Medellin v. State

ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-13-00190-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

April 2, 2015

On appeal from the 207th District Court of Comal County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellant Albert Rodriguez Medellin was indicted for murder and aggravated assault of a member of his household in connection with the death of his girlfriend, Antonia Espinoza. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1) (West, Westlawthrough 2013 3d C.S.).¹ The indictment alleged that Medellin caused Espinoza's death by striking her with his fists and committed aggravated assault by causing Espinoza serious injury with a deadly weapon, his hands. The indictment also alleged two prior convictions, one for bail jumping and one for burglary of a non-habitation. The jury convicted Medellin of both offenses and sentenced him to ninety-nine years' incarceration for the murder charge and fifty years' incarceration for the aggravated assault charge.

On appeal, Medellin challenges both convictions. By seventeen issues, Medellin argues that: the trial court erred in refusing to grant a change of venue; the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's murder verdict; the jury charge contained an erroneous instruction; certain comments by the prosecutor during the case and closing argument were improper; the trial court erred in admitting expert and lay testimony about the deceased's wounds and cause of death; the trial court erred in admitting, during the punishment phase, certain evidence of Medellin's prior offenses and failing to question the jury about those offenses; defense counsel was ineffective; and cumulative error deprived Medellin of a fair trial. We affirm.²

I. Venue³

By his first issue, Medellin argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for a change of venue. Medellin argues that the publicity of hiscase in Comal County, a "small county with only one newspaper," was "pervasive and prejudicial." More specifically, Medellin argues that his chance of a fair trial in Comal County was prejudiced by the district attorney talking to the media about what she perceived as Medellin's guilt.

A change in venue may be granted on a criminal defendant's motion if supported by the defendant's affidavit and the affidavits of two other credible residents of the county if, within the county, there is either (1) "so great a prejudice against [the defendant] that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial," or (2) "a dangerous combination against [the defendant] instigated by influential persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial."⁴ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Medellin's motion sought a change of venue under the first justification—that such a prejudice against him existed in Comal County that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial.

To justify a change of venue based on public attention sparked by media, a defendant must show that the "publicity was pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory." Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "The mere existence of media attention or publicity is not enough, by itself, to merit a change of venue." Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449. Even extensive knowledge of the case in the community is not sufficient if there is not a showing of prejudicial or inflammatory coverage. Id. The defendant "bears aheavy burden to prove the existence of such prejudice in the community that the likelihood of obtaining a fair and impartial jury is doubtful." DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

We review the denial of a change of venue request for an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449. We give great deference to the trial court, which is in the best position to resolve issues involving conflicts in testimony and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 452. If the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, as is the case here, we will assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). As long as the trial court's ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying the venue motion. See Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449.

Four witnesses testified at the hearing on Medellin's venue motion. Medellin called two witnesses, one of whom testified that she had already formed her opinion about Medellin's guilt from reading the articles in the local newspaper and the other of whom testified that Medellin would be unable to obtain a fair trial in Comal County because the news articles were not objective. The State called two witnesses, as well. The first witness was a Comal County Commissioner who testified that in all her contacts with constituents, she never heard anything about Medellin. The second witness was a citizen of the Comal County who testified that even though he remembered the initial publicity about the crime, he did not remember the names of the parties or crimes involved.

Medellin introduced and the trial court admitted four local newspaper articles published in the months following the crime. In those articles, the reporter described the beating incident and noted Medellin's criminal history. In each article, the district attorney was interviewed and stated that she believed Medellin was guilty of the offense. In two of the articles, Medellin's defense counsel was interviewed and stated that Medellin was entitled to a fair trial and should not be tried and convicted through media publicity. Finally, Medellin introduced and the trial court admitted documents purporting to show the circulation of the local newspaper; the trial court concluded that the document showed that of the 108,500 residents of Comal County, less than 5,000 subscribed to the newspaper.

The evidence before the trial court on the venue motion was conflicting. Although the newspaper articles arguably contained predispositions about Medellin's guilt—including information about his prior criminal history and the district attorney's statements that she believed Medellin was guilty—there was also an entire article dedicated to defense counsel's rebuttal; in it, defense counsel extensively discussed Medellin's right to a fair trial and admonished the newspaper for publishing articles seemingly presuming Medellin's guilt. Moreover, the testimony by Medellin's witnesses was directly contradicted by the testimony of the State's witnesses. The trial court acted within its discretion in crediting the State's witnesses and disbelieving Medellin's. See id.

In sum, we cannot conclude that Medellin carried his burden to prove that the media coverage of this crime was so pervasive and prejudicial that he could not obtain a fair trial in Comal County. See id.; see also DeBlanc, 799 S.W.2d at 704. There wassufficient evidence from which the trial court could have reasonably come to the opposite conclusion. The mere existence of the media coverage, which is arguably all that Medellin proved, was not enough to support a change of venue. See Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Medellin's motion. Medellin's first issue is overruled.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his second issue, Medellin argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he caused the death of Espinoza.⁵ Specifically, Medellin argues that:

There were two doctors and two different and opposed opinions about the cause of death. The [S]tate's doctor was incompetent to testify on the record, as she had not even read the complete medical reports. The jury was not free to choose to believe the testimony of an incompetent witness.

"The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original);see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given testimony, and it is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile the conflicts in the evidence." Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. Medellin committed the offense of murder, as charged in the indictment in this case, if he "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death" of Espinoza by striking her in the head and/or chest with his hands or fists. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1).

We have reviewed all of the evidence presented at Medellin's trial and believe there was ample evidence to prove the cause of death alleged in the indictment. It is undisputed that Medellin and Espinoza were engaged, lived together, and had a five-month-old baby....