Meadows v. Charles Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.

DEBRA F. MEADOWS v. CHARLES COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 16-2897

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

June 16, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination case are a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Helen E. Keller (ECF No. 22); a motion for summary judgment by Defendant Charles County Board of Education ("Charles County Schools" or the "Board") (ECF No. 48); and two papers filed by Plaintiff Debra Meadows ("Plaintiff") (ECF Nos. 52; 62) that appear to be motions for leave to amend her complaint.¹ The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Ms. Keller's motion will be granted, the Board's motion will be granted, and both of Plaintiff's motions will be denied.

I. Background²

The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint are not entirely clear. Plaintiff began working for Keller Transportation, Inc. ("KTI"), a bus company that has a contract with Charles County Schools, in 2011. (ECF No. 1, at 7). Plaintiff lives in subsidized federal housing with her children. (Id.). She suffers from dyslexia. (Id. at 8).

When Plaintiff filed her taxes in early 2015, she discovered several problems. (Id. at 7). First, she found out that she was categorized an independent contractor and sought to correct the Board's employment records to reflect that she was an employee of Charles County Schools. Second, she found that KTI's human resources department had classified her and her son as "border and migrant workers." (Id.). Third, she discovered that KTI had reported her income as being "extremely high," too high for her subsidized housing. (Id.). This discrepancy led to Plaintiff and her nine-year-old daughter being assigned a $500,000.00 debt. When the new school year started later in 2015, Plaintiff was given no vacation or sick leave for her position. When Plaintiff was on workers' compensation leave in November 2015, KTI told Plaintiff that she should contact the unemployment benefits office. That office, however, informedher that KTI had not reported her employment with the company and that she was not entitled to any unemployment benefits.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on June 2, 2016, and the EEOC issued her a right to sue notice on June 15. (ECF No. 1, at 6). She filed this suit on August 18 against Ms. Keller, KTI, the Board, and "Keller Jr[.] Keller III Ernest Bus Service Inc.," alleging ongoing discrimination on the basis of her religion, national origin, and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Id. at 2-5).³ She also alleged that Defendants retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. (Id. at 5).

A schedule was set and discovery began (ECF No. 27), but the parties have had numerous discovery disputes. Magistrate Judge Timothy J. Sullivan was assigned to the case on December 19, 2016 (ECF No. 29), and continues to supervise the discovery issues between the parties. Plaintiff has recently filed aninterlocutory appeal based on one of Judge Sullivan's decisions. (ECF No. 64).⁴

On November 23, Ms. Keller moved to dismiss all claims against her. (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice (ECF No. 24), which advised her of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and her entitlement to respond within seventeen days from the date of the letter. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4^th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff responded on December 5 (ECF No. 26) and filed a supplement to her response on March 6, 2017 (ECF No. 50). The Board filed its pending motion for summary judgment on March 1, 2017. (ECF No.48). Plaintiff was provided a Roseboro notice for the Board's motion (ECF No. 49), and she responded on March 13 (ECF No. 51). Plaintiff filed her pending motions on March 28 and April 26. (ECF Nos. 52; 62).

III. Plaintiff's Motions to Amend

A. Standard of Review

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it or within twenty-one days after service of a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). When the right to amend as a matter of course expires, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Whether to grant leave to amend is a matter left to the discretion of the district court, see Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769 (4^th Cir. 2011), though courts should "freely give leave when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Denial of leave to amend is appropriate "only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4^th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4^th Cir. 1986)). Generally, pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standardthan pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff has submitted two papers - one labeled a "Memorandum to Amend and Correct" and the other labeled a "Rule 2-341. Rule -341 Amending and Pleading to Correct in Plaintiff Defen[ses]" - that appear to be efforts to amend her complaint. (ECF Nos. 52; 62).⁵ In these papers, Plaintiff provides additional facts related to her existing Title VII and ADA claims. She also mentions numerous new allegations of violations of other federal laws, including the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; mail fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.; conspiracy to defraud the government; § 1981; § 1983; and multiple provisions of the federal tax code.

Charles County Schools responded in opposition to one of Plaintiff's motions. (ECF No. 54). The Board argued that Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend her complaint becauseher proposed changes would be futile and because she failed to comply with Local Rule 103.6. (ECF No. 54-1, at 2-4).

Local Rule 103.6(a) requires that a plaintiff submit an "original of the proposed amended pleading" separately from her motion for leave to amend. Local Rule 103.6(c) states that the moving party "shall file and serve (1) a clean copy of the amended pleading and (2) a copy of the amended pleading in which stricken material has been lined through or enclosed in brackets and new material has been underlined or set forth in bold-faced type." Local Rule 103.6(d) mandates that a plaintiff seeking leave to amend shall first "attempt to obtain the consent of other counsel" and shall "state in the motion whether the consent of the other counsel has been obtained."

In a number of respects, Plaintiff's motions for leave to amend fail to adhere to the requirements of the Local Rules. In both papers, Plaintiff simply provided a single document with new allegations. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to attach red-line versions comparing her original complaint with her amended ones. Plaintiff's motions also did not state whether any Defendants had consented to the amended pleadings, and the Board avers that Plaintiff did not attempt to obtain its consent.

Failure to comply strictly with the dictates of Local Rule 103.6 by itself is not fatal to Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, especially in light of her pro se status. See Milliganv. Brady, No. RWT-10-2107, 2011 WL 1833346, at *1 n.1 (D.Md. May 13, 2011) ("As a pro se litigant, [the plaintiff's] failure to comply with Local Rule 103.6 is not fatal to her request for leave to amend, and the Court concludes that her filing contains sufficient information to consider her request without additional briefing."); see also Awah v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cty., No. WMN-09-1044, 2010 WL 1929908, at *2 (D.Md. May 11, 2010) (refusing to deny pro se plaintiff's motion to amend on the ground that he had not filed a red-line copy where there was no prejudice to defendant). However, compliance with the Local Rules is not optional. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (noting that local rules "have the force of law"); Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(a)(1). The rules pertaining to amendments, for instance, help ensure that the court has available all the information it needs to determine whether leave can be appropriately granted. As such, even pro se litigants must follow them. See Cmty. Connections, Inc. v. Parker, No. RWT-07-3282, 2010 WL 148332, at *2 (D.Md. Jan. 12, 2010) ("The Court can neither act as counsel for a pro se litigant nor excuse a pro se litigant's failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, or the orders of this Court due to ignorance of the law.").

Additionally, as noted above, Plaintiff's papers include a large number of new allegations and cite to a wide variety offederal statutes. If Plaintiff's papers were construed as amended complaints, they would suffer from some notable deficiencies. First, neither satisfies federal procedural standards that call for claims to be set forth "in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Second, and more importantly, Plaintiff's allegations are overwhelmingly unclear. It is well-settled law that complaint allegations must "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal...