McGue v. Kingdom Sports Ctr., Inc.

DALTON MCGUE, Plaintiff, v. KINGDOM SPORTS CENTER, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-162

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

March 30, 2015

Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 37)

This civil action is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) and the parties' responsive memoranda (Docs. 38, 40).

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an incident that occurred during a basketball game at Defendant's indoor sports facility. Plaintiff alleges that he was severely injured when he accelerated toward the basketball goal, made a lay-up, and landed on the goal's support structure. Plaintiff claims that Defendant negligently, recklessly, and intentionally maintained its premises in a manner that allowed the goal's support structure to be positioned too close to the baseline of the court, rendering the court dangerous for play. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on these claims.

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS¹

1. Kingdom Sports Center, Inc. ("KSP") is a privately-owned multi-sport indoor sports facility located in Franklin, Ohio. (Doc. 10 at 18, 50).

2. KSP is not a member of the Amateur Athletic Union ("AAU"). (Doc. 37-2).

3. KSP is not a member of the National Federation of High School Sports ("NFHSS"). (Id.)

4. KSP is not a member of the Ohio High School Athletic Association. (Id.)

5. Plaintiff injured his leg at KSP while playing in a basketball game on April 30, 2011. (Doc. 12 at 28, 37).

6. Plaintiff was seventeen years old at the time of his injury. (Id. at 7-10).

7. Plaintiff's injury occurred when he was attempting a fast-break lay-up. (Id. at 28, 37).

8. KSP purchased the basketball goal in question from a private seller. (Doc. 10 at 55-56).

9. KSP was advised by the seller that these were "collegiate basketball goals." (Id.)²

10. Prior to Plaintiff's injury, KSP was never advised by any person or entity that its use of these basketball goals was improper at the KSP facility. (Doc. 10 at 82-83, 95; Doc. 37-2).

11. KSP purchased the basketball goals at issue in 2004. (Doc.10 at 55-56).

12. The basketball goals at issue were utilized for at least six basketball seasons prior to Plaintiff's accident, and approximately 1,000 games were played with these goals per year. (Id. at 82-83, 95; Doc. 37-2).

13. In the six or more basketball seasons prior to Plaintiff's accident, there were no other injuries reported to KSP as occurring due to the use of these basketball goals. (Doc. 10 at 82-83, 95; Doc. 36 at 47-48).³

14. In the six or more basketball seasons prior to Plaintiff's accident, there were no other complaints reported to KSP regarding the use of these basketball goals. (Doc. 10 at 82-83, 95; Doc. 37-2; Doc. 36 at 47-48).

15. Neither Plaintiff nor any of his coaches or teammates registered any complaint or concern to KSP regarding the basketball goals at issue, prior to engaging in play on the basketball court in question on the day of Plaintiff's injury. (Doc. 10 at 82-83, 95; Doc. 12 at 26; Doc. 14 at 19-20, 22).

16. Prior to the accident at KSP, Plaintiff had played basketball for three years for his high school team at Lloyd High School in Northern Kentucky and overall had played basketball for approximately ten years, including his elementary school years. (Doc. 12 at 7-10).

17. On the day of Plaintiff's accident, Plaintiff's team did a shoot-around, but its initial game was forfeited because the other team did not show. Plaintiff and others then sat on the sidelines and watched another game, before retaking the court for warm-ups and the game where the injury occurred. (Doc. 12 at 16-17, 25-26; Doc. 14 at 17-19).⁴

18. On the day of Plaintiff's accident, the basketball goals were open to view, with no barriers or visual obstructions to them. (Doc. 12 at 16-17, 25-26; Doc. 14 at 17-22; Doc. 36 at 73-75).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must beconstrued in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Expert Witness

Defendant argues that Corey Andres, Plaintiff's expert witness, is not qualified to provide expert testimony and improperly relies on rules and regulations that are not applicable to Defendant. The Court will use the Daubert framework to assess these arguments.⁵

A party proffering expert opinion evidence bears the burden of proving its admissibility. Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000). While district courts do act as gatekeepers to keep out unreliable expert opinions, "[r]ejection of expert testimony under Daubert is the exception rather than the rule." Von Wiegen v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:13-040-DCR, 2014 WL 66516, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 8, 2014).

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits testimony based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" by experts qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" if the testimony is both relevant and reliable. The trialjudge must act as a gatekeeper, admitting only that expert testimony which is relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Daubert attempts to strike a balance between liberal admissibility for relevant evidence and the need to exclude misleading "junk science." Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 176-77 (6th Cir. 2009). An expert must utilize in the courtroom the "same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Id. at 177.

The relevancy requirement stems from Rule 702's mandate that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Best, 563 F.3d at 591. Relevance means that "there must be a 'fit' between the inquiry in the case and the testimony." United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 555 (6th Cir. 1993). The reliability requirement is drawn from Rule 702's requirement that the subject of an expert's testimony be "scientific knowledge." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90. In this context, reliability means "evidentiary reliability" or "trustworthiness" which in turn connotes "scientific validity." Bonds, 12 F.3d at 555. A party proffering expert testimony has the burden of demonstrating by a "preponderance of proof that the expert whose testimony is being offered is qualified and will testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding and disposing of issues relevant to the case." Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000).

The trial court's objective "is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevantfield." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The trial judge enjoys broad discretion in determining whether the factors listed in Daubert reasonably measure reliability in a given case. Id. at 153.

1. Qualifications

An expert witness's proposed testimony must relate directly to the area in which the witness claims expertise. Smelser v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997). "An expert qualified in one subject matter does not thereby become an expert for all purposes. Testimony on subject matters unrelated to the witness's area of expertise is prohibited by Rule 702." Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F.Supp.2d 558, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Defendant argues that Andres lacks the requisite qualifications because his education and work experience are in the field of special education and he lacks sufficient experience related to basketball facilities or the equipment used there. (See Doc. 36 at 17-31). However, Andres demonstrates that he has knowledge of the manner in which basketball courts are organized and related regulations. See Part IV.A.2, infra. Further, as Defendant acknowledges, Andres does have some experience with basketball. (See id. at 12-15). Experts can be qualified by their knowledge and experience. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly, the Court declines to find that Andres lacks the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert on the matters on which he opines.

2. Reliability

Defendant argues that Andres improperly bases his opinions on his assumption that the rules promulgated by the AAU, the NFHSS, and the NCAA apply to Defendant's facility and the game in question. (See Doc. 36 at 37-39).

Andres testifies that Mike Roe, Defendant's owner and operator, failed to implement well-established safety procedures and failed to provide a product in his facility that would minimize the risk of injury or comply with well-established safety rules. (Doc. 36 at 86). To support these conclusions, Andres compares the specifications of the goal used by Defendant with AAU, NFHSS, and NCAA regulations. Specifically, Andres testifies that Defendant used a T-Rex 66 basketball goal, made for only 66 inches of safe play, while NFHSS and NCAA rules specify that regulation size basketball courts require the use of a basketball...