of relocating his parents' truck closer to the bus so he would not have to walk as far when the team returned. A teammate, Adam Slagle, was with Thomas.

At the same time, McElhaney was walking through the parking lot with another student, Andrew Hecker. As the two approached the bus, Thomas saw them and approached from behind. McElhaney heard the truck and moved toward the curb to avoid being hit. The front-passenger tire of the truck then rolled onto McElhaney's feet, trapping her. With her feet caught under the tires, McElhaney fell to the ground. Hecker yelled at Thomas to back up, which he did. McElhaney realized she could neither stand nor walk, so Slagle lifted her into the cab of the truck so Thomas could drive her to the bus to receive medical aid. McElhaney was later taken to a hospital, at which point an emergency responder contacted the police to report the accident.

These basic facts are not in dispute. Instead, the parties' disagreement centers on Thomas' state of mind. McElhaney testified that after Slagle set her inside the truck, Thomas said, "Oh, my gosh, I'm so sorry. I just meant to bump you." In an affidavit, Hecker likewise claimed Thomas said that "he only meant to bump into Emma with his truck." In the accident report, the investigating officer noted that Slagle said Thomas was "messing around." Thomas, however, denied ever saying he meant to bump McElhaney. He maintains he merely pulled too close to McElhaney while attempting to park.

McElhaney's first petition alleged Thomas was liable for damages under both negligence and intentional tort theories. The intentional tort claim alleged that "[o]n or about April 15, 2008, Defendant intentionally ran into Plaintiff with his truck, causing painful and permanent injuries." In the next paragraph, McElhaney asserted, "Perhaps intending to only bump into her with his truck, Defendant Charles Thomas ran over both of Emma McElhaney's feet."

McElhaney then timely moved to amend her petition to add a punitive damages claim against Thomas. McElhaney cited her deposition testimony as well as Hecker's affidavit to support her claim that Thomas intended to bump her with the truck. She claimed that Thomas' "actions were reckless at best and willful, wanton, and/or with malice at worse." Thomas responded by denying any intention to bump her with the truck, citing his own deposition testimony in support.

The district court held a hearing on the motion and, following arguments from counsel, denied McElhaney's request to add a punitive damages claim against Thomas. The district court found McElhaney had failed to carry her burden "to determine a probability that [she] will prevail on [her] claim in a clear and convincing standard of proof." Following this ruling, but during the same hearing, the parties sought clarification of the court's ruling as it related to whether McElhaney could proceed to trial on her intentional tort claim.

After several exchanges, the district court concluded:

"Here's what I'm gonna do: There is nothing in the final pretrial order that says anything about ... an intentional claim. If you're ... desiring to proceed under an intentional theory at this point, since it was in the [p]etition[,] I will allow you to amend the pretrial order to make that claim."

McElhaney then asked the court whether proceeding "on an intentional claim" would allow the court to "revisit the Motion for Punitive damages at that point if the jury finds it was an intentional act?" The Court responded, "I think I have to, if it was intentional." The court memorialized its order as follows:

"As to defendant Charles Thomas, plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is based upon the allegation that ... his intent was to scare or bump into the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff's evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to her, the statement by the defendant that ‘I only meant to bump into you’ does not rise to the level of an intentional tort. Although to act (bump) may have been intentional the resulting injury or intent to injure was not intentional.

"The plaintiff has failed to meet her burden that is required to support a claim for punitive damages and said claim is therefore denied."

Before the parties submitted a final pretrial order, McElhaney moved to dismiss her case without prejudice. The defendants opposed the motion to dismiss, fearing McElhaney was simply trying to avoid the court's earlier rulings. As such, the defendants asked the court to either deny the motion outright or place conditions on any refiling to ensure the court's prior rulings would remain in effect. The district court declined and simply granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, stating: "I don't think it's appropriate that I enter any orders that would anticipate something that may or may not happen. I have confidence in whatever judge that might be ...."

Three months later, McElhaney refiled her claims, again alleging Thomas was liable for damages under both negligence and intentional tort theories. In this respect, the language of the second petition was identical to the first. Once again, Thomas denied any intentional tort liability. Eventually, the case ended up in front of the same district court judge who had presided over McElhaney I.

Having now come full circle, Thomas filed a "motion to enforce previous orders." The motion asked the court to reinstate its previous rulings. After considering the motion at a hearing, the court stated:

"Other than the passage of time, I haven't heard anything, or heard any additional facts which would in any way persuade me to reconsider those previous rulings; and therefore, I'm gonna grant the motion which ... [denied] the punitive damages against Charles Ryan Thomas, unless, of course, it's—the case proceeds under the intentional tort, as I previously had ruled. So it's my intent to just reinstate those orders in this case."

In response, McElhaney filed a "renewed" motion to add a claim for punitive damages. But at the pretrial conference held on February 6, 2014, the district court reiterated, "[T]here is nothing that changes my opinion of my ruling from what I previously entered, and there's nothing willful and wanton about the actions."

The parties proceeded to argue about whether McElhaney had sufficiently pled and produced evidentiary support for her intentional tort claim. After hearing arguments, the...