Meas v. Demoura, Civil Action No. 16-12236-NMG

444 F.Supp.3d 291

Malein MEAS, Petitioner,

v.Doug DEMOURA, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 16-12236-NMG

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed March 16, 2020

Malein Meas, Concord, MA, pro se.

Argiro K. Shapiro, Office of the Attorney General, Worcester, MA, Maria Granik, Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, Boston, MA, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Gorton, District Judge.

In March, 2008, a Middlesex County grand jury indicted Malein Meas ("Meas" or "petitioner") on one count of murder in the first degree and one count of carrying a firearm without a license. A jury trial was held in November, 2010, in Middlesex County Superior Court ("the Trial Court") and Meas was ultimately convicted on the firearm charge and on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a concurrent term of four to five years on the firearm conviction. He is currently incarcerated at the Department of Correction Institution in Concord, Massachusetts.

Following his convictions, Meas appealed and the Massachusetts Appeals Court ("the Appeals Court") affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court ("the SJC") denied Meas' application for further appellate review. Thereafter, Meas filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

I. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

To secure federal habeas corpus relief in the wake of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a petitioner must demonstrate that the "last reasoned state court decision" in the case

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application, of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ; see also Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Because the [Supreme Judicial Court] summarily denied further appellate review, we look to the last reasoned state-court decision — in this case, the [Massachusetts Appeals Court's] rescript."). Here, the last reasoned decision of a state court is the decision of the Appeals Court affirming Meas' conviction. See id.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254 have "independent meaning" thus providing two different avenues for a petitioner to obtain relief. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's adjudication will be "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it either "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" by the Supreme Court or considers facts that are "materially indistinguishable" from a Supreme Court decision and arrives at a different conclusion. Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

On the other hand, the decision of a state court will constitute an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it "identifies the correct governing legal principle" from the Supreme Court but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Consequently, a federal habeas court may not grant relief simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the decision of the state court applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. It must further conclude that such an application was unreasonable. Id.

A reviewing federal habeas court "shall ... presume[ ] to be correct" factual determinations made by a state court unless the petitioner can rebut that presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; see also Cooper v. Bergeron, 778 F.3d 294, 296 (1st Cir. 2015).

B. Application

Meas proffers two primary grounds in support of his petition for habeas relief. First, he objects to the Trial Court's refusal to "definitively rule" on his motion for a required finding of not guilty. Second, he maintains that two jury instructions violated his right to due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts responds that Meas is not entitled to habeas relief because 1) the decision of the Appeals Court was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent; 2) Meas' petition presents issues of state law not subject to habeas review; and 3) Meas has not properly exhausted his claims.

1. Meas' Motion for a Required Finding of Not Guilty

Meas submits that the Trial Court's failure to render a "definitive" ruling on his motion for a required finding of not guilty 1) violated Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(a), 2) deprived him of his right to have sufficient evidence presented against him and 3) forced him to decide whether to testify in his defense without knowing if the Commonwealth possessed sufficient evidence to support a conviction of first-degree murder. Meas' arguments are uniformly unpersuasive.

As a preliminary matter, Meas fails to proffer any Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing the rights he claims were violated by the Trial Court. He asserts that the Trial Court violated Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(a), which directs a trial court to enter a finding of not guilty after the close of evidence offered by either side if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on the offense charged. As the Appeals Court explained, however, "[t]he trial judge did not reserve decision. On the record, the judge explicitly denied the defendant's motion." Commonwealth v. Meas, No. 15-P-710, 2016 WL 1728790, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). Meas mistakes his disagreement with the Trial Court's ruling for a violation of the rule. In any event, the failure of a state court to follow a state court rule of criminal procedure is not an appropriate subject for federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (reiterating that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.").

Meas separately complains that the Trial Court's ruling allowed the Commonwealth to conclude its case in chief without sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Meas argues this is either contrary to or an unreasonable application of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In In re Winship, the Supreme Court considered a juvenile adjudication in which a state court was permitted to find guilt based upon a preponderance of the evidence. 397 U.S. at 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that all criminal convictions be supported by evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068. In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that federal habeas courts must ensure that criminal convictions meet the standard set in In re Winship. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In other words, a federal habeas court should scrutinize underlying convictions to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original).

Meas correctly recites Jackson' s holding but misconstrues its application. Nothing in Jackson entitles a defendant to a sufficiency finding at the close of the prosecution's case. Jackson requires a reviewing court to scrutinize only whether the evidence presented was such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Furthermore, that the Trial Court and Appeals Court cited Commonwealth v. Lattimore, 378 Mass. 617, 393 N.E.2d 350 (1979) rather than Jackson is of no consequence because the standards are equivalent. See Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that in Lattimore the SJC applied the federal Jackson standard to the Commonwealth).

Meas further submits that the trial judge's failure to rule on his motion for a required finding of not guilty further violated his rights by forcing him to decide whether to testify without knowing whether the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence against him.

As noted by the Appeals Court, Meas raises a "novel theory" when he claims that his decision to testify was affected by the Trial Court's failure to make a sufficiency finding and enter a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case. See Jenkins v. Bergeron, 824 F.3d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 2016) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never articulated the standard for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right to testify or determined who has the burden of production and proof under particular circumstances."). Thus, a violation, if one exists, is not in contravention of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

In any event, the Appeals Court was not unreasonable in concluding that even if Meas has such a right, there was sufficient evidence presented against him to meet the Jackson standard. The standard of review for Jackson sufficiency claims is deferential. See Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40-41, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 183 L.Ed.2d 32 (2012). It is met if the evidence presented against the defendant at trial was such that any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 123 (1st Cir. 2016). On habeas review, a petitioner must meet a "twice-deferential" standard by demonstrating that the decision of the reviewing state court was "objectively unreasonable." See id.

The Appeals Court determined sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to conclude the following:

The

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