Mebuin v. United States

REUEL MEBUIN, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-0443 (DMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: August 5, 2013

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Reuel Mebuin

Essex County Jail

Plaintiff prose

CAVANAUGH, District Judge

Plaintiff Reuel Mebuin, an alien detainee confined at Essex County Jail in connection with removal proceedings, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.¹

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint² to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.

Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of Cameroon who was granted Legal Permanent Resident status in 2004. He was taken into custody by immigration authorities in 2012 and placed in removal proceedings. He now is confined at Essex County Jail in connection with those removal proceedings.

Plaintiff alleges that on July 6, 2012, he was transferred from Cell 330 to Cell 320 in the same Unit, Pod 2C4, of Essex County Jail. According to Plaintiff, Cell 320 contained a sexually graphic picture, and some gang related materials were carved on the door. Plaintiff alleges that he notified correctional officers several times, requesting that something be done about the picture and carvings, which Plaintiff considered both scary and offensive. Despite his protestations, Plaintiff alleges, the cell door was not repainted until on or about December 12, 2012.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 15, 2012, he went to ask Defendant Officer Alvarez for some paper, in response to which Officer Alvarez allegedly madean obscene gesture and laughingly asked Plaintiff if he had pornographic pictures in his cell or was copying some pornographic pictures. Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter to the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Homeland Security complaining about this incident and that he delivered a copy of the letter to a Mr. Anthony Perillo (otherwise unidentified).

Plaintiff further alleges that on December 29, 2012, the detainees in his Unit were ordered to the gym for a fire drill and to sit on the gym floor. Plaintiff alleges that the gym was very cold and that he asked Defendant Officer John Doe if he could return to his cell to get his sweat shirt for warmth. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Officer John Doe responded by shoving him so hard that it felt like a punch, which he alleges disoriented him, causing him to stumble. Plaintiff alleges that another officer stabilized him, but that as he stumbled along, he experienced pain in an already injured knee. Plaintiff alleges that he notified a sergeant of this incident about two hours later, but that no further action was taken about it.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that on September 12, 2012, Defendant Officer Raimato came into the Computer Lab and Law Library and ordered the detainees there to return to their units. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Raimato yelled obscenities at the detainees and that some of his spit unintentionally landed on Plaintiff's face, all of which left Plaintiff feeling "traumatized and shaken."

Plaintiff characterizes the above-referenced events as violations of his rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff names as Defendants here the United States of America, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security New Jersey Field Director John Tsoukaris, Warden Roy L. Hendricks, and Officers Alvarez, Raimato, and John Doe. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling the Department of Homeland Security"to take appropriate steps to protect and guarantee a detainee's rights to freedom, safety and security." (Complaint, at 8.)

II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because Plaintiff has sought and been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim³ , the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "'A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).

III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, § 1983 applies to Plaintiff's claims against state actors Warden Roy L. Hendricks and Officers Alvarez, Raimato, and John Doe.

IV. BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN AGENTS

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action against that agent, individually, for damages. The Supreme Court has also implied damages remedies directly under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), and under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). But "the absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation does not necessarily mean that courts should create a damages remedy against the officer responsible for the violation." Schreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). Thus, since Carlson, the Supreme Court "has consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants." Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001).

Relying upon Bivens, several circuit courts have implied a damages cause of action against federal officers, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for claims by federal pre-trial detainees alleging inadequate medical care or unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980). Accordingly, this Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims against the federal officials Janet Napolitano and John Tsoukaris are governed by Bivens.

V. ANALYSIS

A. The Claim Against the United States

The United States has sovereign immunity except where it consents to be sued. U.S. v.Bormes, 133 S.Ct. 12, 16 (2012); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). In the absence of such a waiver of immunity, Plaintiff cannot proceed in an action for damages against the United States or an agency of the federal government for alleged deprivation of a constitutional right, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1994), cited in Anselma Crossing. L.P. v. U.S. Postal...