McLaughlin v. deMedeiros

613 F.Supp.3d 547

William C. MCLAUGHLIN and Deborah McLaughlin, Plaintiffs,

v.Denise DEMEDEIROS; Joan B. Chabot; Jay Lambert ; Peter Mello; Brett N. Pelletier; David Perry; Joseph Sousa ; Matthew Wojcik; Andrew M. Teitz ; Gina A. DiCenso; Neil Hall; and Gareth Eames, each in their individual capacities and their official capacities as either current or former agents and/or employees of the Town of Tiverton; Town of Tiverton; Tiverton Town Council; and Mancini Demolition, Inc., Defendants.

CA. No. 16-648-JJM-PAS

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Signed March 27, 2020

Sean R. Doherty, Law Office of Sean R. Doherty, Daniel Calabro, Jr., Daniel Calabro Jr., Attorney at Law, North Kingstown, RI, for Plaintiffs.

Marc DeSisto, Kathleen A. Hilton, DeSisto Law LLC, Providence, RI, David A. Tammelleo, Cranston, RI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

John J. McConnell, Jr., Chief United States District Judge

William C. McLaughlin and Deborah McLaughlin (together, the "Plaintiffs") sue the Town of Tiverton (the "Town") and certain of its officials and employees (collectively, the "Town Defendants")¹ and Mancini Demolition, Inc. ("Mancini Demolition") alleging violations of due process, conversion, trespass, negligent training and supervision, estoppel, and abuse of process in relation to the removal of a garage located on the Plaintiffs’ property. See generally ECF No. 1. The Town Defendants move for summary judgment.

ECF No. 37. The Plaintiffs oppose the Town Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40) and file their own Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 44.²

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 44) and GRANTS the Town Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 37.

I. BACKGROUND & FACTS

Seven counts remain from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint—Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, IX, and X. ECF No. 1 at 12-19, ¶¶90-147.³ The Court will briefly review the undisputed facts relevant to these motions.

The Plaintiffs are the joint owners of 1640 Fish Road in Tiverton, Rhode Island (the "Property"). ECF No. 45 at 1, ¶ 1 In 2008, after receiving building permits from the Town, the Plaintiffs began constructing a forty-foot by sixty-foot garage on the Property. Id. at ¶¶2-3. After the construction was complete, the Plaintiffs received a certificate of occupancy. Id. at ¶4. In 2010, a zoning official of the Town issued the Plaintiffs a notice of violation for failing to comply with the Town's applicable setback requirements. ECF No. 38 at 1-2, ¶¶2, 4. This prompted the Plaintiffs to apply for a variance from the setback requirements with the Town Zoning Board of Review (the "Zoning Board"). ECF No. 45 at 2, 18. In seeking this variance, the Plaintiffs indicated that they mistakenly erected the garage within the setbacks of their property. Id. at 19.

On October 3, 2011, the Zoning Board denied the Plaintiffs’ request for a variance. Id. at ¶10. Mr. McLaughlin appealed the Zoning Board's decision to the Rhode Island Superior Court (the "Superior Court"). Id. at 111. On October 4, 2013, the Superior Court upheld the Zoning Board's decision. Id. at 115. In upholding the Zoning Board's decision, the Superior Court found that "the only hardship [Mr.] McLaughlin faced was purely financial in nature ... and that such self-created financial hardship was not a sufficient ground justifying a variance." ECF No. 38 at 2, ¶6 (citing McLaughlin v. Tiverton Zoning Bd. of Review , 186 A.3d 597, 601 (R.I. 2018) ). Mr. McLaughlin subsequently filed a pro se appeal to the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on procedural grounds. ECF No. 45 at 2-3, ¶16.

Five months later, the Zoning Board filed a "Motion for Order to Comply" with the Superior Court, seeking an injunction that would require Mr. McLaughlin to either move or remove the garage. Id. at 3, ¶17. The Superior Court called a hearing for the Zoning Board's "Motion for Order to Comply" on April 7, 2014. Id. at 120. Neither Mr. McLaughlin nor Mrs. McLaughlin attended this hearing. Id. The Motion was thus granted without objection on April 7, 2014. Id.

Six months later, the Town sought to have Mr. McLaughlin held in contempt for still not moving or removing the garage. Id. at ¶21. The Superior Court granted the Town's motion in August 2015 and found Mr. McLaughlin in contempt. Id.

Despite being found in contempt, the Plaintiffs still failed to remedy the situation as of October 2015, which prompted the Zoning Board to seek leave from the Superior Court to remove the Plaintiffs’ garage. ECF No. 38 at 3, ¶11. On November 18, 2015, the Superior Court granted the Town's motion but gave Mr. McLaughlin ninety days (until February 7, 2016) to comply. Id. at 3, 112. If Mr. McLaughlin did not comply by the deadline, pursuant to the terms of the Superior Court order, the Town had permission "to enter Plaintiff's property, remove the offending structure therefrom, and charge the entire cost of removal to the Plaintiff, without any further action of the [Superior] Court." ECF No. 38, Exhibit 12 at 1, ¶3.

The Plaintiffs failed to comply by February 7, 2016 and then unsuccessfully moved for a temporary restraining order in federal court. ECF No. 45 at 3-4, ¶23; see also Text Order, Mar. 3, 2016 (C.A. No. 16-84); Text Order, March 7, 2016 (C.A. No. 16-84). The Town directed Mancini Demolition to remove the garage from the Property on March 28, 2016. See ECF No. 45 at 34, ¶¶23, 24. As part of the demolition, Mancini Demolition removed all "[d]emolition debris and waste oil." ECF No. 45, Exhibit O at 7.

On May 25, 2016, Mr. McLaughlin filed a motion to vacate the April 7, 2014 Order to Comply (the "Order to Comply") and all subsequent orders premised thereon. ECF No. 45 at 4, ¶25. The Superior Court denied this motion and Mr. McLaughlin appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Id. at ¶26.

On June 20, 2018, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued a decision vacating the Order to Comply pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment"). Id. at ¶27 (citing McLaughlin , 186 A.3d at 607-08 ). The Supreme Court's reason for vacating the Order to Comply was that the Town of Tiverton did not bring a separate action under R.I.G.L. § 45-24-62, which vests the Superior Court with the power to assist cities and towns in the enforcement of their zoning ordinances so long as there are "due proceedings" in the name of the city or town instituted by its city or town solicitor. McLaughlin , 186 A.3d at 609. The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the Zoning Board's "Motion for Order to Comply" was not a "due proceeding" as required by the plain language of the statute. Id. at 609 ("A motion to comply, filed by the zoning board, not the town, at the conclusion of a zoning appeal, simply does not pass muster.") Because the Town's solicitor never filed a separate complaint on behalf of the Town setting forth Mr. McLaughlin's alleged noncompliance with the Town's zoning ordinance, the Supreme Court found that "even though [Mr.] McLaughlin received notice and an opportunity to be heard, the [T]own's failure to comply with [R.I.G.L.] § 45-24-62 in obtaining permanent injunctive relief on April 7, 2014, is fatal." Id. at 610. Upholding that order, according to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "would permit, not prevent, manifest injustice." Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must look to the record and view all the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Univ. Ins. Co. , 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991). Once done, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires that summary judgment be granted if there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The parties have both filed motions for summary judgment, but "[t]he presence of cross-motions for summary judgment neither dilutes nor distorts this standard of review." Mandel v. Boston Phoenix, Inc. , 456 F.3d 198, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). In evaluating cross-motions, the court must determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Torres , 561 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

The Town Defendants claim they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because, in facilitating the demolition of the Plaintiffs’ garage, they were acting pursuant to the order issued by the Superior Court on November 18, 2015. ECF No. 37-1 at 5-6.

Judicial immunity is a doctrine that protects judges from liability for judicial actions "[e]xcept where judges act completely without jurisdiction." Slotnick v. Garfinkle , 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980). This doctrine extends beyond judges to protect officials from liability who are carrying out the orders of a judge. Id. Courts have held that officials, such as a court clerk or warden, who act "pursuant to a facially valid court order have a quasi-judicial absolute immunity from damages for actions taken to execute that order." Stow v. Horan , 829 F. Supp. 504, 506 n.4 (D.N.H. 1993) (quoting Patterson v. Von Riesen , 999 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1993) ); see also Faria v. Scott , No. 16-cv-049-JD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77103 at *4, 2016 WL 3277304 at *1–2 (D.N.H. May 23, 2016). Citing this doctrine, the Town Defendants assert that the order authorizing demolition of the Plaintiffs’ garage, which was facially valid at the time of demolition, shields them from liability. ECF No. 37-1 at 5-6.

In response to this argument, the Plaintiffs contend that the Town Defendants cannot be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as they were never performing a "judicial act." ECF No. 40 at 6. Quasi-judicial immunity, the Plaintiffs argue, has only been recognized when an actor has been made party to a lawsuit as a result of committing a "judicial...