Meadows v. Reed

Ronnie Meadows, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. Patricia S. Reed, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent Below, Respondent

No. 14-0138

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

March 16, 2015

(Kanawha County 13-AA-89)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Ronnie Meadows, by his counsel Carter Zerbe and David Pence, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered February 6, 2014. That order affirmed a final order dated July 23, 2013, by the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles,¹ which revoked the petitioner's license to drive for driving under the influence ("DUI"). The Commissioner, by counsel Janet E. James, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order. The petitioner filed a reply.

This Court has considered the parties' briefs, the record on appeal, and the parties' oral arguments. Upon consideration under our standards of review, the Court finds no substantial question of law, and finds that the circuit court was plainly wrong in its decision. The record establishes that the petitioner did not receive a timely hearing on his revocation, and the Commissioner's delay in affording a hearing clearly worked to prejudice the petitioner. For these reasons, a memorandum decision reversing the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On August 21, 2008, petitioner Ronnie Meadows was arrested by Officer J.D. Matheny of the Charleston Police Department for driving under the influence. The arresting officer conducted a test of Mr. Meadows's breath that showed he had a blood alcohol content of .071 g/dL. At the time of Mr. Meadows's arrest, evidence of more than .05 but less than .08 g/dL of alcohol in a person's blood was relevant evidence the person was under the influence of alcohol.²

Officer Matheny did not charge Mr. Meadows with any criminal offense, including driving under the influence. However, the arresting officer forwarded the printout from Mr. Meadows's breath test, as well as an implied consent statement and a "DUI Information Sheet," to the Division of Motor Vehicles.

On September 17, 2008, the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Mr. Meadows's license to operate a motor vehicle, because of Officer Matheny's allegation that Mr. Meadows drove while intoxicated.³ Mr. Meadows timely requested an administrative hearing of the revocation order. By law, the Commissioner was required to hold the requested hearing within six months unless there was a "postponement or continuance . . . for good cause shown."⁴ Mr. Meadows also requested the investigating officer's attendance at the hearing. By law, the Commissioner then bore the responsibility for securing Officer Matheny's attendance at any hearing. W.Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(d) [2008].

Officer Matheny notified the Commissioner by letter that he would be on active military duty from October 8, 2008, through March 8, 2009, and from April 1^st to the 19^th of 2009.⁵ In a follow up letter, Officer Matheny said he would be available for hearings after April 20, 2009.

In response, in a letter dated September 22, 2008, the Commissioner informed Mr. Meadows that the arresting officer was on military leave and that a hearing would be scheduled upon Officer Matheny's return.

While Officer Matheny's letters said he would be available after April 20, 2009, the record suggests the Commissioner did not attempt to contact the officer until December 2010 (that is, some 20 months after the officer became available and 27 months after Mr. Meadows requested a hearing). On January 27, 2011, the Charleston Police Department sent a letter to the hearing coordinator for the Commissioner stating that, as of October 15, 2010, Officer Matheny was "no longer employed with the Charleston Police Department."

The Commissioner scheduled the first administrative hearing in this case for May 4, 2011, over 31 months after Mr. Meadows asked for a hearing. On May 4^th, the hearing was continued. No reason for the continuance appears in the record⁶ and counsel for Mr. Meadows objected.

The Commissioner scheduled the second hearing in this case for November 14, 2011, 38 months after Mr. Meadows asked for a hearing. Four days before the hearing, counsel for the Commissioner (an assistant attorney general) asked for a continuance because he had not had "sufficient time to review the file and speak with any witnesses regarding this matter." The Commissioner continued the second hearing.

The Commissioner scheduled a third hearing to be held on February 27, 2012, some 41 months after Mr. Meadows requested a hearing. On the morning of February 27^th, the Commissioner continued the administrative hearing due to the illness of a hearing examiner.⁷ Mr. Meadows objected to the continuance, pointing out that the Commissioner had failed to provide a hearing within six months as required by law.

Two months later, on April 26, 2012, Officer Matheny died.

The Commissioner scheduled a fourth hearing for July 9, 2012, almost four years after Mr. Meadows was arrested by Officer Matheny. At the hearing, the Commissioner presented no witnesses and relied solely upon the DUI Information Sheet and the other two documents submitted by Officer Matheny in August 2008.

Mr. Meadows, by counsel, made a motion that the hearing examiner dismiss the case. Mr. Meadows argued that state law required a hearing within six months of his request for a hearing, yet the Commissioner had (without good cause and twice over the objections of Mr. Meadows) postponed three hearings and taken four years to hear his case. In that time, Officer Matheny, the only witness against Mr. Meadows, had died and could not be cross-examinedabout the contents of his reports. Counsel asserted that Mr. Meadows was prejudiced because he was "unable to cross examine the DUI Information Sheet" and that in his "numerous years of practice, I've never gotten an answer from a sheet of paper no matter how many times I've questioned it." Counsel also argued that, if the hearing examiner failed to dismiss the case, then Mr. Meadows was presumptively prejudiced because he was going to be forced to testify to rebut the unchallengeable paperwork submitted by Officer Matheny.

The hearing examiner acknowledged that this was an "unfortunate situation." However, the hearing examiner concluded that she had absolutely no authority to dismiss the case against Mr. Meadows. The hearing examiner's only authority was to "rule on evidentiary issues and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the consideration of the" Commissioner. W.Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(a) [2008].

Mr. Meadows testified at the July 2012 hearing.

Ten months later, the hearing examiner drafted a final order for the Commissioner with findings of fact based largely upon the DUI Information Sheet prepared by Officer Matheny.⁸ Effective July 23, 2013, the Commissioner adopted the final order and concluded that Mr. Meadows had been stopped while driving a motor vehicle "under the combined influence of alcohol, and a controlled substance or drug." Among other requirements, the Commissioner revoked Mr. Meadows's driver's license for one year.

Mr. Meadows timely petitioned the circuit court for review of the Commissioner's order. Mr. Meadows submitted a brief to the circuit court asserting he had suffered prejudice from the Commissioner's delay in affording him a prompt hearing. The Commissioner responded that prejudice could not be presumed but rather had to be proven in a hearing. In a reply brief, Mr. Meadows asked the circuit court to "allow the parties to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding this issue."

The circuit court did not hold a hearing. In an order dated February 6, 2014, the circuit court entered a final order affirming the Commissioner's July 2013, revocation order. Mr. Meadows now appeals.

The applicable standard of review when reviewing a circuit court's order in an administrative appeal is this:

On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va.Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syllabus Point 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). This Court has outlined the statutory standards contained in W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4 in this way:

Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: "(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

Syllabus Point 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. State ex rel. State of W.Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 172 W.Va. 627, 628, 309 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1983).

Mr. Meadows argues that he was prejudiced by the Commissioner's delay in hearing his objection to the Commissioner's September 17, 2008 revocation order. At the time of Mr. Meadows's objection, W.Va. Code 17C-5A-2(c) required the Commissioner to conduct a hearing within 180 days (unless there was a postponement or continuance for "good cause shown"). The Commissioner failed to conduct a...