McPherson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

Denise McPherson, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. CV-20-08202-PCT-JAT

United States District Court, D. Arizona

August 20, 2021

ORDER

James A. Teilborg, Senior United States District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Denise McPherson's appeal from the Commissioner's denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381- 1383f. (Doc. 1). The appeal is fully briefed. (Docs. 25, 26, 27). The Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was 59 years old at the time of her hearing, completed “some college, ” and has past relevant work experience as a hospital cleaner, transportation driver concession worker, and caregiver. (Doc. 25 at 2). Plaintiff argues that the following conditions rendered her disabled “1. Headache; 2. One Eye: Total Vision Impairment; 3. Primary Open-angle Glaucoma; 4. Plateau iris syndrome; 5. Adhesions and Disruptions of Pupillary Membranes; 6. Acute and Chronic Open-angle Glaucoma; 7. Pain in or Around Eye; 8. Rubeosis Iridis; 9. Phacolytic Glaucoma; 10. Nuclear Sclerosis; 11. Total or Mature Senile Cataract; and 12. Glaucoma Associated with Vascular Disorders of Eye.” (Doc. 25 at 2). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of “right eye glaucoma and prosthetic left eye.” (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 16). Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 20, 2016, the alleged onset date. (AR at 16).

Plaintiff filed applications for SSDI and SSI benefits on May 23, 2016. (AR at 14). Those applications were denied at the initial stage, (AR at 14), upon reconsideration, (AR at 14.), and by the ALJ after a hearing, (AR at 14-22). The Appeals Council then denied review. (Doc. 25 at 1). Plaintiff then sought review in this Court. (Doc. 1).

a. The Disability Determination

A claimant must show she “is under a disability” to qualify for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The claimant is disabled if she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in any “substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 423(d)(1)-(2). The Social Security Administration has created a five-step process for an ALJ to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a)(1). Each step can be dispositive. See Id. § 404.1420(a)(4). “The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, ” and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009).

At step one, the ALJ examines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If not, then the ALJ proceeds to step two. At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a physical or mental impairment or a combination of impairments that are “severe.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ finds that there is severe impairment, then the ALJ proceeds to step three to determine whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ must assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) before proceeding to step four. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC is the most a claimant “can still do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). At step four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can still do “past relevant work” in light of the claimant's RFC. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the final step and examines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work” considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If an adjustment can be made, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

b. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ denied Plaintiff social security benefits because she determined that Plaintiff had “not been under a disability” since the onset date and was “capable of performing past relevant work as a caregiver and hospital cleaner.” (AR at 20-21). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy” such as “linen room attendant (DOT 222.387-030).” (AR at 22). After finding that Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 20, 2016 at step one, the ALJ determined, at step two, that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “right eye glaucoma and prosthetic left eye.” (AR at 17).

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments, singularly or in combination, did not “meet[] or medically equal[] the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” (AR at 17). Accordingly, the ALJ conducted an RFC analysis and found that Plaintiff could perform “a full range of work at all exertional levels but with [certain] nonexertional limitations.” (AR at 17-21).

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform past relevant work as a caregiver and hospital cleaner, (AR at 21), and that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy” such as “linen room attendant (DOT 222.387-030), ” (AR at 22). Thus, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from February 20, 2016 through the date of the ALJ's decision. (AR at 22).

II.LEGAL STANDARD

The ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits may be overturned “only when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)).

“The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Id. (citations omitted); see Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); see Benton, 331 F.3d at 1035 (“If the evidence can support either outcome, the Commissioner's decision must be upheld.”).

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On the other hand, the Court “may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court's inquiry is constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of those reasons. See id.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that there are four potential errors in the ALJ's analysis: (1) the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's headaches to be non-severe and did not support her decision with substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ's RFC was not supported by the Vocational Expert's (“VE”) opinion; (3) the ALJ abused her discretion in not submitting Plaintiff's proposed interrogatories to Dr. Heller; and (4) the ALJ erred in not fully crediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Doc. 25). The Court addresses each contention in turn.

a. Severity Determination and Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's headaches to be non-severe and did not support her decision with substantial evidence, going so far as to call the RFC determination “incomprehensible.” (Doc. 25 at 5-8). Plaintiff goes on to state, given Plaintiff's medical record and history, “a closed period of disability would seem to be warranted at the very leas [sic].” (Id. at 8). The ALJ, on the other hand, stated that Plaintiff's headaches were non-severe, and the RFC was supported by the objective medical record, the medical opinions, and Plaintiff's reported and observed levels of functioning. (AR at 19).

1. Legal Standard

At step two, the ALJ conducts a de minimis screening of a plaintiff's alleged impairments to dispose of groundless claims. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). “An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the plaintiff's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). If a plaintiff meets the evidentiary...