McLean v. Leonard

LARRY McLEAN, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY M. LEONARD, individually and in his official and supervisory capacities asthe Chief of Police for the Town of Wake Forest, North Carolina Police Department,T.C. WEBB, individually and in his official capacity as a Police Officer with the Townof Wake Forest, North Carolina Police Department and J.J. JEFFERSON,individually and in his official and supervisory capacities as a Police Sergeantwith the Town of Wake Forest, North Carolina Police Department and TOWN OFWAKE FOREST, North Carolina and DONNIE HARRISON, individually and inhis official capacity as Sheriff for Wake County, North Carolina, and WAKECOUNTY, North Carolina, Defendants.

NO. 5:14-CV-718-FL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION

September 30, 2015

ORDER

This matter is before the court on motion to dismiss by defendants Donnie Harrison ("Harrison") and Wake County, North Carolina ("Wake County"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (DE 28). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), United States Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II, entered memorandum and recommendation ("M&R"), wherein it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. (DE 56). Plaintiff filed objections to the M&R, and defendants submitted no response in the allotted time period. (DE 61). In this posture, theissues raised are ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, the court adopts the M&R and grants the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Larry McLean ("McLean") initiated this action on October 28, 2014, against Jeffrey Leonard, Chief of Police for Wake Forest; Officer T.C. Webb and Sergeant J.J. Jefferson of the Wake Forest Police Department; the Town of Wake Forest; Wake County; and Wake County Sheriff Donnie Harrison. Plaintiff claims defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for knowing of a conspiracy to violate his civil rights, and under state common law for torts of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He seeks more than $2,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.

Defendants may be arranged into two groups according to their involvement in plaintiff's arrest and their answers to plaintiff's complaint: 1) defendants Leonard, Webb, Jefferson, and the Town of Wake Forest, and 2) defendants Harrison and Wake County.¹ On January 12, 2015, defendants Harrison and Wake County filed a motion to dismiss all claims against them for failure to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court referred the motion to dismiss to the magistrate judge, and the M&R was entered on August 19, 2015. In the M&R, it is recommended that the court dismiss the federal constitutional claims against defendants Harrison and Wake County because North Carolina law establishes that Wake County cannot be held liable for constitutional violations arising out of law enforcement activities undertaken by the Sheriff's Office. Furthermore, it is recommended that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show any§ 1983 violations resulted from any official policy set by defendant Harrison and failed to state a claim against defendant Harrison in his individual capacity because there is insufficient evidence to show that his deputies' activities posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury. Finally, it is recommended that plaintiff's state common law tort claims be dismissed because both defendants are entitled to governmental immunity and defendant Harrison enjoys public official's immunity. On September 10, 2015, plaintiff filed objections to the M&R, and defendants have submitted no response. (DE 61).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court adopts and incorporates in large part herein the summary statement of facts set forth in the M&R. At approximately 1:00 AM on February 7, 2014, plaintiff and his fiancé were driving home from dinner when he was pulled over by defendant Webb. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 18, 23, DE 1). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Webb stopped him while conducting a practice termed "Bingo Hunting," in which law enforcement officers randomly check motorists' license plates in the hopes of finding evidence of criminal activity. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 41). Shortly thereafter, defendant Jefferson joined defendant Webb at the traffic stop, and both defendants ordered plaintiff out of his car. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27). Defendants Jefferson and Webb handcuffed plaintiff and placed him under arrest pursuant to an Order for Arrest ("OFA") from Franklin County. (Id.). Plaintiff objected to being arrested and told defendants that the OFA was related to a case that was dismissed in 2012. (Id. ¶28). Shortly after placing plaintiff under arrest, defendants Webb and Jefferson learned that the OFA was accompanied by a "Do Not Arrest" order. (Id.).

Nonetheless, defendants Webb and Jefferson transported plaintiff to the Wake County Detention Center. (Id. ¶29). Defendant Webb took plaintiff before a Wake County Magistrate whoordered plaintiff photographed, fingerprinted, and detained until such time as he could post a $100,000.00 secured bond. (Id. ¶31). Upon his admission to the Wake County Detention Center, plaintiff was strip searched, subjected to a cavity search, had his personal property seized, and was placed in the general jail population. (Id. ¶32). Detention center staff did not allow plaintiff to use the telephone and refused to contact Franklin County to investigate plaintiff's claim that he should be released. (Id. ¶33). Six days later, plaintiff was released from the Wake County Detention Center after his attorney contacted the Franklin County District Attorney's Office about his arrest. (Id. ¶31). Following his release, plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on October 28, 2014.

COURT'S DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The district court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which specific objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The court does not perform a de novo review where a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent a specific and timely filed objection, the court reviews only for "clear error," and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint but "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability ofdefenses." Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.1999). A complaint states a claim under 12(b)(6) if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating the complaint, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.2009) (citations omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Pleading Standard

Plaintiff objects to the Rule 8 pleading standard as it is analyzed through the lens of the 12(b)(6) standard of review set out above and employed in the M&R. He contends that facts alleged in a civil rights complaint are entitled to deferential review, and asserts that defendants advocated and the magistrate judge employed a heightened pleading standard beyond what is required under Rule 8. (Pl.'s Resp., DE 61). Plaintiff heavily relies upon the Supreme Court's application of the pleading standards to a § 1983 claim in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). However, claims brought in federal court are subject to generally applicable standards established by the entirety of the Supreme Court's Rule 8jurisprudence, including Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Although plaintiff ignores both cases, these later "decisions require more specificity from complaints in federal civil cases than was heretofore the case." Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012); see Cook v. Howard, 484 F. App'x 805, 809-10 (4th Cir. 2012). The court must apply the current interpretation required by Rule 8(a), and it does not hold plaintiff to a heightened pleading standard. Plaintiff's objection on this point is without merit.

2. § 1983 Claim Against Defendant Wake County

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Wake County liable for constitutional and common law torts allegedly committed by deputies of the Wake County Sheriff's Office. To impose liability on a municipality a plaintiff must "plead and prove the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights." Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994). However, local government ...