Medina v. Cody

106 Arizona Cases Digest 29

538 P.3d 737

Claudia MEDINA, duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estates of Carlos Mario Pena Jaramillo; Soraida Delgado Sierra; Juliana Pena Delgado; and Manuela Pena Delgado, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.The ESTATE OF Javas Jaysean CODY, The Estate of Aaron Chee; Martina Grandson, an unmarried woman; Sentry Insurance Company f/k/a Sentry Insurance a Mutual Company, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0709

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

Filed October 5, 2023

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Phoenix, By Robert B. Carey, Michella A. Kras, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Zwillinger Wulkan, PLC, Phoenix, By Colin Bradley, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Jefferson Cody

Appel Law Office, P.L.L.C., Fountain Hills, By Marc Appel, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Martina Grandson

Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C., Phoenix, By Gena L. Sluga, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sentry Insurance Company

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Phoenix, By Susan M. Freeman, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sentry Insurance Company

Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, By Sage G. Metoxen, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Navajo Nation

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court's opinion, in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

WILLIAMS, Judge:

¶1 The issue before us is whether a plaintiff who is not an enrolled tribal member may bring a civil tort case in state court against an enrolled tribal member for conduct occurring within tribal reservation boundaries but on a stretch of land for which the State has been granted a highway right-of-way easement. We hold that a non-tribal plaintiff bringing such a case cannot hale a nonconsenting enrolled tribal member defendant into state court for actions arising out of conduct on the defendant's reservation, even when that conduct occurs on a state highway. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Early one evening in January 2019, Javas Jaysean Cody drove his mother's (Martina "Grandson") vehicle across the center line of an undivided highway into oncoming traffic, colliding with the Pena Delgado family's car. Tragically, the head-on collision killed the occupants of both vehicles on impact—the four members of the Pena Delgado family (Carlos, Soraida, Juliana, and Manuela), and Cody and his passenger, Aaron Chee. The collision occurred along a section of U.S. Highway 89 located on the Navajo Nation. Both Cody and Chee were enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe, as was Grandson; the Pena Delgado family was not.

¶3 As a surviving Pena Delgado family member, Claudia Medina was appointed the personal representative of the Pena Delgado estates. Medina filed two wrongful death cases (later consolidated), one (predicated on negligence) against Cody's estate and the other (predicated on negligence and negligent entrustment) against Grandson and Chee's estate (collectively "the Defendants").

¶4 About eighteen months into the litigation, Sentry Insurance Company ("Sentry"), which insured Grandson and Chee at the time of the collision (and covered Cody as an additional insured), successfully moved to intervene. Sentry then moved to dismiss the consolidated cases, arguing, among other things, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tort action arose "out of on-reservation conduct by Navajo tribal members."

¶5 Without addressing Sentry's other asserted bases for dismissal, the superior court dismissed Medina's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the undisputed facts: (1) the Defendants are "Navajo tribal members residing on the Navajo Reservation," (2) the Pena Delgado family were non-tribal members, and (3) the location of the accident was "on a state highway within the Navajo Reservation." Upon entry of final judgment, Medina timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Medina challenges the superior court's dismissal of her tort action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to the superior court's implicit finding, Medina contends that tribal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil tort actions arising out of conduct that occurs on state-maintained rights-of-way running through tribal land.

¶7 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a controversy." Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa , 222 Ariz. 588, 594, ¶ 13, 218 P.3d 1045, 1051 (App. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). We review de novo whether a superior court has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action. Buehler v. Retzer ex rel. Indus. Comm'n , 227 Ariz. 520, 521, ¶ 4, 260 P.3d 1085, 1086 (App. 2011).

¶8 "[Q]uestions of jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country remain a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law, which is better explained by history than by logic." Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll. , 434 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To resolve such questions, courts must "inspect [the] relevant statutes, treaties, and other materials," including existing caselaw. Strate v. A-1 Contractors , 520 U.S. 438, 449, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997).

¶9 In 1868, after decades of conflict, the Navajo Tribe entered a treaty with the United States government. Arizona v. Navajo Nation , 599 U.S. 555, 143 S. Ct. 1804, 1809, 216 L.Ed.2d 540 (2023) ; see also Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667 (ratified Aug. 12, 1868) ("Treaty of 1868"). "In exchange for the Navajos’ promise not to engage in further war, the United States established a large reservation for the Navajos in their original homeland," including a substantial section of northeastern Arizona. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. at 1809–10. Apart from providing for designated tribal land, the Treaty of 1868 established "the Navajo Tribe as a sovereign entity" possessing "the right of self-government" within its territorial boundaries. Begay v. Roberts , 167 Ariz. 375, 379, 807 P.2d 1111, 1115 (App. 1990). Indeed, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court, both the federal government and the Navajo Tribe "[i]mplicit[ly] ... underst[oo]d" that under the treaty, "the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed." Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217, 221–22, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) (emphasis added). Consistent with this understanding, courts construed the Treaty of 1868 "to preclude state court jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation" in matters arising from on-reservation activity. Begay , 167 Ariz. at 379, 807 P.2d at 1115 ; see also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz. , 411 U.S. 164, 168–69, 175, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (construing the Treaty of 1868 as precluding the "extension of state law ... to Indians on the Navajo Reservation" and holding that under the "Indian sovereignty doctrine," tribal nations "hav[e] territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive ... [and] state law ... ha[s] no role to play within the reservation boundaries").

¶10 More than forty-five years ago, in Enriquez v. Superior Court , this court squarely addressed the precise issue raised in this appeal—whether state courts may exercise jurisdiction over a civil tort action brought by a non-tribal member against an enrolled tribal member for damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on a state highway within the limits of the tribal reservation on which the enrolled member resided. 115 Ariz. 342, 342–43, 565 P.2d 522, 522–23 (App. 1977). To resolve that question, this court looked to: (1) the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Williams , 358 U.S. at 220, 222–23, 79 S.Ct. 269, holding that absent federal legislation, state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over on-reservation activity because doing so would undermine the authority of tribal courts and infringe on the right of tribal members to make their laws and govern themselves; and (2) a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), which defines "Indian country" to include "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation ... including rights-of-way running through the reservation." Enriquez , 115 Ariz. at 343, 565 P.2d at 523. While acknowledging that 18 U.S.C. § 1151, on its face, "is concerned only with criminal jurisdiction," this court construed its definition of "Indian country" as applying "as well to questions of civil jurisdiction," concluding that the tribe's "granting of an easement" to the state for the highway "did not alter the status of the highway as being ‘Indian country.’ " Id. Having determined that the accident occurred on tribal land, this court reasoned that under Williams ’ infringement test, the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tort action brought against a tribal member: "[Tribes’] right of self-government includes the right to decide what conduct on the reservation will subject the Indians living there to civil liability in the Tribal court." Id.

¶11 In her briefing, Medina concedes that no Arizona case has overruled Enriquez , but she argues that subsequent case law calls into question its continuing viability. Specifically, she contends that since Enriquez , the jurisdictional analysis has evolved considerably under federal precedent—most notably, a series of United States Supreme Court cases —to apply much stricter limitations on the reach of tribal jurisdiction. Accordingly, Medina urges us to "revisit and reverse" Enriquez applying the current jurisdictional framework.

¶12 In addressing Medina's argument, we briefly return to Williams . In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction over a civil collection action brought by a non-tribal member —who operated a general store on the Navajo reservation—...