Mead v. Gaston Cnty.

MICHAEL MEAD, Plaintiff, v. GASTON COUNTY, REGINALD BLOOM,individually and officially, WILLIAM H. SAMPSON,individually and officially, and CALIVIN SHAW, individually and officially , Defendants.

3:12 CV 132

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

Signed: November 1, 2013

ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 75), Defendants' memorandum in support (Doc. No. 76), Plaintiff's response (Doc. No. 78), Defendants' reply (Doc. No. 80), and Plaintiff's notice of additional authority (Doc. No. 83). This matter is now ripe for disposition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff Michael Mead brought this action alleging that Defendants violated his civil and constitutional rights through his arrest, temporary imprisonment, and criminal trial. The case was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on February 27, 2012 (Doc. No. 44). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 18, 2012, in which he sought compensatory and punitive damages and specifically alleged that the Defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and obstruction of justice (Doc. No. 59).

This action arises out of Plaintiff's previous criminal investigation, arrest, and trial after his pregnant fiancée, Lucy Johnson, was murdered and her home burned. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges a series of mistakes and misgivings on the part of the Defendant policeofficers during the investigation, including failing to pursue leads against a more likely suspect, James Spelock. (Am. Compl. ¶ 48, Doc. No. 59). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants concealed and misrepresented facts by, among other things, advancing a number of unsupportable and specious theories of his culpability (Id. ¶ 52), securing perjurious testimony from inmates (Id. ¶ 52), withholding the results of a gunshot residue examination that failed to connect him to the crimes (Id. ¶¶ 55-59), concealing the fact that an arson dog failed to detect accelerants at Mr. Mead's home (Id. ¶¶ 60-64), claiming that Mr. Mead stole Ms. Johnson's engagement ring (Id. ¶¶ 69-74), and failing to record or memorialize information that contradicted Defendants' theories of Plaintiff's culpability (Id. ¶¶ 82-83). Following the investigation, a Grand Jury indicted Mr. Mead for First Degree Murder, First Degree Rape, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, First Degree Arson, and First Degree Burglary. The prosecutor dismissed the First Degree Burglary charge. During the trial, the judge dismissed the Robbery with a Deadly Weapon and First Degree Rape charges and the jury later found Mr. Mead not guilty of either First Degree Arson or First Degree Murder.

The Amended Complaint alleges nine claims for relief: 1) unlawful seizure (under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 2) malicious prosecution (under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983); 3) substantive and procedural due process violations (under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 4) trespass by public officers; 5) malicious prosecution; 6) substantive due process (brought in the alternative under the North Carolina Constitution, Art. I, §§ 1, 19); 7) false arrest and false imprisonment (brought in the alternative under the North Carolina Constitution, Art. I, §§ 19, 20); 8) obstruction of justice; and 9) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See Am. Compl.).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings "test[s] the legal sufficiency of the complaint and will result in claims being dismissed, 'where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noted facts.'" Jones v. Penn Nat'l Ins. Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95-96 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (quoting Continental Cleaning Serv. v. U.P.S., 1999 WL 1939249, at *1 (M.D.N.C. 1999)). It scrutinizes the complaint in a manner similar to a motion to dismiss, except "on a 12(c) motion, 'the court is to consider the answer as well as the complaint . . . . [as well as] documents attached to the pleadings.'" Bradley v. Ramsey, 329 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 (W.D.N.C. 2004) (citations omitted). In this analysis, "the Court 'must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Id. (citations omitted). While the Court retains discretion when "'allegations . . . contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,'" Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)), this is tempered in "a civil rights complaint [where the Court] ' . . . must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged' and 'must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged.'" Id. (quoting Harrison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir. 1988)).

As a general rule, pleadings must entail "only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint's "'[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' andhave 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Demetry v. Lasko Products, Inc. 284 Fed. App'x. 14, 15 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard instructs that a "complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, these broad requirements still "demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Immunity

i. Qualified Immunity—Federal Law Claims

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity as a defense to Plaintiff's federal claims. According to the Fourth Circuit, "[q]ualified immunity protects government officials from suit for damages when their conduct does not violate a 'clearly established' constitutional right." Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In order to avoid an immunity dismissal, "a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right (2) that is clearly established at the time of the violation." Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). While immunity bars some claims, it also works to support individual rights. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C. Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 786, 431 S.E.2d 276, 291 (1992) ("It would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the one hand that citizens have constitutional individual civil rights that are protected from encroachment actions by the State, while on the other hand saying that . . . [these individuals] cannot sue because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity."). Further, "[w]hen qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the plaintiff's claim or claims may be hard to identify." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238-39.

Rather than creating a necessary condition for plaintiffs to allege, qualified immunity acts as a defense that defendants must plead. Id. at 640 ("[T]he burden of pleading [immunity] rests with the defendant."). In order to qualify for immunity, the defendant must "claim that his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful." Id. at 641 (citation omitted). The burden shifts because of a potential evidentiary imbalance—"[t]here may be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether the official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will ever claim that he does. The existence of a subjective belief will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know." Id.

The Defendants broadly raise qualified immunity in their answer and specifically request immunity. However, when taking all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, it is at least plausible that Defendants violated an established right during Plaintiff's pretrial arrest, detention, and continued prosecution, and that insufficient probable cause existed for their actions, given the officers' alleged misconduct. Mr. Mead alleges that the Defendants withheld or obstructed access to exculpatory information, including the results of a gunshot residue examination and a search of his home for accelerants, and generally failed to record or memorialize information that contradicted their theories of Plaintiff's culpability. (See Am. Compl. Doc. No. 59). Mr. Mead also alleges that Defendants advanced a number of specious theories and false or misleading information that contributed to a seizure unsupported by probable cause. (See id.). Simply put, the Plaintiff here pled as much as he was able in order to show potential violations of established constitutional rights. See discussion infra Part II.B. Consequently, the issue of qualified immunity cannot be resolved without additional fact-finding, rendering it premature to determine at this time.

ii. Public Official Immunity—State Law Claims

Defendants also assert that any potential liability on their part is precluded by the public official immunity doctrine at the state level. Plaintiff argues that his allegations of malicious behavior which exceeded the doctrine's protective scope foreclose any immunity.

An official enjoys public official immunity "'[a]s long as [he] lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office . . . , keeps within the scope of his official...