Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.

119 F.Supp.3d 807

Andrea Mosby MEACHEM, Plaintiff,

v.MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS & WATER DIVISION, Defendant.

Case No. 2:14–cv–02156–JTF–dkv.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

Signed Aug. 10, 2015.

William B. Ryan, Janelle Crandall Osowski, Donati Law Firm, LLP, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Michael D. Tauer, Miska Lerose Shaw, Saul C. Belz, Glankler Brown, PLLC, Memphis, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR., District Judge.

Before the Court comes Defendant Memphis Light, Gas & Water's Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 31, 2015. (ECF No. 44). On May 4, 2015, Plaintiff Andrea Mosby Meachem filed her Response in Opposition, (ECF No. 53), to which Defendant filed a Reply on May 29, 2015, (ECF No. 56).¹ After review of the Motion, Response, Reply, and the entire record, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

In 2005, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant for an Attorney 3 position² within the Department of Legal Services ("Department"). (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 5). During her tenure, Plaintiff was supervised by Defendant's Vice President and General Counsel, Ms. Cheryl Patterson ("Patterson").Id. The Department consists of Patterson, as well as, four other attorneys. Id. As an Attorney 3, Plaintiff primarily manages workers' compensation claims, employment issues, and litigation, but Plaintiff has never participated in a trial during her then 8–year tenure. (ECF No. 53 at p. 2).

On January 2, 2013, during the 23rd week of Plaintiff's pregnancy, Plaintiff's doctors discovered that Plaintiff's cervix had shortened, hospitalizing Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 44–1 at p. 8; 53 at p. 3). As such, Plaintiff underwent corrective surgery on January 3, 2013. Plaintiff called her supervisor, Patterson, and informed her of Plaintiff's medical complications, which would require bed rest for up to eleven weeks. (ECF No. 44–1 at pp. 8–10). At first, Patterson seemed agreeable to allowing Plaintiff to continue working once Defendant was provided appropriate supporting documentation. (ECF Nos. 53 at p. 3; 53–1 at ¶ 109) (stating that Plaintiff continued working until her accommodation request was denied); see also (ECF No. 44–23) (January 30, 2013, denial letter).

On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff made an official accommodation request to work from bed, either within the hospital or within her home. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 11). That same day, the ADA Committee ("Committee")—consisting of Eric Conway, Steve Day, and Rutha Griffin³ —met to discuss Plaintiff's requested accommodation. Id. On January 9, 2013, Dr. Shannon Malone wrote a letter advising the Defendant that Plaintiff was on bed rest, and in particular, noted that "[i]t would be ok for [Plaintiff] to work from her hospital or home." Id. at p. 10; (ECF No. 53 at p. 3). On January 15, 2013, the Committee, along with Patterson and Vernica Davis,⁴ held an interactive⁵ process with Plaintiff, in which Plaintiff was asked whether she could perform each essential job function. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 12). Plaintiff responded in the affirmative for each question asked; reiterating that all work could be done telephonically or through use of a computer. Id.; (ECF No. 53 at p. 4) (requiring only "remote access to her computer and access to her electronic case files"). Patterson relayed her concerns that Plaintiff would not be able to perform certain tasks without her being physically present. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 12). The committee denied Plaintiff's accommodation request on January 18, 2013. (ECF No. 53 at p. 5). However, Plaintiff did not receive notice until January 30, 2013. Id.; see also (ECF No. 44–23). The crux of the Committee's denial letter of January 30, 2013, stated that (1) physical presence was required and (2) Plaintiff's request elevated concerns of confidentiality. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 13).

Defendant provided Plaintiff with job-protected sick leave until exhausted and short-term disability benefits thereafter. Id. Plaintiff appealed Defendant's denial on February 2, 2013, via email. (ECF No. 53 at p. 5). On February 9, 2013, Dr. Paul Neblett provided an "Attending Physician Statement" advising Plaintiff not to work, which assisted Plaintiff's application for short term disability insurance. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 8). Also, on February 18, 2013, Dr. Neblett authorized a "Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition," noting Plaintiff's inability to drive to work and sit at a desk all day, which allowed for Plaintiff to receive sick leave under FMLA. Id. Defendant again notified Plaintiff of their denial on February 19, 2013, to which Plaintiff again appealed on February 21, 2013. (ECF No. 53 at p. 5).

In total, Plaintiff utilized nearly four weeks of sick leave with the remainder covered by the short-term disability benefits. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 12). Plaintiff stated that she had symptoms beginning January 2, 2013, such as being "unable to concentrate, analyze information and make legal decisions." Id. at p. 14. Dr. John Cooper could not determine whether such symptoms were caused or exacerbated by Plaintiff's "high risk" pregnancy, domestic issues, or Defendant's failure to provide Plaintiff's accommodation. Id.

With Plaintiff able to return the work on April 1, 2013, the accommodation period pertinent to this matter lasted from January 3, 2013, through March 31, 2013. Id. at pp. 3, 10. From February 26, 2013, until the end of the accommodation period, Plaintiff's license to practice law was suspended for failure to pay the annual registration fee. Id. at p. 14. Such failure to pay was a clerical error on the part of the Defendant. See (ECF No. 53 at p. 10, 26–27) (stating that Defendant had a temporary billing clerk at the time of the error). The suspension was publicized under Plaintiff's name via the Tennessee Bar Association Board of Governors email distribution list and website. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 15). Plaintiff's return to work in April 2013 was fully compensated despite Defendant's awareness of Plaintiff's suspension. Id. Plaintiff, however, claims that she lacked awareness until receiving a June 28, 2013 letter from Patterson. (ECF Nos. 53 at p. 10, 26–27; 53–1 at ¶ 78) (claiming that Plaintiff's suspension was never discussed prior).

Patterson, as Plaintiff's supervisor, completed a written appraisal for Plaintiff's performance for 2013. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 15). Plaintiff was assigned an overall score of "3", which included a 40% rating for negative media towards Defendant. Id. at pp. 15–16; (ECF No. 53 at p. 11). Such rating also included some commentary that Plaintiff finds retaliatory. (ECF No. 53 at p. 11) (stating that many of the comments were "without any factual basis"). Specifically, Plaintiff does not find the overall score retaliatory, but the commentary, which is readily viewable under Tennessee's open records act. (ECF No. 53–1 at ¶ 137). Additionally, Patterson has assigned medical-related employee accommodation requests to other attorneys. (ECF No. 44–1 at p. 17).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment must prove clearly and convincingly that there is no genuine issue of material fact, while the Court must draw all reasonable inferences and read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kochins v. Linden–Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2) ; see also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) ("The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the respondent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine dispute for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added) (requiring more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence"). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing DeLuca v. Atl. Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.1949) ). Furthermore, one may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must present "concrete evidence supporting [his] claims." Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir.1989) (citations omitted); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The district court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3) ; InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989). The nonmovant has the duty to point out specific evidence in the record that would be sufficient to justify a jury decision in his favor. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) ; InterRoyal Corp., 889 F.2d at 111. " ‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inference from the...