McLaughlin v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters

641 F.Supp.3d 177

Timothy MCLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 249, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-832

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Signed September 6, 2022

James B. Lieber, Jacob M. Simon, Lieber Hammer Huber & Paul, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph J. Pass, Patrick K. Lemon, Justin T. Romano, Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 249, Michael A. Ceoffe, Joseph Rossi.

Joshua M. Bloom, Joshua M. Bloom & Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants Marc Scott, Katie Scott, Byron Roland.

John L. Lamb, Michael E. Truncellito, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Don Kraus, Frank Conforti, TriStar Pictures, Inc.

Carolyn Owens Boucek, Clare M. Gallagher, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellot, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant CBS Studios, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Timothy McLaughlin ("McLaughlin"), a unionized professional truck driver, claims that he has been blacklisted for over a decade from work as a driver on movie and television productions in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 41). In December 2021, he filed a twelve-count Amended Complaint against ten Defendants¹ alleging violations of federal and state law, including the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and Pennsylvania common law.² (ECF No. 41). Defendants subsequently filed four Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which collectively challenge all of McLaughlin's claims. (ECF Nos. 48, 50, 52, 54). For the reasons below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

McLaughlin was born in 1952. (ECF No. 41, ¶ 22). He is a professional truck driver with a Class A commercial driver's license and has been a member of Local 249 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters for over fifty years. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 23). Between 2001 and 2011, McLaughlin worked consistently as a driver on movie and television productions in Pittsburgh. (Id. ¶ 25). Such positions are "highly attractive" because they provide a high wage rate and substantial opportunities for overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). To fill these positions, the production companies often reach a standard agreement with Local 249. (Id. ¶¶ 91, 99). Under that standard agreement, the Union operates a non-exclusive hiring hall—meaning the Union refers members (and non-members) to the companies as potential employees, but the companies are free to hire employees from other sources.³ (Id. ¶¶ 30, 92). In making its referrals, the Union does not rely on its regular seniority system. (Id. ¶ 37). Instead, the Union uses a so-called "Producer's Choice" system, where the Union sends the companies the resumes and applications of all interested individuals, and the producers decide who to hire. (Id. ¶¶ 101-02).

In late 2010, McLaughlin began to publicly complain about the "Producer's Choice" system. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). For example, at a Union meeting that year, McLaughlin stated that the system is "unfair" because it "insulate[s] nepotism and favoritism" and because the "production companies do not have any basis to know which drivers to select." (Id. ¶ 34). According to McLaughlin, the "Producer's Choice" system "is a smokescreen and not a legitimate hiring process" because, in practice, hiring "is controlled not by the out-of-town producers but by a few select local individuals and the Union for the benefit of themselves and their friends, family, and political allies." (Id. ¶ 154). Those local individuals include the Officers of Local 249, along with Transportation Coordinators (individuals who coordinate trucking and transportation needs during movie and television productions) and Captains (Union members who oversee drivers and other similar employees during productions). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 32).

Beginning in 2011, McLaughlin stopped being hired as a movie driver. (Id. ¶ 42). Instead, the production companies hired "[s]ignificantly younger and inexperienced individuals" who often had "personal ties" to the Officers, Transportation Coordinators, and Captains (e.g., spouses, children, neighbors, and friends). (Id. ¶ 43). Over the next decade, McLaughlin continued to criticize the "Producer's Choice" system by writing letters and emails to various Union officials (id. ¶¶ 47, 51, 55, 78-79, 84, 109, 112, 121-24, 130-31) and filing a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") (id. ¶ 110). He also filed charges of age discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") (id. ¶¶ 62, 119, 137, 142), followed by lawsuits alleging the same (id. ¶¶ 66, 150).⁴ Meanwhile, McLaughlin continued to seek employment as a movie driver. (Id. ¶¶ 60-61, 63-65, 70-77, 82-83, 85-87, 105-08, 116, 126-29, 135-36, 138, 144-49, 151-52). But he was "blacklisted," and, by 2021, he had not been hired "for discriminatory and/or retaliatory reasons on over 50 productions." (Id. ¶¶ 68, 155).

In June 2021, McLaughlin filed the present lawsuit against the Union, two Union Officers (Ceoffe and Rossi), five Transportation Coordinators and/or Captains (M. Scott, K. Scott, Roland, Kraus, and Conforti), and two production companies (CBS and TriStar). (ECF No. 1). He amended his Complaint in December 2021 and now raises twelve counts:

• Count I — LMRDA Retaliation (Against Union)

• Count II — RICO Racketeering Activity (Against All Defendants)

• Count III — RICO Conspiracy (Against All Defendants)

• Count IV — ADEA Retaliation (Against CBS)

• Count V — ADEA Retaliation (Against TriStar)

• Count VI — ADEA Age Discrimination (Against TriStar)

• Count VII — ADEA Retaliation (Against Union)

• Count VIII — ADEA Age Discrimination (Against Union)

• Count IX — PHRA Retaliation (Against Union and Roland)

• Count X — PHRA Age Discrimination (Against Union and Roland)

• Count XI — NLRA Breach of Duty of Fair Representation (Against Union)

• Count XII — PA Common Law Interference with Prospective Employment (Against Union, M. Scott, Roland, Kraus, and Conforti)

(ECF No. 41, ¶¶ 157-313). Thereafter, Defendants filed four Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 48, 50, 52, 54).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Although a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is "not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

The "plausibility" standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not akin to a "probability" requirement but asks for more than sheer "possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In other words, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Facial plausibility is present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Even if the complaint's well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not entitle a plaintiff to relief. Id. at 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The complaint must support the inference with facts to plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, taken together, challenge the entirety of McLaughlin's Amended Complaint. The Court will consider each count in turn.

A. Count I — LMRDA Retaliation (Against Union)

In Count I, McLaughlin alleges that he engaged in protected speech under the LMRDA and the Union retaliated against him by blacklisting him from movie driver positions. (ECF No. 41, ¶¶ 157-74). McLaughlin maintains that such retaliation constitutes improper disciplinary action and infringement of his right to free speech, in violation of the LMRDA. (Id. ¶ 167). See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (affording union members "the right to meet and assemble freely with other members" and "to express any views, arguments, or opinions"); id. § 411(a)(5) (barring union members from being "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined" absent certain procedures); id. § 412 (providing a civil cause of action for "[a]ny person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed"). The Union argues that Count I should be dismissed because (1) discrimination within a job referral system does not constitute "discipline" under the LMRDA, (2) McLaughlin failed to bring the claim within the LMRDA's two-year statute of limitations, and (3) McLaughlin failed to exhaust intra-union administrative remedies. (ECF No. 51, pp. 6-11). None of those arguments succeed. The Court will deny the Union's Motion to Dismiss...