Medhin v. U.S.

308 A.3d 1242

Estifanos T. MEDHIN, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 22-CM-0611

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 5, 2023

Decided February 8, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2020-DVM-001277), (Hon’ Jennifer M. Anderson, Trial Judge)

Thomas G. Burgess for appellant.

Chimnomnso N. Kalu, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, John P. Mannarino, and Patricia-Joy Mpasi, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Easterly, McLeese, and Shanker,^* Associate Judges.

Easterly, Associate Judge:

Estifanos Medhin, who was convicted after a bench trial of misdemeanor simple assault and sentenced to one year of probation in lieu of the authorized maximum of 180 days of incarceration, challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his pre-trial motion for jury trial. Mr. Medhin’s conviction triggered a five-year ban on possessing a firearm in the District under D.O. Code § 22-4503(a)(6). On appeal, Mr. Medhin argues that this penalty, which he asserts implicates his fundamental right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, is sufficiently serious to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489. U.S. 538, 543, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (explaining that a defendant may rebut the presumption that a petty offense punishable by less than six months’ imprisonment does not trigger the right to a jury trial if they "can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one"). We hold that the Superior Court did not plainly err in failing to hold a jury trial in Mr. Medhin’s case because it is not clear under current law that a temporary, geographically limited firearm ban transforms an otherwise petty offense into an offense triggering the right to a jury trial. (Mr. Medhin does not challenge the constitutionality of D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) on Second Amendment grounds and we express no view on that issue.) We therefore affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On October 7, 2020, Mr. Medhin was charged by information with misdemeanor sexual abuse and simple assault, based’ on allegations by the complainant that Mr. Medhin had touched her vulva, over her clothes,¹ and stated that he was going to rape her. Both offenses carry a maximum sentence of 180 days of incarceration. D.C. Code §§ 22-3006, 22-404(a)(1). Because Mr. Medhin and the complainant lived in the same residence, both offenses also constituted an "intrafamily offense," as that term was previously broadly defined. See D.C. Code § 16-1001(8) (2009) (defining "intrafamily offense" as "interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence") & § 16-1001 (6)(A) (2009) (defining "interpersonal violence" as "a criminal offense that is committed … upon a person … [w]ith whom the offender shares or has shared a mutual residence")²; see also Shewarega v. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d 47, 52 (D.C. 2008) (concluding that the term "mutual residence," as used in D.C. Code § 16-1001, applied to parties who had no relationship but lived in the same boarding house).

After the Superior Court scheduled a non-jury trial for June 15, 2022, Mr. Medhin requested a jury trial, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Because he is a lawful permanent resident with a prior conviction for a crime of moral turpitude, Mr. Medhin stated that, if he were to be convicted either of sexual abuse or simple assault, he could be deported. Relying on this court’s decision in Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018) (en banc), Mr. Medhin argued that the penalty of deportation is sufficiently serious to overcome the presumption that his offenses were petty and to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

The government subsequently filed an amended information wherein it charged Mr. Medhin only with simple assault. The government separately filed an opposition to Mr. Medhin’s request for a jury trial, arguing that the amended information rendered his arguments related to the sexual abuse charge moot and that simple assault is not a deportable offense because it is not a "crime involving moral turpitude" and does not constitute a "crime of domestic violence" within the meaning of that term under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mr. Medhin did not file a response. Two weeks later, the Superior Court rejected Mr. Medhin’s jury demand. Ac- knowledging Mr. Medhin’s argument that the deportation consequence of an offense could rebut the presumption that an offense is petty and ineligible for a jury trial, the court ruled that simple assault, the only charge Mr. Medhin faced, is not a deportable offense.

The Superior Court held a bench trial on August 8, 2022. After crediting the complainant’s testimony over Mr. Medhin’s, the court found Mr. Medhin guilty of simple assault and sentenced him to ninety days of incarceration in favor of one year of supervised probation. The court also informed him, "[b]ecause this is a crime of domestic violence, you may not own or possess a firearm." Mr. Medhin timely appealed.

II. Analysis

Upon Mr. Medhin’s conviction, he automatically became subject to D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6), which provides that "[n]o person shall own or keep a firearm, or have a firearm in his or her possession … , within the District of Columbia, if the person … [h]as been convicted within the past 5 years of an intrafamily offense, as defined in D.C. Official Code § 16-1001(8), punishable as a misdemeanor."³ appeal, Mr. Medhin has abandoned his pre-trial claim that he was entitled to a jury trial under Bado because of the potential deportation consequences of his charged offenses; instead he argues that D.C. Code § 22-4503(6)’s "onerous and potentially deadly" deprivation of an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, U.S. Const. amend. II, is sufficiently serious to transform his presumptively petty simple assault charge into a serious offense, thereby entitling him to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

A. Preservation

[1] Mr. Medhin’s motion for a jury trial was based entirely on the potential deportation consequences of his charged offenses. Nevertheless, he argues that his jury trial argument grounded in the Second Amendment is preserved on appeal because, pursuant to Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992), "[h]e is entitled to make any arguments in support of" his general claim below that he was entitled to a jury trial. The government argues that Mr. Medhin’s jury trial claim is reviewable only for plain error. See Grogan v. United States, 271 A.3d 196, 212 (D.C. 2022) (reaffirming that where a criminal defendant fails to preserve a claim in the trial court, this court reviews only for "plain error"). On this record, we agree with the government.

[2–4] "This court does not ‘apply plain error review in a rigid fashion which elevates form over the practical dynamics of trial litigation,’ " Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 883 (D.C. 2005) (Glickman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999)). "We appreciate that difficult questions may … arise at trial with little warning, and … trial counsel … may be understandably taken off guard by a completely unexpected denouement." Id. (quoting Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 953 (D.C. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "When that happens, our cases do not hold counsel to unrealistic standards of precision. Rather, we treat a claim as preserved for appeal so long as the judge is fairly apprised as to the question on which she is being asked to rule." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). But the trial judge in Mr. Medhin’s case was only "fairly apprised" of his argument that he was entitled to a jury trial because of the deportation consequences of the charges he faced, and not because of the Second Amendment implications. And this is not a case where leeway is warranted given the fast-paced nature of trial court proceedings.

The trial court was not "fairly apprised" of Mr. Medhin’s argument that he was entitled to a jury trial because of the Second Amendment implications of a conviction for simple assault; that argument was not "fairly included" in an analysis of his argument that he was entitled to a jury trial because of the deportation consequences of a conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse.⁴ See Gilchrist v. United States, 954 A.2d 1006, 1012-13 (D.C. 2008) (holding that challenge to statement’s admissibility as a declaration against penal interest under Laumer did not preserve constitutional claims); see also, e.g., Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 980-82 (D.C. 2010) (holding that challenge to expert’s qualifications did not preserve challenge to expert’s methodology); Cornford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1186-88 (D.C. 2008) (concluding that defendant’s Rule 403 objection did not preserve hearsay argument). Mr. Medhin’s Second Amendment argument requires both confirmation that his simple assault conviction is a qualifying "intrafamily offense" under D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) (prohibiting anyone convicted of an intrafamily offense from possessing a firearm), and analysis of a whole body of post-Heller Second Amendment precedent. See infra Part II.B. But neither the "intrafamily offense" provision of the statute nor this case law was brought to the court’s attention even in passing.⁵

Moreover, after the government filed an amended information that no longer contained a charge carrying deportation consequences and filed an opposition to Mr. Medhin’s motion for jury trial on that basis, Mr. Medhin had ample time before ...