McGinnis v. Halawa Corr. Facility

THOMAS KELLY MCGINNIS, #A4013561, Plaintiff, v. HALAWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 20-00567 DKW-KJM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

June 16, 2021

ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

Before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas Kelly McGinnis' ("McGinnis") Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 14. McGinnis alleges that Defendants,¹ prison officials at the Halawa Correctional Facility ("HCF"), violated the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution by using excessive force, threatening his safety, denying him medical care, and mishandling his mail. Id. at 4-6. For the following reasons, the TAC and this action are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for McGinnis' repeated failure to state a colorable claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. SCREENING

The Court is required to conduct a pre-Answer screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a). During this screening, the Court must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) "are directed at screening out meritless suits early on"); see also Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b)).

In determining whether a complaint or any portion thereof should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) or 1915A(b), the Court applies the same standard as that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12"). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on itsface." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). A claim is "plausible" when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although this plausibility standard does not equate to a "probability requirement," "it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Dent v. Nat'l Football League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (same).

Rule 12 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) ("Rule 8") when screening a complaint. Rule 8 "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'furtherfactual enhancement.'" Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original); see also Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016) (same).

The Court construes pro se litigants' pleadings liberally and affords them the benefit of any doubt. See Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642. Liberal construction of a pro se civil rights complaint, however, "may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor do courts have an "obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants." Pliler v. Ford, 42 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Eblacas v. Agbulos, Civ. No. 18-00376 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 5621954, at *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2018) ("While the court construes [the plaintiff's] allegations liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt, it will not speculate about [the plaintiff's] claims, and has no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Courts may not dismiss a pro se litigant's pleading without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039.

II. BACKGROUND²

On December 18, 2020, McGinnis filed a Complaint alleging that he was: (1) "threatened," "[verbally] assaulted," and "physically assaulted"; (2) denied medical care; and (3) assaulted "physically [and] mentally" by prison officials at the HCF. ECF No. 1 at 5-7. Before the Court had an opportunity to screen the Complaint, McGinnis filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). ECF No. 4. In the FAC, McGinnis alleged that prison officials at the HCF: (1) used excessive force against him; and (2) denied him medical care. ECF No. 4 at 4-6. The Court dismissed the FAC on January 12, 2021. ECF No. 5.

McGinnis filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on April 22, 2021. ECF No. 10. In the SAC, McGinnis alleged that: (1) ACO Tavale assaulted him; (2) LPN Christina denied him medical care; and (3) Warden Espinda did nothing to help him. Id. at 5-7. McGinnis also included the HCF in the caption of the SAC. Id. at 1.

The Court dismissed the SAC on April 28, 2021. ECF No. 12. The Court concluded that McGinnis could not sue the HCF under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment barred McGinnis' claims for money damages against ACO Tavale, LPN Christina, and Warden Espinda in their official capacities. Id. at 6-8.The Court further concluded that McGinnis failed to state an excessive force claim against ACO Tavale, he failed to state a denial-of-medical-care claim against ACO Tavale or LPN Christina, and he failed to state a claim against Warden Espinda. Id. at 8-16. The Court gave McGinnis an opportunity to file a third amended pleading. Id. at 17.

McGinnis filed a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") on June 1, 2021. ECF No. 14. In Count I, McGinnis alleges that ACO Tavale used excessive force by pushing him in the chest. Id. at 4. McGinnis also claims in Count I that ACO Tavale referred to him as "a fag" in front of other inmates, threatened him, and told "other [ACOs]" to threaten him. Id. In Count II, McGinnis alleges that he was denied medical care at the HCF. Id. at 5. In Count III, McGinnis alleges that unidentified prison officials interfered with his mail. Id. at 6. McGinnis seeks $100 million in punitive damages and $100,000 in "individual damages." Id. at 7. He also asks the Court to appoint counsel. Id.; see also ECF No. 15.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of statelaw. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). "'A person "subjects" another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). Section 1983 also requires a connection or link between a defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) ("In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury." (citation omitted)).

B. Eleventh Amendment

McGinnis names ACO Tavale in his or her official capacity. ECF No. 1 at 1. Although McGinnis also includes LPN April and LPN Christina in the caption of the TAC, he does not say if they are named in their individual or official capacities. See id.

"The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities." Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citationsomitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor does it bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).

McGinnis' claims for money damages against ACO Tavale in his or her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity."). Likewise, to the extent McGinnis seeks money damages...