McMillin v. Foodbrands Supply Chain Services, Inc.

Page 1211

272 F.Supp.2d 1211

Maria M. McMILLIN, Plaintiff, v. FOODBRANDS SUPPLY CHAIN SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A.01-2598-GTV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

July 21, 2003.

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James E. Kunce, Overland Park, KS, for plaintiff.

Robert W. McKinley, Michael A. Williams, Lathrop & Gage L.C., Kansas City, MO, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VanBEBBER, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Maria McMillian, brings this case alleging that Defendant, Foodbrands Supply Chain Services, Inc., violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA") by failing to properly compensate her for overtime hours worked; violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ("EPA") by failing to compensate her at a rate equal to that received by similarly situated males; discriminated against her based on her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); retaliated against her in violation of the FLSA and Title VII for opposing the alleged unequal pay and discrimination she faced; and breached an oral contract of employment with Plaintiff. The case is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 42). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act and Title VII sex discrimination claims and denied with respect to all other claims.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are either uncontroverted or are based on the evidence submitted with the summary judgment papers and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Immaterial facts and facts not properly supported by the record are omitted.

Defendant operates a warehouse business in Kansas where processed foods are received, assembled, and then shipped to brokers and wholesale customers. In April 1998, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a billing clerk at an hourly rate of $9.50. As a billing clerk, Plaintiff was responsible for recording her own time and overtime on time sheets.

In January 1999, Defendant created the Samples Department, a new department responsible for providing samples of Defendant's food products to salespersons and brokers. Upon opening the department, Defendant promoted Plaintiff to the position of Samples Specialist, a non-exempt position under the FLSA. Plaintiff's new position required her to clock in and out of work on a computerized time clock rather than manually fill out time sheets. The time clock system recorded all hours, including overtime hours, worked by Plaintiff at the office. It did not, however, record any hours that she worked from home. She alleges that from September 1999 through May 2000, she worked — and was not compensated for — an average of twenty hours of overtime per week from home. Part of the overtime work she performed from home involved typing in names, addresses, and labels directly onto her home computer. The remainder of the work required her to access Defendant's computer network through a software program added to her home computer. Defendant's computer records establish that Plaintiff first accessed Defendant's network from home on December 27, 1999, and that she logged a total of 19 hours and 25 minutes on the network from that time through May 15, 2000. Plaintiff did not otherwise keep records of the overtime work she performed from home.

Plaintiff first inquired about being paid for her home-based overtime in January 2000. Her immediate supervisor at the time, Joe Segobia, informed her that she had been given home access to Defendant's computer network so that Defendant would not have to pay her overtime. Plaintiff raised the subject with Mr. Segobia two or three more times and received the same response. She also spoke with Chris Chidester, Defendant's Director of Human Relations, about the issue. Mr. Chidester told Plaintiff that she should be paid for every hour she was working from home, and that she should contact Defendant's IT Department in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma to obtain her remote access computer records to determine how much overtime she had worked. Plaintiff contacted the IT Department and was informed that she needed to obtain permission from a supervisor before any computer records could be released. By the time she attempted to obtain that permission from Mr. Chidester, his employment had been terminated. Plaintiff did not ask Mr. Segobia for permission, and she never otherwise lodged a written request or complaint regarding the denial of overtime pay.

In May 2000, Defendant converted Plaintiff's Samples Specialist position into an exempt position under the FLSA. Following the conversion, Plaintiff earned a salary of $32,000 per year and was no longer eligible for overtime pay.

In January 2001, Jeff Jones, Defendant's Director of Operations, offered Plaintiff the opportunity to move to one of two open positions: Warehouse Administrative Supervisor or Back Dock Supervisor. The Warehouse Administrative Supervisor position involved supervision of approximately eleven clerical employees and required the supervisor to work in an office or cubicle for approximately ninety percent of the day. The Back Dock Supervisor position required that the individual spend ninety percent of the day supervising and assisting twenty to twenty-five warehouse employees in loading, unloading, moving, and rotating merchandise in refrigerated and frozen warehouses. At the time Mr. Jones offered Plaintiff the positions, he informed her that the salaries were the same and were equal to the salaries being paid to other warehouse supervisors. Plaintiff accepted the Warehouse Administrative Supervisor position.

Plaintiff assumed responsibilities for the Warehouse Administrative Supervisor position in March 2001. Several months passed and Plaintiff had yet to receive the raise in salary promised by Mr. Jones. She confronted him about this on several occasions during the period from March to June of 2001, once directly asking him whether she was not receiving the raise because she was a woman and the company did not want to pay her the same as a man. She also specifically noted that she was the only female supervisor and was making significantly less money than the male supervisors.

On or about July 20, 2001, Plaintiff received a $1,600 per year pay increase, retroactive to March 15, 2001. The increase raised her salary to $34,100 per year, approximately $8,000 to $10,000 per year less than the salaries of the male warehouse supervisors. Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Jones and Steve Bryan, Defendant's Director of Human Resources, about her displeasure over the raise. She testified in deposition that she said the following to the two men: "I told [them] I was very unhappy and I would have to consider other means to receive gratification [or, in other words] ... have to seek other avenues to receive the compensation I had been promised." Eventually, Mr. Jones told Plaintiff that they needed to end the meeting and take some time to cool off. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones left for vacation.

On August 15, 2001, approximately one to two days following Mr. Jones's return from vacation, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment. Mr. Jones and Mr. Bryan both took part in the decision to discharge Plaintiff. Defendant alleges that it discharged Plaintiff because it decided to eliminate her Warehouse Administrative Supervisor position as a cost-cutting measure and had, in fact, been contemplating the elimination since June 2001. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's position was not necessary because: (1) Tyson Foods, which bought out Foodbrands in June 2001, did not provide samples to sales people or brokers; (2) air freight was handled by Tyson's headquarters in Springdale, Arkansas; and (3) supervision of billing clerks was transferred to the inventory manager, Bruce Murphy. Aside from one other employee whose project was canceled, Plaintiff was the only employee terminated in the second half of the 2001 calendar year due to reorganization after the Tyson buy-out.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant never informed her that the reason it was terminating her employment was because her position was being eliminated. Rather, she claims that Mr. Bryan informed her in the August 15, 2001 meeting that she was being discharged as a result of two "incidents" which had recently occurred. Those "incidents" involved: (1) an allegation that Plaintiff had spread gossip involving LaDonna Spies, a customer service coordinator; and (2) a meeting Plaintiff had with Jim Parise and Josh Rennas, the warehouse manager, in which Mr. Rennas accused Plaintiff of, and later wrote her up for, being uncooperative in a discussion about potential solutions to a problem they were experiencing at the warehouse. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Bryan had previously been informed that the incident involving Ms. Spies was not true, and that she told Mr. Bryan that the incident with Mr. Rennas was "totally bogus."

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Id. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of...