McLaughlin v. Children's Safety Ctrs.

Terry Walker McLaughlin, Plaintiff,

v. Children's Safety Centers, Genesis II, FamilyWise Services,and Richard Bents individually, Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-01746 (SRN/JJG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Dated: February 8, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDER

Jeffrey D. Schiek, Lisa McLeod-Lofquist, and Philip G Villaume, Villaume & Schiek, P.A., 2051 Killebrew Drive, Suite 611, Bloomington, Minnesota 55425, for Plaintiff.

Jessica L. Edwards, Norah E. Olson Bluvshtein, and Teresa M. Thompson, Fredrikson & Byron, PA, 200 South Sixth Street, Suite 4000, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-1425, for Defendants Children's Safety Centers, Genesis II, and FamilyWise Services.

Joseph B. Nierenberg, Nierenberg Employment Law, PLLC, 701 Fourth Avenue South, Suite 500, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415-1818 for Defendant Richard Bents.

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge

This matter came before the Court on Defendants Children's Safety Centers, Genesis II, and FamilyWise Services' Motion to Dismiss Counts I through VII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. Nos. 6, 28.]¹ Also before the Court is Defendant Richard Bents'Motion to Dismiss Count VIII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. [Doc. Nos. 12, 28.] For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants Children's Safety Centers, Genesis II, and FamilyWise Services' Motion to Dismiss and denies Defendant Bents' Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Children's Safety Center ("CSC"),² is a private, non-profit organization that offers programming and services to children, adults, and families in the Twin Cities area. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4 [Doc. No. 29].) Defendant CSC hired Plaintiff in November of 1997 to work as the organization's Executive Director. (Id. 7, 9.) Defendant Richard Bents owns Future Systems Consulting, Inc., a Minnesota organization, which provided consulting services to Defendant CSC. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that in her 2009 performance evaluation, Defendant CSC commended her for "her ability to energize and motivate those around her; being able to stabilize the accounting position; being creative in Defendant's funding sources and solutions; and being an asset to the Defendant [sic] business." (Id. ¶ 11.) While Plaintiff was criticized for "not being enthusiastic during hard situations," Defendant CSC stated inher review that it "had complete confidence in her ability to guide CSC into the next decade." (Id.)

On or about October 11, 2010, Plaintiff was placed on a written performance action plan due to her alleged mistreatment of fellow employees and her management style. (Id. ¶ 12; Affidavit of Jessica L. Edwards ("Edwards Aff.") [Doc. No. 9] Ex. A (hereinafter referred to as the "Charge"), ¶ 5(a).)³ Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bents assisted Defendant CSC in creating the performance action plan. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)

On or about October 20, 2010, Plaintiff complained to Defendant CSC that she had been subjected to sexual harassment by a "male vendor"—Defendant Bents—for "approximately one year." (Id. ¶ 14; Charge ¶ 5(a).) Plaintiff claims that Defendant CSC informed her that an investigation would be completed regarding Defendant Bents' alleged harassment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) To Plaintiff's knowledge, however, no investigation or remedial action occurred. (Id.) Plaintiff continued as Executive Director of Defendant CSC for a year following her sexual harassment complaint and during that year she "was not required to work" with Defendant Bents. (Charge ¶ 5(a).)

In January 2011, Plaintiff claims that "as a result of the inaction of Defendant CSC regarding the aforementioned sexual harassment, [she] wrote an email to Defendant Bents with instructions to discontinue services with Defendant CSC." (Am. Compl. ¶ 19; Charge¶ 5(c).) Plaintiff included several current, former, and prospective Defendant CSC board members on the e-mail. (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently reprimanded for "including the former and prospective board members" on the e-mail list. (Id.)

In February 2011, Plaintiff was informed that the requirements of her action plan had been met and that the action plan would be lifted. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Charge ¶ 5(d).) On or about October 7, 2011, a year after Plaintiff was placed on the performance action plan, the President of CSC's Board, David Chisnell, met with Plaintiff to conduct her annual performance review. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25; Charge ¶ 5(e).) During the meeting, Chisnell discussed problems with Plaintiff's job performance, including "lack of management and people skills," "staff retention issues," and failure "to make progress as set forth in the action plan." (Charge ¶ 5(e).)

Around October 10, 2011, Plaintiff spoke with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ("MDHR") to discuss allegations of discrimination against Defendant CSC. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) The next day, Plaintiff informed a board member that she had met with the MDHR. (Id. ¶ 27.) Shortly thereafter, on October 13, 2011, Plaintiff was informed by Chisnell that her position as Executive Director would be terminated, and she was offered the choice to either take a temporary position as Transition Director for up to six months or accept a separate package of four weeks' severance pay. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff inquired whether she was being terminated pursuant to Defendant CSC's bylaws, but Chisnell did not respond. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to choose between the Transition Director position and the separation package, so her employment with Defendant CSC terminated effective October 14, 2011. (Id.)

On November 1, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the MDHR and it was automatically cross-filed with the EEOC. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 32.) In her Charge, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant CSC had engaged in reprisal discrimination in violation of § 363A.15(1) of the MHRA. (Charge ¶ 4.) The Charge did not include a claim of sexual harassment or any other unlawful practice. (Cf. id. ¶¶ 1-5.) Neither the EEOC nor the MDHR issued any findings on Plaintiff's Charge. On May 25, 2012, Plaintiff received a letter from the MDHR, notifying her that all proceedings relating to the Charge would be terminated because she had withdrawn her Charge to pursue civil litigation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31; Edwards Aff. Ex. B). On September 12, 2012, Plaintiff received a notice of dismissal of the Charge from the EEOC and was provided with a notice of her right to file suit. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.)

Plaintiff commenced the present action in state court against Defendant CSC on June 29, 2012. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1-1].) Plaintiff's Complaint alleged the following claims against Defendant CSC: (1) sexual harassment under the MHRA; (2) reprisal under the MHRA; (3) violation of the Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. § 181.932; (4) reprisal under the Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. § 181.932 ; (5) sexual harassment under Title VII; (6) retaliation under Title VII; and (7) sexual harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 32-98.) Plaintiff also asserted claims of assault and battery against Defendant Bents individually. (Id. ¶¶ 99-103.) Defendant CSC removed the action to this Court on July 19, 2012 based on federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1].) Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 20, 2012 to reflect the fact that she had received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. (Ltr. to Dist. Court [Doc. No. 27]; Am.Compl. ¶ 33.) Defendant CSC and Defendant Bents filed separate Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on August 9, 2012. [Doc. Nos. 6, 12, 28.]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint present "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a "sheer possibility." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 593 (2009) (citation omitted). It is not, however, a "probability requirement." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Several principles guide courts in determining whether a complaint meets this standard. First, the court must take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009). This tenet does not apply, however, to legal conclusions or "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" such allegations may properly be set aside. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, some factual allegations may be so indeterminate that they require "further factual enhancement" in order to state a claim. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S....