McLaughlin v. Bos. Ret. Bd.

146 F.Supp.3d 283

Richard McLaughlin, Plaintiff,

v.Boston Retirement Board, City of Boston, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-10818-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed November 10, 2015

Filed November 12, 2015

Richard McLaughlin, Weymouth, MA, pro se.

Padraic P. Lydon, Timothy J. Smyth, Boston Retirement Board, Erika Reis, City of Boston Law Department, Julia E. Kobick, Office of the Attorney General, Ricardo Brandon Rios, Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BURROUGHS, DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Richard McLaughlin filed his complaint in this action on March 12, 2015. [ECF No. 1 (“Complt.”).] McLaughlin, a retired Boston firefighter, alleges widespread misconduct by the three defendants—the Boston Retirement Board (“Retirement Board”), the City of Boston (“Boston”), and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the “Commonwealth”)—in connection with his retirement and accidental disability benefit payments. All three defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, [ECF Nos. 31, 37, & 65], and on October 27, 2015, the Court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. [ECF No. 77.] Now before the Court are the Retirement Board and Boston's motions to dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, both motions are GRANTED and all other pending motions in this case are DENIED as MOOT.

I. Background

McLaughlin retired from the Boston Fire Department in 1997 after suffering a broken leg. Complt. ¶¶ 1, 7; McLaughlin v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. , Civil Action No. 2012-04354-D, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Jan. 13, 2014).¹ Starting on January 31, 2000, McLaughlin began receiving accidental disability retirement benefits from the Retirement Board, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Law ch. 37, § 7. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. , slip op. at 1. In January 2009, while still receiving those benefits, a jury convicted McLaughlin of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (“OUI”) and negligent operation to endanger. See McLaughlin v. MacDonald , No. CIV.A. 11–11587–JLT, 2013 WL 4679604, at *1 (D.Mass. Aug. 29, 2013) (habeas opinion summarizing McLaughlin's previous criminal proceedings). By a subsequent jury-waived trial, the judge found the OUI conviction to be McLaughlin's third such offense and sentenced him to two and a half years of incarceration under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). See id. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed his conviction in 2011 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied further review. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin , 79 Mass.App.Ct. 670, 670, 948 N.E.2d 1258 (2011), rev. denied 460 Mass. 1110, 951 N.E.2d 350 (2011). McLaughlin filed two petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which were both denied. McLaughlin v. Gillen , No. CIV.A. 11–10746–NMG, 2011 WL 2746459 (D.Mass. July 8, 2011) ; MacDonald , 2013 WL 4679604. He was released on parole on October 4, 2011. See MacDonald , 2013 WL 4679604, at *2–3.

On or about July 15, 2011, the Retirement Board became aware of McLaughlin's incarceration and stopped paying his accidental disability benefit payments. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. , slip op. at 2. The Retirement Board subsequently entered into an agreement with McLaughlin, in which he agreed to repay the $115,974.30 in benefits he received from January 15, 2009 (when he was first incarcerated) to July 15, 2011 (when the Retirement Board learned he was incarcerated). [ECF No. 83-1, at 4.]² The Retirement Board acted pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws c. 32, § 7(2)(d), which provides that:

Payments to a member retired under the provisions of this section who is incarcerated for having been convicted of a felony committed on or after the effective date of this paragraph shall cease for the period of such member's incarceration. Under no circumstances shall such payments be recoverable by such member after such period of incarceration.

McLaughlin later requested a waiver of repayment and on December 2, 2011, the Retirement Board held a hearing on McLaughlin's request. [ECF No. 83-1, at 1.] The Hearing Officer recommended that McLaughlin's request for waiver be denied and in February 2012, the Retirement Board adopted his recommendation. [ECF No. 83-1, 83-2.] The Hearing Officer found that “the Legislature has made it abundantly clear through its use of the phrase—‘under no circumstances'—that it did not want to provide retirement boards with the discretion to award accidental disability retirement benefits to members while they were incarcerated on account of a felony conviction.” [ECF No. 83-1, at 7.] Accordingly, McLaughlin “could not be relieved of his obligation to repay benefits received while he was incarcerated on account of Board error, as there was none.” Id. at 6.

McLaughlin appealed the Retirement Board's decision to the Contributory Retirement Appeals Board (“CRAB”), which assigned the matter to the Division of Administrative Appeals (“DALA”). Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. , slip op., at 2. After both sides filed cross-motions for a summary decision, the DALA affirmed the Retirement Board's decision to deny McLaughlin's request for waiver. Id. On October 1, 2012, the CRAB received a letter from McLaughlin with objections to the DALA decision and a request for additional time to file documents. Id. The CRAB denied McLaughlin's request and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the DALA decision, since McLauhlin had sent the letter outside the fifteen-day appeals window. Id. at 3-4 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 32, § 16 (4) ). In a January 13, 2014 opinion, the Suffolk County Superior Court affirmed the CRAB's finding that McLaughlin's appeal was untimely. Id. at 4. Though it did not need to reach the merits of McLaughlin's claim, the Superior Court noted that even had McLaughlin filed his appeal on time, he would not have prevailed. There was “no proper basis to overturn the DALA decision,” since McLaughlin had been incarcerated for a felony conviction, and “the language the Legislature used is unambiguous that the Plaintiff is not entitled to pay while incarcerated for having been convicted of a felony.” Id. at 4, n. 2.

On March 12, 2015, McLaughlin filed his complaint in this action, seeking $20 million in damages from the Retirement Board, Boston, and the Commonwealth. Complt. ¶ 84. McLaughlin's complaint makes wide-ranging allegations against the three defendants regarding both his retirement from the fire department and his receipt of accidental disability benefit payments. Among other things, McLaughlin alleges that Boston used coercion to force him to retire, that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 7(2)(d) is unconstitutional, and that the Retirement Board is liable for defamation, libel, invasion of privacy, and a variety of other torts.

Boston and the Retirement Board both moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. [ECF Nos. 31, 37.] In its motion to dismiss, Boston argues that it is not a proper party to the lawsuit and that it should not be held responsible for the conduct of the Retirement Board, an independent political body. [ECF No. 32.] In addition, Boston asserts that the complaint was filed more than three years after the Retirement Board voted to adopt the Hearing Officer's recommendation, and therefore McLaughlin's challenges are time-barred. Id. In turn, the Retirement Board contends that McLaughlin's conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that, regardless, his claims are time-barred and precluded by res judicata . [ECF No. 38.]

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc. , 647 F.3d 377, 384 (1st Cir.2011). Although detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss, “more than labels and conclusions” are required. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not enough. Id. The facts alleged must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The plaintiff must “nudge[ ] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or the claims will be dismissed. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The make-or-break standard ... is that the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.” Sepulveda–Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R. , 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility” of actionable conduct. Id.

In this case, the Court construes McLaughlin's complaint liberally because it was filed pro se . See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). “However, pro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt , 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1997). Dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to state an actionable claim. Muller v. Bedford VA Admin. Hosp. , Civ. No. 11–10510, 2013 WL 702766, at *3 (D.Mass. Feb. 25, 2013) (citing Overton v. Torruella , 183 F.Supp.2d 295, 303 (D.Mass.2001) ).

B. Analysis

The bulk of McLaughlin's complaint concerns the Retirement Board's decision to suspend benefit payments while McLaughlin was incarcerated and to deny his request to waive repayment of benefit payments made before the Retirement Board realized he was incarcerated. The Retirement Board's...