McLaurin v. Pitkins, Civil Action No. 11-50 Erie

SAUNDERS McLAURIN, Petitioner,

v.D.W. Pitkins, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 11-50 Erie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: November 1, 2012

Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

OPINION AND ORDER¹

Presently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Saunders McLaurin. [ECF No. 11]. He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County on January 28, 2009. For the reasons set forth below, his petition is denied and a certificate of appealability is denied.

I.

A. Relevant Background²

Petitioner was charged in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas at Criminal Docket Number 2093 of 2008 with one count of Robbery, Theft By Unlawful Taking, and Receiving Stolen Property. The court appointed Assistant Public Defender Michael A. DeJohn, Esquire, to be his counsel. The Honorable Ernest J. DiSantis, Jr., presided over a non-jury trial on December 18, 2008.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania summarized the basic facts of this case:

A review of the record discloses that on the 21st day of June, 2008, Kathleen Anderson and her daughter (Jamie Sheehan) were walking home from an evening at a local bar when Anderson had her purse stolen by a person later identified as [Petitioner]. Prior tothe incident, Sheehan had managed to distance herself one-half block from her mother. During the course of the robbery, Anderson was hit in the eye by her assailant, which caused her to fall and yell for her daughter's intervention. Sheehan came to her mother's aid and, in the course thereof, retrieved the stolen purse from [Petitioner].... Anderson gave a videotaped statement to police but not before receiving treatment at the hospital, which diagnosed her with sustaining a subdural hematoma, draining, and a concussion.... Anderson could not select her assailant from a photo array, she did identify [Petitioner] as her attacker at the preliminary hearing. Also, Sheehan and Anderson selected [Petitioner] as the perpetrator of the offenses charged at his non-jury trial, which resulted in the trial court finding [Petitioner] guilty.

(CP Dkt. No. 15, Commonwealth v. McLaurin, No. 156 WDA 2009, slip op. at 1-2 (Pa.Super. Oct. 7, 2009)).

In his subsequent appeal to the Superior Court, Petitioner claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's verdicts. Attorney DeJohn submitted a "Statement of Intent to File an Anders/McClendon Brief," in which he explained that he believed that there were no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on direct appeal. (CP Dkt. No. 12).

On October 7, 2009, the Superior Court issued a Memorandum in which it affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence. It first concluded that DeJohn had complied with the requirements of Anders. (CP Dkt. No. 15, McLaurin, No. 156 WDA 2009, slip op. at 3). It then reviewed Petitioner's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and rejected it on the merits. (Id. at 4-6).

On April 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se motion under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (CP Dkt. No. 16). The court appointed William J. Hathaway, Esquire, to represent him. Hathaway subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying "no-merit" letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1988). (CP Dkt. Nos. 19, 20).

On May 17, 2010, the PCRA Court granted Hathaway's petition for leave to withdraw and issued an Opinion and Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Without a Hearing Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).(CP Dkt. No. 21). Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, Petitioner had 20 days to file a response to the PCRA Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. He did not file one. On June 10, 2010, the PCRA Court issued an Order in which it denied the PCRA motion. (CP Dkt. No. 22). Petitioner did not file an appeal with the Superior Court.

On or around February 18, 2011, Petitioner filed with this Court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus [ECF No. 11] and accompanying brief in support [ECF No. 12]. He claims, as he did in his direct appeal, that the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence to support the verdicts of guilt. He also raises numerous other claims, including that his Miranda rights were violated, that the indictment was amended improperly, that Attorney DeJohn provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel, and that Attorney Hathaway was ineffective.³ Respondents have filed an Answer [ECF No. 19], in which they contend, inter alia, that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted most of his claims. They also contend that Petitioner's claim that there was insufficient evidence should be denied on the merits.

B. Discussion

(1) Insufficiency of the Evidence Claim

(a) Standard of Review

This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under this statute, habeas relief is only available on the grounds that Petitioner's judgment of sentence was obtained in violation of his federal constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In addition, AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). It "requires federal courts collaterally reviewing state proceedings to afford considerable deference to state courts' legal and factual determinations." Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004).

As codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,⁴ or involved an unreasonable application of,⁵ clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(Emphasis added).

When he appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court, Petitioner raised the same insufficiency of the evidence claim that he raises in the instant petition. The Superior Court denied it on the merits. (CP Dkt. No. 15, McLaurin, No. 156 WDA 2009, slip op. at 4-6). Because it did, this Court's analysis of the claim is governed by AEDPA's standard of review as codified at § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has stressed the "highly deferential" review that this Court must accord the state court's decision under § 2254(d):

We have explained that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Indeed, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id., at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Rather, that application must be "objectively unreasonable." Id., at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. This distinction creates "a substantially higher threshold" for obtaining relief than de novo review. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). AEDPA thus imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam).

Renico v. Lett, — U.S. — , 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). See also Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) ("If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.... It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no farther.").

(b) Was the Superior Court's Decision "Contrary To or An Unreasonable Application Of Clearly Established Federal Law, As Determined By the Supreme Court Of the United States"?

The "clearly established Federal law," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), in which to analyze this claim is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). "The Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" of each element of the offense. Id. at 309. Under Jackson, evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, "after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). "Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors [or, in this case the trial judge] 'draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Coleman v. Johnson, — U.S. — , 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

In rejecting this claim, the Superior Court applied the Pennsylvania equivalent of the Jackson standard. (CP Dkt. No. 15, McLaurin, No. 156 WDA 2009, slip op. at 4). See also Evans v....