McIntyre v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist.

499 S.W.3d 820

Michael McIntyre and Laura McIntyre, Individually and on Behalf of Their Children, K.M., L.M., C.m., M.M., and L.M., Petitioners,

v.El Paso Independent School District, Dr. Lorenzo Garcia, and Mark Mendoza, Respondents

NO. 14–0732

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 2, 2015

Opinion Delivered: June 24, 2016

Rehearing Denied October 21, 2016

Charles (Chad) E. Baruch, Johnston Tobey Baruch, P.C., Dallas TX, Steven C. James, Law Offices of Steven C. James, El Paso TX, Thomas C. Sanders, Tom Sanders, P.C., Sugar Land TX, for Petitioners Michael McIntyre and Laura McIntyre.

S. Anthony Safi, Mounce Green Myers Safi Paxson & Galatzan, P.C., El Paso TX, for Respondents El Paso ISD, Lorenzo Garcia and Mark Mendoza.

Richard L. Arnett, Brim Arnett & Robinett PC, Austin TX, for Amicus Curiae Association of Texas Professional Educators.

Holly McIntush, Lisa A. Brown, Thompson & Horton LLP, Austin TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund.

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT, JUSTICE WILLETT, JUSTICE GUZMAN, JUSTICE LEHRMANN, and JUSTICE BOYD joined.

John P. Devine, Justice

The Texas Education Code permits appeals to the Texas Commissioner of Education by persons “aggrieved by” either “the school laws of this state” or “actions or decisions of any school district board of trustees that violate [ ] the school laws of this state.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a). It does not permit, much less require, administrative appeals when a person is allegedly aggrieved by violations of laws other than the state's school laws, such as our state and federal constitutions. Yet the court of appeals expected the petitioners “to exhaust their administrative remedies” for their state constitutional claims. See 457 S.W.3d 475, 487–90 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2014). The trouble is they have none. Whether their constitutional rights were violated remains to be decided, but it is a question the courts—not the Commissioner—must decide. We accordingly reverse the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it dismissed the petitioners' claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment dismissing certain claims based on qualified immunity.

I

In 2007, Michael and Laura McIntyre, along with three of their children, were criminally charged with contributing to truancy and failure to attend school, respectively.¹ The McIntyres claimed the children were exempt from Texas' compulsory attendance laws because they were homeschooled. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.086(a)(1) (exempting children who attend private schools from compulsory school attendance); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 443–44 (Tex.1994) (holding that bona-fide homeschools are “private schools” within the meaning of the exemption). The McIntyres had refused to sign a homeschool verification form provided by El Paso Independent School District. According to the McIntyres, the form committed them to using curriculum approved by the Texas Education Agency. The District disputes the McIntyres' interpretation.

The McIntyres assert that after the District's attendance officer filed criminal charges against them, he admitted in a phone call that they were “not breaking a law at this time.” This admission, they contend, is corroborated by the criminal complaints the officer filed against them. In the space reserved for the officer to list the days of school that children have missed, the complaint instead alleged the McIntyres had “not met [the] homeschool verification requirements.” The McIntyres thus assert the charges resulted from a “failure to provide documentation,” not criminal conduct. The District, however, insists additional information substantiated concerns that the McIntyre children were not being educated.

The McIntyres sued the District and its attendance officer (among others), alleging they violated the McIntyres' constitutional rights by prosecuting the McIntyres for a crime they knew the McIntyres did not commit, and by using the charges to force the McIntyres to cooperate with their demands. The McIntyres alleged that their rights to due process, equal protection, and free exercise of religion under both the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution were infringed, along with their right to privacy under the Texas Constitution. The McIntyres sought various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.

The District and its attendance officer filed pleas to the jurisdiction, special exceptions, and motions to dismiss, and the attendance officer moved for summary judgment. Among other things, the District argued the McIntyres failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and the attendance officer invoked qualified immunity. The trial court denied these pleas, exceptions, and motions, and the District and its attendance officer filed an interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(5), (8) (authorizing certain interlocutory appeals). In the court of appeals, the District urged the McIntyres must exhaust administrative remedies as for their state-law claims only.

The court of appeals agreed, dismissing the McIntyre's state-law claims against the District. 457 S.W.3d at 490. It also dismissed the state-law claims against the District's attendance officer based on the election-of-remedies provision in section 101.106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and dismissed the federal-law claims against the attendance officer based on qualified immunity. Id. at 492, 499.

The McIntyres petitioned for review from this Court, challenging the court of appeals' judgment on qualified immunity and exhaustion of remedies.

II

This is an interlocutory appeal with special jurisdictional considerations. The court of appeals' decision in an interlocutory appeal is generally final. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(b)(3). There are exceptions, however, such as when “one of the courts of appeals holds differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals or of the supreme court.” Id. § 22.225(c) ; see id. § 22.001(a)(2). Courts hold differently from each other “when there is inconsistency in their respective decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants.” Id. § 22.225(e).

This is such a case. The court of appeals held the Texas Education Code required the McIntyres to appeal their state-law claims to the Commissioner of Education merely because they “involve” the school laws of Texas. See 457 S.W.3d at 486. Other courts of appeals have held that the Education Code's appeal provision is more limited, recognizing that the statute “has no general appeal clause for persons aggrieved by school board actions.” Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ; see also Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lowery, 212 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex.App.–Austin 2006, pet. denied) (describing statutory changes limiting the Commissioner's jurisdiction). The Commissioner's authority over school disputes should be clarified, and we have jurisdiction.

III

The Legislature has granted the Texas Commissioner of Education exclusive authority to resolve certain disputes. T EX . E DUC . C ODE § 7.057(a) ; see Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544–45 (Tex.2016). Where the Legislature grants the Commissioner authority to resolve a dispute, parties to such disputes must seek relief from the Commissioner through an administrative appeal before resorting to the courts. See Clint Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 S.W.3d at 546. Because exhaustion is only required for “complaints that the Legislature has authorized the Commissioner to resolve,” we turn first to the text of the statute. See id. (citing Warren v. Sanger Indep. Sch. Dist., 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159, 160 (1926) ).

A

The exhaustion statute is not all-encompassing. With a few narrow exceptions not applicable here,

a person may appeal in writing to the commissioner if the person is aggrieved by:

(1) the school laws of this state; or

(2) actions or decisions of any school district board of trustees that violate:

(A) the school laws of this state; or

(B) a provision of a written employment contract between the school district and a school district employee, if a violation causes or would cause monetary harm to the employee.

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a) ; see id. § 7.057(e) (listing statutory exceptions).²

The “school laws of this state” consist of Titles 1 and 2 of the Education Code and the administrative rules adopted under them. Id. § 7.057(f)(2). In short, aside from employment-contract disputes, the Education Code limits administrative appeals to cases where a person is aggrieved by Titles 1 or 2 of the Education Code or a school board's violation of them.

At times, disputes arising under other laws depend on violations of the school laws. In these disputes, the Commissioner, not a court, is required to make the initial determination that a school board violated the school laws. Such was the case in Clint Independent School District v. Marquez, where parents argued a school district “defie[d] the Constitution's mandates by violating the requirements of the Education Code. ” 487 S.W.3d at 547. The Court agreed the constitutional provisions were not “school laws of the state,” but still required exhaustion because the constitutional claims were “ancillary to and supportive of a complaint about the board's ... application of school law.” Id. at 552, 552–53 (quoting Jones, 46 S.W.3d at 474 ).

In other words, when claims are predicated on a matter within the Commissioner's exclusive jurisdiction, exhaustion is required. But if claims do not challenge the school laws themselves,³ and neither assert nor depend on violations of the school laws or an employment contract, then exhaustion is not required.

That the Legislature fully...