McGuckin v. Brandywine Realty Trust

185 F.Supp.3d 600

Richard M. McGuckin, Plaintiff,

v.Brandywine Realty Trust, and H. Jeffrey Devuono, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-290

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed May 05, 2016

Jonathan Landesman, Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Christopher A. Tinari, Bianca N. Iozzia, Michael Ronald Miller, Margolis Edelstein, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

DuBois, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of plaintiff Richard M. McGuckin's employment by defendant Brandywine Realty Trust ("Brandywine") under the supervision of defendant H. Jeffrey DeVuono. Plaintiff asserts claims for violation of: Pennsylvania's Wage Payment Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 260.1 et seq. (Count I); breach of contract (Count II); unjust enrichment (Count III); wrongful discharge (Count IV); retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Count V); and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count VI) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 (Count VII). Presently before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case as set forth in plaintiff's Amended Complaint are as follows. Plaintiff is now fifty-one years old. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Until December 2014, he was employed by Brandywine, a real estate company that is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15. He was hired by Brandywine in April 2000 as a leasing representative, and repeatedly promoted until he was made a Vice President of Leasing in 2011. Am. Compl. ¶¶189–24. In that role, he was responsible for leasing 4.2 million square feet of Brandywine property in the western suburbs of Philadelphia. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. Defendant H. Jeffrey DeVuono was plaintiff's direct supervisor as Executive Vice President and Senior Managing Director of Brandywine. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 35.

In 2014, Brandywine began negotiating a leasing deal with CenterSquare Investment Management ("CIM"), one of Brandywine's tenants. Am. Compl. ¶ 39. CIM is "affiliated" with BNY Mellon, which itself is a major investor in Brandywine. Am. Compl. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36–38. Under the terms of the deal, CIM would "move its offices" and occupy space in another Brandywine property. Am. Compl. ¶ 39. For reasons not explained in the Amended Complaint, the CIM deal did not close. Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Plaintiff avers that "because BNY Mellon is a major investor in Brandywine and because CIM represents and/or provides services to other persons and/or entities who are major investors in Brandywine, Brandywine elected to provide[ ] a concession to CIM of approximately $200,000 when the CIM Deal did not close." Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges that CIM subsequently leased a different Brandywine property and that because of this Brandywine "did not actually experience a loss in connection with the CIM deal." Am. Compl. ¶ 43.

Plaintiff claims that he was "scapegoated" and blamed for the failure of the CIM deal even though he "did nothing wrong" and his actions were "known to defendants." Am Compl. ¶ 47–48. After the deal failed to close, in "mid-2014," defendants demanded that plaintiff "authorize a wage deduction of approximately $200,000." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52–53. In 2014, plaintiff's salary exceeded $300,000 annually. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Nonetheless, plaintiff claims that if he had accepted the wage deduction he would have been forced to work for Brandywine for "a period of no less than six months without receiving compensation of any kind." Am. Compl. ¶ 53. He refused to accept the wage deduction and told defendants that the deduction was unlawful. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.

On December 5, 2014, defendants told plaintiff that he was fired effective December 31, 2014. Am. Compl. ¶ 59. Plaintiff alleges that "defendants explained to plaintiff that he would not have been terminated but for his refusal to authorize a wage deduction in connection with the CIM deal." Am. Compl. ¶ 60. Further, he avers that he was told that he was fired "because he complained and because he refused to reimburse Brandywine for its alleged loss" by accepting the wage deduction. Am. Compl. ¶ 61.

It is plaintiff's contention that the wage deduction and firing would not have occurred but for his age, then-forty-nine years. Am. Compl. ¶ 65. Plaintiff alleges that DeVuono "and Brandywine's upper management, made overtly negative comments regarding plaintiff's age." Am. Compl. ¶ 49. Brandywine's president, Gerard H. Sweeney, "questioned plaintiff about his age, and when hearing plaintiff's response, stated that he did not know that plaintiff was so old." Am. Compl. ¶ 50.

Plaintiff claims that at the time he was fired, he was owed $122,000 in bonus and $90,707 in holdback commission under the terms of Brandywine's Leasing Compensation Program. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83, 87. Furthermore, "when informing plaintiff that his employment was being terminated, defendants specifically and orally promised plaintiff that he would be paid all compensation due and owing to him, including all commissions..., holdbacks, and bonuses." Am. Compl. ¶ 93. Brandywine offered plaintiff two different severance agreements, both of which provided him with less benefits and severance pay than Brandywine "routinely provides...to younger employees." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69–75.

On January 22, 2016, plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case. After defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 8, 2016. The Amended Complaint includes seven counts: violation of Pennsylvania's Wage Payment Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 260.1 et seq. (Count I); breach of contract (Count II); unjust enrichment (Count III); wrongful discharge (Count IV); retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Count V); and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count VI) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 (Count VII). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 21, 2016, which is now fully briefed.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to respond to a pleading by filing a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that " ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Victaulic Co. v. Tieman , 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A district court first identifies those factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court then assesses "the ‘nub’ of the plaintiff['s] complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]"—to determine whether it states a plausible claim for relief. Id.

"[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir.2008). However, the Court may dismiss a claim with prejudice based on "bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Lorenz v. CSX Corp. , 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir.1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

In the Motion to Dismiss, defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss. The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part, and dismisses (1) plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment and wrongful discharge for failure to state a claim as a matter of law, and (2) plaintiff's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act arising from his termination because these claims are time-barred. The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss in all other respects.

A. Wage Payment Collection Law and Breach of Contract Claims

Defendants argue that plaintiff's claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Law ("WPCL") and for breach of contract should be dismissed for failure to plead the existence of a promise to pay wages or an enforceable contract. The Court rejects this argument.

To state a breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff must allege: "(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages." Jacoby v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. , Civil Action No. 13–6511, 2014 WL 7058224, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 15, 2014) (quoting Omicron Systems, Inc. v. Weiner , 860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa.Super.Ct.2004) ). "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick , 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.2010).

"[T]he WPCL provides employees a statutory remedy to recover wages and other benefits...