McNeal v. Univ. of Minn. Physicians

Brett McNeal, Plaintiff, v. University of Minnesota Physicians, Defendant.

Civ. No. 15-3442 (RHK/JSM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

January 28, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Richard A. Williams, Jr., Megan A. Spriggs, R.A. Williams Law Firm, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.

Samuel W. Diehl, Matthew P. Webster, Gray Plant Mooty Mooty & Bennett, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brett McNeal began working for Defendant University of Minnesota Physicians ("UMP") in 2007; in 2010, he was fired. He commenced this action five years later, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. Presently before the Court is UMP's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, UMP's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges the following facts. McNeal is an African-American male who was hired in January 2007 as UMP's Manager of Diversity and Recruitment; he later became the Manager of Diversity and Employee Relations. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 36.) He asserts UMP engaged in widespread and continuous racial discrimination towards him and others employed at UMP. He claims he was called a racist (id. ¶¶ 15, 21, 28) and made the subject of false rumors (id. ¶¶ 25-26), all in a continuing effort by his coworkers and supervisors to have him discharged based on his conduct—conduct McNeal contends was done to discharge his responsibilities as "Manager of Diversity." (Id. ¶ 36.)

McNeal recounts several such instances where he experienced this behavior. Shortly after he began working at UMP, he posted a job opening for a recruiter. (Id. ¶ 14.) A non-minority female, who was temporarily working under McNeal's supervision, applied for the position, yet McNeal was told he was not to hire her. (Id.) When an allegedly more-qualified white male was hired for the position, the temporary worker began telling co-workers that McNeal was a racist and would never hire a non-minority. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) McNeal notified one of his supervisors¹ about the temporary worker's statements but is unaware of any action taken in response. (Id. ¶ 16.)

McNeal contends he was again accused of being a racist in 2007, when supervisor "Robin M." requested his input about terminating an African-American employee. (Id. ¶ 17.) McNeal suggested there was insufficient documentation to terminate the employee and indicated that proper documentation was important to reduce the risk of the employee filing a race-based grievance. (Id.) Afterwards, Robin M. complained to her supervisor,"Sheila H.," that McNeal was a racist and was trying to set different standards for "Black employees." (Id. ¶ 18.) Sheila H. reported this information to UMP Senior Vice President "Ann P.," who then complained to UMP Vice President of Human Resources, Ann Eilbracht, that McNeal was a racist, not qualified for his job, and should be terminated. (Id. ¶ 19.) The accusations of racist behavior were ultimately reported to an unnamed "executive," who indicated there was no problem with McNeal. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Furthermore, throughout his employment at UMP, McNeal noticed differential treatment among applicants and employees based on race. He alleges that non-minority individuals, whom he considered less qualified than minority members, were given certain jobs, notwithstanding recommendations from McNeal and his department that they were not the best applicants based on UMP's hiring protocols. (Id. ¶ 35.) It was his opposition to this repeated conduct which he contends led to his termination in June 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36-37.) As an example, in 2008 McNeal posted an opening for a job within his department and Terry Porter, an African-American male who was employed in the department at the time, applied. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Porter had a Master's Degree and was working towards a Ph.D. in Industrial Relations. (Id.) Nevertheless, McNeal claims the unnamed "Vice President" responsible for filling the position told McNeal's department that Porter would not be hired "because he did not have adequate experience." (Id. ¶ 32.) McNeal and his department felt the other applicants—including the "Caucasian female" who was ultimately hired—were not as qualified as, and in many cases less qualified than, Porter. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.)

On June 1, 2010, McNeal was terminated from his job without explanation. (Id. ¶ 37.) On September 24, 2010, he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which was cross-filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ("MDHR") three days later. (Id. ¶ 39; Diehl Aff., Exs. A, B.) The EEOC informed the MDHR and McNeal that it would initially investigated the charge. (Diehl Aff., Exs. A, B.) Almost five years later, the EEOC completed its investigation and on May 18, 2015, issued a determination finding no probable cause, dismissing the charge, and granting a right to sue. (Compl. ¶ 40.) The MDHR's right-to-sue letter was issued on June 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 41.)

McNeal filed this action in Hennepin County District Court on July 30, 2015, alleging race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), Title VII (Count II), and the MHRA (Count III). He also alleged reprisal in violation of the MHRA (Count IV) and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count V).² UMP removed the action to this Court and now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, for summary judgment.³ The Motion has been fully briefed, the Court heard argument on December 21, 2015, and the Motion is now ripe for disposition.

STANDARD OF DECISION

As noted above, UMP has styled its Motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. In support of its Motion, UMP submitted evidentiary materials beyond the pleadings (Doc. Nos. 14, 15);McNeal responded in kind (Doc. Nos. 17, 18). However, "Rule 12(b)(6) motions are not automatically converted into motions for summary judgment simply because one party submits additional matters in support of or [in] opposition to the motion." Casazza v. Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). When faced with this situation, the Court enjoys "complete discretion" whether to exclude the material and proceed under Rule 12, or consider it and proceed under Rule 56. Stahl v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2003); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In the Court's view, this matter is not yet ripe for summary-judgment consideration as inadequate discovery has taken place at this early stage of the proceeding. See Hester v. Redwood Cty., 885 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (D. Minn. 2012) (Montgomery, J.) ("As a general rule, summary judgment under Rule 56 is proper only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery."). As such, the Court will address UMP's Motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The Court "must accept [the] plaintiff's specific factual allegations as true but [need] not . . . accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions." Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Complaint must be construed liberally, andany allegations or reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be interpreted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. ⁴ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-56.

ANALYSIS

I. Beaulieu requires dismissal of McNeal's MHRA claims.

UMP first argues that McNeal's MHRA claims (Counts III and IV) should be dismissed because it has been prejudiced by the nearly 5-year delay between when McNeal filed his charge and the MDHR issued its determination. The MHRA provides, in relevant part, that "the commissioner [of the MDHR] shall make a determination within 12 months after the charge was filed as to whether there is probable cause to credit the allegation of [discrimination]." Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6(b) (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court later determined that the mandatory word "shall" was intended by the legislature to set a "strict time frame [of 12 months] within which the MDHR must make a probable cause determination." State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Minn. 1996). The court also held that respondents would likely be prejudiced by determinations made more than 12 months after a charge was filed and, in such an instance, respondents should be permitted to seek appropriate relief, including dismissal of the claims. Id. at 702-03. Nonetheless, the court also created a bright-line rule "that probable cause determinations made 31 or more months after a charge is filedare per se prejudicial to the respondent and require dismissal of the complaint" as a matter of law. Id. at 703.

Here, it is undisputed the MDHR issued its determination on June 16, 2015, 57 months after McNeal's charge was cross-filed with it. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 41.) UMP contends this delay is "per se prejudicial" because it far exceeds the 31-month bright-line rule set in Beaulieu. The Court agrees. The MDHR's 57-month delay clearly transgresses this line and McNeal's MHRA claims for discrimination and reprisal must be dismissed. 552 N.W.2d at 702-03; see also Powers-Potter v. Nash Finch Co., Civ. No. 14-339, 2014 WL 2003063, at *1 (D. Minn. May 14, 2014) (Schiltz, J.).

While at first blush this may appear a harsh result, McNeal had some responsibility to act to ameliorate it. See Beaulieu, 552 N.W.2d at 702 n.7 ("[T]he...