McQuay v. McDonald

1

LEONARD B. MCQUAY, Plaintiff, v. FERNELLE MCDONALD, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00182-JRS-MKK

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

January 16, 2024

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

JAMES R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

Leonard McQuay, an Indiana prisoner, was placed in segregation, lost his prison job, and was removed from the PLUS Program when he was confined at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF).^[1] In this lawsuit, he alleges that the defendants took these actions in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The defendants seek summary judgment on Mr. McQuay's claims. For the reasons below the motion for summary judgment, dkt. [81], is GRANTED.

I. Standard of Review

Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, a way to resolve a case short of a trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Sch. 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.

II. Factual Background

Because the defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

During the incidents at issue, Mr. McQuay worked as the lead sanitation worker in the Offender Services Building ("OSB") at WVCF. See Dkt. 82-1 at 51:2-8; 13:8-9. The defendants were employed in the following capacities: Fernelle McDonald was the Chief Investigator at WVCF, and Randall VanVleet, Steven Carpenter, and Travis Davis were Investigators. Dkt. 1 at 2-3. Lead sanitation worker is a trusted position because of the level of access the inmate has to staff and the OSB. See Dkt. 82-1at 16:8-17. To obtain that job, the inmate must be approved by various departments, must interact with staff in a professional, appropriate manner, and not have a history of recent misconduct. See id. at 19:11-25, 36:15-37:7. At that time, Mr. McQuay had recently entered the initial phase of the PLUS Program. See id. at 45:8-17. Inmates could participate in this program if they did not have any recent conduct violations, agreed to abide by a code of conduct, agreed to relinquish their current employment upon entry into the second phase of the program, and so on. See id. at 42:21-43:23.

On January 22, 2020, defendants Carpenter and McDonald questioned Mr. McQuay about a note that he had given to a mental health clerk. See id. at 51:7-19, 54:18-21, 55:13-18. Mr. McQuay admitted to writing the note and placing it on the clerk's desk. Id. at 51:19-22, 54:1521. The parties agree that the note stated that the counselor "was absolutely a beautiful person." Id. at 54:19-21. The defendants contend that the note was inappropriate, but Mr. McQuay disputes this. Still, Mr. McQuay was released from his job as a lead sanitation worker because of this incident. Id. at 51:23-52:6. Defendants Carpenter and McDonald told Mr. McQuay that he would be given a different job and no conduct reports or poor work evaluations were issued for the offense. Id. at 52:6-12. Immediately after this interview, however, Mr. McQuay was patted down by other staff who found a second note in his pocket. Id. at 53:4-10. This note related to contraband trafficking. Id.

The next day, the defendants questioned Mr. McQuay regarding the note and suspected trafficking. Id. at 53:3-17, 83:3-7. They believed he had knowledge of or involvement in the trafficking because of his possession of the note, his employment as a sanitation lead which gave him the ability to hide contraband in the OSB, other inmates implicating him in the activity, and his reputation as having knowledge of and acting as a quasi-jailhouse informant for illicit activity occurring at WVCF. See id. at 53:4-17, 88:21-90:1; Dkt. 82-2 at 1-2. Mr. McQuay denied the accusations or knowledge of any alleged trafficking. See dkt. 82-1 at 53:9-13, 54:1-8.^[2] Mr. McQuay was removed from the PLUS Program and told that he was being transferred to G-Housing Unit ("G House"), a segregated housing unit. Id. at 52:13-17, 83:19-25.

Mr. McQuay was then taken to the SHU where he remained for 21 days as the defendants kept investigating the trafficking. Id. at 54:9-12, 57:1-4; dkt. 82-2 ¶ 5. During that time, the defendants searched his cell, the OSB, the equipment he used in the course of his job duties, and potentially other offenders. See dkt. 82-1 at 81:3-21; dkt. 82-2 ¶ 5. Once the investigation concluded, Mr. McQuay was exonerated, and he was moved into G House as originally planned. See dkt. 82-1 at. 57:2-5, 59:1-10. He was given a job as a non-managerial sanitation worker within ninety days of entering G House but was not allowed to reenter the PLUS Program. Id. at 65:2566:5, 71:10-14.

Defendant VanVleet affirms that, even if Mr. McQuay had provided information regarding the trafficking, he still would have lost his job and program eligibility. Dkt. 82-2 ¶ 6-8. He explains that Mr. McQuay lost his job because of the note he wrote to the mental health counselor because that act raised questions about his professionalism. Id. ¶ 7. The defendants also explain that other medical staff reported that they were afraid of writing Mr. McQuay up because of his status as a high-ranking gang member. Id.^[3]

III. Discussion

To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, Mr. McQuay must show that "(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was 'at least a motivating factor' in the defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action." Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 708 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)).

The defendants do not dispute that Mr. McQuay has satisfied the second element of a retaliation claim because his job loss, transfer to segregation, and removal from the PLUS Program are acts that would deter an ordinary person from future First Amendment activity. They argue instead that he cannot support the first and third elements. First, they assert that he refused to participate in the interrogation regarding suspected trafficking and that this refusal was not a protected First Amendment activity.^[4] Next, they argue that even if it was, the defendants did not take the adverse actions against Mr. McQuay because of his conduct in the interrogation.

A. First Amendment Activity

The defendants first argue that Mr. McQuay's refusal to answer their questions about the note found in his pocket and suspected trafficking is not a protected First Amendment activity. The defendants are correct that the Seventh Circuit has suggested that a prisoner can be compelled to disclose information when that information does not incriminate him. Caffey v. Maue, 679 Fed.Appx. 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017) (refusal to help officials investigate an assault was not protected speech). But the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Mr. McQuay is that he told the defendants he did not know the answer to their questions, not that he refused to answer. See dkt. 82-1 at 53:9-13, 54:1-8. A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Mr. McQuay truthfully answered that he did not know the answers to the investigators' questions. If a jury reached this conclusion, his actions are protected by the First Amendment. McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 Fed.Appx. 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2018) (Finding, for purposes of summary judgment, that the plaintiff engaged in First Amendment activity because "[w]e must assume, because it is a disputed fact, that [the plaintiff] truthfully answered their questions in saying he did not know about gang leadership.") (citing Carson v. ALL Erection & Crane Rental Corp., 811 F.3d 993, 994 (7th Cir. 2016)). The defendants are thus not entitled to summary judgment based on their argument that Mr McQuay...