McFadden v. Burke

1

TEDKIEYA MCFADDEN, Petitioner, v. CONNIE BURKE, Respondent.

No. 3:22-cv-30062-KAR

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

August 3, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 11)

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Respondent Connie Burke (Respondent) has moved to dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 of petitioner Tedkieya McFadden (Petitioner). The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the government's motion and dismisses the petition.

I. Relevant Background

On May 11, 2022, Petitioner, a federal inmate who was temporarily in custody at the Western Massachusetts Women's Regional Correctional Center (WCC) in Chicopee, Massachusetts, filed a two-page handwritten pleading entitled "2241 Motion" (Dkt. No. 1).^[1] Petitioner alleged that she was in a special housing unit (SHU) at the WCC because FCI-Danbury did not have an SHU for female inmates and contracted with the WCC to house female inmates in its SHU (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). Petitioner claimed that she was denied access to the telephone, the law library, her legal materials, and the commissary (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). She requested help and expressed concern that her complaints would result in her being transferred far away (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2).

On July 6, 2022, Petitioner filed a handwritten Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 naming the warden of FCI-Danbury, four officials of that facility, and Connie Burke, Assistant Superintendent of the WCC, as respondents (Dkt. No. 5). Petitioner alleged discrimination based on the different treatment afforded to male inmates at FCI-Danbury, who were permitted to access their legal documents, the telephone, the commissary, and the staff at FCI-Danbury for the purpose of filing a grievance, while she was denied those privileges (Dkt. No. 5 at 3). As to injuries, she claimed that she lost personal and legal property and suffered mental stress (Dkt. No. 5 at 4). Petitioner asked the court to grant her access to her legal materials, the telephone, and the commissary and requested transfer from the WCC's SHU at the expiration of the disciplinary period (Dkt. No. 5 at 4). Petitioner attached four Hampden County Sheriff's Department Grievance/Appeal forms to the petition (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 1-4).

On August 19, 2022, the government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 11). On October 14, 2022, having received no response to the government's motion, the court ordered Petitioner to address the status of the case by November 4, 2022 (Dkt. No. 14, 15). The copy of the court's order, mailed to Petitioner at the WCC, was returned as undeliverable because Petitioner had been transferred to FCI-Aliceville in Alabama (Dkt. No. 16). On October 31, 2022, the court directed Petitioner to address the status of the case by November 21, 2022 and to update the court's docket to show her new address at FCI-Aliceville (Dkt. No. 17). See McFadden v. Burke, Civil Action No. 22-30062-KAR, 2022 WL 16554708, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2022). Petitioner's opposition to the government's motion included a claim that she was transferred to FCI-Aliceville in retaliation for filing the § 2241 petition (Dkt. No. 22 at 2-3).

II. Analysis

Because a prisoner must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before petitioning for relief under § 2241, see Darling v. Boncher, CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-11664-JGC, 2023 WL 319861, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 2023) (citing Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 1999)), Petitioner's cognizable claims are limited to the four grievances that she filed with the WCC. See Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 445 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 2006). She complained that she was denied access to FCI-Danbury's grievance procedure, her legal documents, adequate food and drink, and the commissary (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 1-4). The government does not contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims.

A. Legal Standards

The threshold question is whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims under § 2241. "Subject-matter jurisdiction means the power to resolve the parties' dispute." Toddle Inn Franchising, LLC v. KPJ Assocs., LLC, 8 F.4th 56, 60 n.4 (1st Cir. 2021). "Because federal courts are the sole guardians of their limited jurisdiction, they have an obligation to examine their subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte at all stages of the litigation." Gautier-Figueroa v. Bristol-Myers Squibb P. R., Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (D.P.R. 2012). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The burden to prove jurisdiction rests with the petitioner. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209 (1st Cir. 1996).

"The pleading standard for satisfying the factual predicates for proving jurisdiction is the same as applies under Rule 12(b)(6) - that is, the [Petitioner] must 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Labor Relations Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 326-27 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court "must credit [Petitioner's] well-pled factual allegations" as true and "draw all reasonable inferences in [her] favor." Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010). However, "[t]he court is not obliged to accept 'bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like.'" Borrero-Roman v. United States, No. Civ. 04-2177(HL), 2006 WL 696084, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 17, 2006) (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)). "[A]n order granting a motion to dismiss" under Rule 12(b)(1) "is appropriate only when the facts adumbrated in the [petition], taken at face value, fail to bring the case within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Gordo-Gonzalez v. United States, 873 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2017). "Where, as here, the petitioner is proceeding pro se, the court must construe [her] allegations liberally." Barnes v. Spaulding, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-11745-RGS, 2020 WL 6065045, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 2020), rec. dec. adopted, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-11745-RGS, 2020 WL 6060922 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2020).

B. The court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 2241 petition.

Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to § 2241, which provides for review when a person claims to be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). "It is clear, not only from the language of § 2241(c)(3) . . ., but also from the common-law history of the writ, that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) ("Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus . . . ."); Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2008) ("a habeas petition seeking relief from the manner of execution of a sentence is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.").

With some exceptions not applicable here, "[i]f ... a prisoner 'is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of [her] prison life, but not the fact or length of [her] custody' an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 or the doctrine of Bivens . . . is the appropriate vehicle to request relief." Phelps v. Sabol, C. A. No. 09-cv-40091-MLW, 2010 WL 2640167, at *1 (D. Mass. June 26, 2010) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499). If Petitioner challenges the "'fact or duration'" of her confinement, Kane v. Winn, 319 F.Supp.2d 162, 213 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-83 (1994)), her claims are cognizable under § 2241. If, on the other hand, she seeks an improvement in the conditions of her confinement, those claims do not fall within the scope of § 2241 and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

Petitioner's allegations that, while at the WCC, she was denied access to FCI-Danbury's grievance procedure, her legal materials, adequate food and drink, and the commissary are not cognizable under § 2241. Petitioner complained that the staff of FCI-Danbury did not permit her to file grievances at that facility concerning the conditions of her confinement at the WCC's SHU (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1). However, because the staff of FCI-Danbury did not control the conditions of Petitioner's confinement at the WCC, her grievances had to be - and were - filed with the WCC. See Acosta, 445 F.3d at 512 ("the claims as to the counties had to be directed to the county facilities responsible for the supposed wrongdoing. . . . Otherwise, the ordinary purposes served by such requirements - to provide timely notice of the claim and an avenue for redress short of litigation . . . . - could not be served.") (citations omitted). Petitioner does not allege interference with her ability to file grievances with the WCC and the exhibits to her petition show that she had access to the WCC's administrative grievance procedure (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 1-4).

Therefore, Petitioner's complaint alleging denial of access to FCI-Danbury's grievance procedure is not cognizable under § 2241.

As to Petitioner's claim that the Respondent withheld her legal documents, the denial of an inmate's access to her legal materials and ...