McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier

Kraton McGugan Plaintiff,

v.Linda L. Aldana-Bernier, M.D., et. al. Defendants,

Case No. 11-cv-00342 (TLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Date: April 30, 2012

MEMORANDUM RULING

AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendants Dr. Rabbi Mahmudur, Femi Abioye, Jamaica Hospital Medical Center, Dr. Shushan Hovanesian, and Dr. Lilian Aldana-Bernier's¹ Motions to Dismiss [Rec. Doc. 46, 53, 56]² , plaintiff Kraton McGugan's Memorandum in Opposition thereto [Rec. Doc. 49, 51, 54, 58]³ , and defendants' Reply Memoranda [Rec. Doc. 50, 52, 55] in further support of the motions. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions will be GRANTED.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff was involuntarily taken from a New York airport to Jamaica Hospital Medical Center ("JHMC") by Gamaliel Bonilla, Kenneth Bogle, and Officer Angerhauser, and further alleges that defendants Linda Aldana-Bernier, M.D., Sushan Hovanesian, M.D., Rabbi Mahmuduer, M.D., and Remi Abioye, R.N. conducted inadequate examinations, leading to an improper involuntary hospitalization of plaintiff. Plaintiff brings federalclaims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and New York state law claims for medical malpractice.

I. Background

This statement of facts is drawn from plaintiff's second amended complaint [Rec. Doc. 29], which the Court accepts as true for purposes of defendants' motions to dismiss.

a. Airplane Flight and Transport to JHMC

On July 23, 2008, plaintiff boarded a plane in San Francisco bound for New York City. During the flight, she requested a seat change because she began to cough uncontrollably, due to bronchitis, and she did not want to disturb passengers seated nearby. Initially, her request was denied, but later was granted after plaintiff used "stronger language." She moved to an empty row of seats and immediately fell asleep.

Upon awakening after the plane landed in New York, plaintiff found herself surrounded by three police officers. The officers handcuffed her and escorted her to an airport police station where she was questioned about her trip to New York. Plaintiff asserts that she answered the questions truthfully and in a non-hostile way. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was transported to JHMC by Bogle, Bonilla and Officer Angerhauser. Plaintiff asserts that Bogle, Bonilla, or Officer Angerhauser administered an unknown medication by injection without her permission, which sedated her. Plaintiff further asserts that she was cooperative and did not engage in hostile behavior.

b. Initial Examination/Treatment

Plaintiff remained sedated through her arrival at the emergency room at JHMC. Dr. Bacares, now deceased and thus not a defendant in this action, wrote a medication order authorizing the forcible administration of medication. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Bacares did not conduct an evaluationof plaintiff's mental status prior to authorizing the forcible administration of medication. Pursuant to Dr. Bacares medication order, defendant Abioye, a registered nurse, administered a combination of Haldol⁴ , Benadryl, and Ativan by injection. Furthermore, defendant Dr. Mahmudur issued a medication order that authorized the nursing staff to forcibly administer Haldol, Benadryl, and Activan on a as-needed basis. Plaintiff further asserts that Dr. Mahmudur and other members of the hospital staff failed to seek or obtain a court order permitting the administration of medication to plaintiff over her objection.

c. Psychiatric Evaluation

On July 25, 2008, the plaintiff became frustrated and demanded to see a friend, Chris Tulipanov, using "curse words." Pursuant to Dr. Mahmudur's medication order, defendant Abioye administered medication over plaintiff's objection. Plaintiff asserts that she was not causing nor imminently likely to cause harm to herself or to others. Subsequently, hospital staff questioned plaintiff and she said she was in a romantic relationship with Chris Tulipanov. A staff member then attempted to contact Chris Tulipanov but mistakenly contacted Kris Dickman instead, plaintiff's ex-boyfriend. Mr. Dickman told the staff member that he was not in a relationship with plaintiff and described a dispute the two had in which plaintiff threw a metal object at him. Plaintiff asserts that hospital staff believed that she was suffering from delusions due to the fact that Mr. Dickman stated that he was no longer in a relationship with plaintiff.

Defendant Dr. Aldana-Bernier then conducted a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff asserts that she was heavily sedated during the evaluation and thus had difficulty talking to Dr. Aldana-Bernier.Plaintiff further asserts that Dr. Aldana-Bernier stereotyped her as dangerous and failed to conduct a minimally competent assessment. On July 26, 2008, Dr. Aldana-Bernier concluded that plaintiff suffered from a mental illness and certified plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization to JHMC pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39.

Later on the same day, defendant Dr. Hovanesian evaluated plaintiff and confirmed the need for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 on the ground that the plaintiff posed a danger to others. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Hovanesian also performed a substandard evaluation. Plaintiff remained involuntarily confined at JHMC until July 30, 2008.

d. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint [Rec. Doc. 1] in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on January 21, 2011. On June 2, 2011, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Rec. Doc. 16]. After obtaining permission from the Court, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint [Rec. Doc. 29] on July 27, 2011, which asserted nine causes of action against ten defendants.

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: 1) § 1983 false imprisonment claim against Dr. Aldana-Bernier and Dr. Hovanesian; 2) § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process against Dr. Aldana-Bernier and Dr. Hovanesian; 3) § 1983 claim for violation of procedural due process against Dr. Aldana-Bernier and Dr. Hovanesian; 4) § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process against Dr. Mahmudur and Ms. Abioye; 5) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 by JHMC; 6) § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process against Mr. Bogle, Mr. Bonilla, and Officer Angerhauser; 7) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Actagainst the City of New York and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; and claims 8) and 9) two New York State Law medical malpractice claims against Dr. Aldana-Bernier, Dr. Hovanesian, and JHMC.

Dr. Aldana-Benier [Rec. Doc. 56] and Dr. Hovanesian [Rec. Doc. 53] independently move to dismiss plaintiff's first, second, third, eighth, and ninth causes of action against them. Dr. Mahmudur and Femi Abioye jointly move to dismiss [Rec. Doc. 46] plaintiff's fourth cause of action against them. JHMS moves to dismiss [Rec. Doc. 46] plaintiff's fifth, eighth, and ninth causes of actions against it.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all allegations of fact made by the plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 555 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must set forth factual allegations that are sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 555 U.S. at 555.

III. Discussion

1. Plaintiff's Federal Claims

i) § 1983 Claims : State Action

Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against Dr. Aldana Bernier, Dr. Hovanesian, Dr. Mahmudur, Ms. Abioye, and Jamaica Hospital Medical Center for violations of the FourteenthAmendment. Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the authority of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). Section 1983 requires plaintiff to prove each of the following: (1) that the defendants were acting under the color of state law at the time of the incident; and (2) that the defendants violated plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. Washington v. Cty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004). Section 1983's "under color of state law" element applies to acts of the state and excludes from its reach "merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); see Sybalski v. Ind. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008).

Under certain circumstances, however, the actions of a private entity can be attributable to the state, which can then subject the private entity to liability under Section 1983. Those circumstances exist when 1) the entity acts pursuant to the "coercive power" of the state, or is "controlled" by the state ("the compulsion test"); 2) when the state provides "significant encouragement" to the entity, the entity is a "willing participant in joint activity with the state," or the entity's functions are "entwined" with state policies ("the close nexus" test); or 3) where the entity "has been delegated a public function by the state" ("the public function test"). Sybalski, 546 F.3d at 257 (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Sec. Sch. Ath. Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)).

Plaintiff concedes that defendants⁵ pursuing the instant motions are private actors but argues that their actions can be imputed to the state, subjecting them to liability under Section 1983. Compl. ¶¶91-106; Pl. Opp. Mem. at 7-12. Thus, the critical issue in plaintiff's Section 1983 claims is whether the conduct of private defendants, a hospital and medical...