McGinnis v. Halawa Corr. Facility

THOMAS KELLY MCGINNIS, #A401361, Plaintiff, v. HALAWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 20-00567 DKW-KJM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

April 28, 2021

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND

Before the court is Plaintiff Thomas Kelly McGinnis' ("McGinnis") Second Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint ("SAC") brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 10. McGinnis alleges that Defendants,¹ prison officials at the Halawa Correctional Facility ("HCF"), violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by using excessive force and denying him medical care. Id. at 1-3, 5-7. For the following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(a), with partial leave to amend.

I. SCREENING

The court is required to conduct a pre-Answer screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a). During this screening, the court must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) "are directed at screening out meritless suits early on"); see also Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b)).

In determining whether a complaint or any portion thereof should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) or 1915A(b), the court applies the same standard as that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12"). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018)(per curiam). A claim is "plausible" when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although this plausibility standard does not equate to a "probability requirement," "it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Dent v. Nat'l Football League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (same).

Rule 12 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) ("Rule 8") when screening a complaint. Rule 8 "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original); see also Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016) (same).

The court construes pro se litigants' pleadings liberally and affords them the benefit of any doubt. See Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Liberal construction of a pro se civil rights complaint, however, "may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor do district court judges have an "obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants." Pliler v. Ford, 42 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Eblacas v. Agbulos, Civ. No. 18-00376 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 5621954, at *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2018) ("While the court construes [the plaintiff's] allegations liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt, it will not speculate about [the plaintiff's] claims, and has no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The court cannot dismiss a pro se litigant's pleading without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Before dismissing a pro se complaint, the court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint "to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. MCGINNIS' CLAIMS²

McGinnis alleges in Count I that ACO Tavale "push[ed]" him in the chest in May 2019, while McGinnis was handcuffed and showering. ECF No. 10 at 1, 5. According to McGinnis, ACO Tavale's push caused him to fall to the floor and hit his head. Id. at 1, 5. He further claims that ACO Tavale denied him medical care after the incident. Id. at 5. McGinnis alleges in Count II that LPN Christina has denied him medical care since he arrived at the HCF in March 2019, despite his "serious heart and liver conditions." Id. at 2, 6. According to McGinnis, LPN Christina and other staff members "just laugh[ed] at [him.]" Id. at 6. Finally, McGinnis alleges in Count III that Warden Espinda "has not done anything" for McGinnis during his incarceration at the HCF. Id. at 7. McGinnis seeks $800,000 in damages. Id. at 8.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of statelaw. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). Section 1983 requires a connection or link between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) ("In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury." (citation omitted)). "'A person "subjects" another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).

B. The Halawa Correctional Facility is not a "person"

McGinnis names the HCF as a defendant in the SAC's caption. ECF No. 10 at 1. The HCF, however, is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Allison v. Cal. Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1969) (concluding that state prison was not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Kehano v. Harrington, No. 20-00013 SOM-KJM, 2020 WL 826033, at *4 n.7 (D. Haw. Feb. 19, 2020) ("HCF is a prison and cannot be considered a personwithin the meaning of § 1983."). McGinnis' claims against the HCF are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

C. Eleventh Amendment

McGinnis names ACO Tavale, LPN Christina, and Warden Espinda in both their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 10 at 1-2.

"The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities." Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor does it bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).

McGinnis' claims for money damages against ACO Tavale, LPN Christina, and Warden Espinda in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damagesagainst a state official acting in his or her official capacity."). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar McGinnis' claims for money damages against these Defendants in their individual capacities. Id. (noting that the Eleventh Amendment "does not . . . bar claims for damages against state officials in their personal capacities").³

D. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment governs the treatment of convicted prisoners and forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021). It imposes duties on prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement[.]" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009). "[P]rison officials...