Medlin v. Sec'y

THOMAS MEDLIN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Case No. 8:14-cv-1607-T-33TBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

September 24, 2015

ORDER

Petitioner Thomas Medlin, a prisoner in the Florida Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Medlin challenges his convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida, in 2010. Respondent filed a response (Doc. 7), in which it concedes the timeliness of Medlin's petition. Medlin filed a reply (Doc. 13). Upon review, Medlin's petition must be denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Medlin entered pleas of nolo contendere to fifty counts of possession of photographs of sexual performance by a child in case number 2005CF-007623. (Doc. 9, Ex. 1.) He was sentenced to an overall term of 16.5 years in prison. The written sentence provides for: sentences of five years on counts one through fifteen concurrent with each other; a sentence of five years on count sixteen, consecutive to the sentence on count one; sentences of five years on counts seventeen through thirty-one, concurrent with each otherand with count sixteen; a sentence of five years on count thirty-two, consecutive with count sixteen; sentences of five years on counts thirty-three through forty-nine, concurrent with each other and with the sentence on count thirty-two; and a sentence of one year and six months on count fifty, consecutive to the sentence on count thirty-two. (Doc. 9, Ex. 1.) Medlin did not file a direct appeal.¹

Medlin filed a motion to correct a sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which he sought credit for time served in addition to the 86 days of credit he received at sentencing. (Doc. 9, Ex. 2.) The state court granted Medlin's motion, awarding him a total of 453 days of jail credit. (Doc. 9, Ex. 3.) Medlin filed a motion for rehearing, requesting that this amount of credit be applied to each of the "four groups" into which "the counts were broken up" for sentencing. (Doc. 9, Ex. 4.) The state court granted his motion only to the extent that the 453 days of jail credit were applied to the concurrent sentences for counts one through fifteen. (Doc. 9, Ex. 5.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed, with citations, the state court's orders. (Doc. 9, Ex. 8.)

Medlin next sought postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising three claims for relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. 11, pp. 26-49.) The state court entered an order dismissing claim 2 of the motion with leave to amend and directing the State to respond to claims 1 and 3. (Id., pp. 50-51.) The State filed its response. (Id., pp. 52-54.) Medlin filed an amended version of claim 2. (Id., pp. 55-60). The state court dismissed his amendment, however, because it was not sworn in accordance with the requirements ofRule 3.850. (Id., p. 61.) Medlin filed a second amended version of claim 2 and a reply to the State's response. (Id., pp. 62-78.)

The state court entered an order granting an evidentiary hearing on claim 1 and denying claim 2. (Id., pp. 79-81.) Following the hearing, the state court entered an order denying claim 1. (Id., pp. 176-77.) This order also denied claim 3, stating that the court intended to deny claim 3 in its earlier order denying claim 2 and had addressed its reasons in that earlier order. The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of Medlin's postconviction motion. (Doc. 9, Ex. 15.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that [the federal court is] to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to preventfederal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, _U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ("This is a 'difficult to meet,' . . . and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted).

In a per curiam decision without a written opinion, the state district court of appeal affirmed the denial of Medlin's postconviction motion. The state appellate court's per curiam affirmance warrants deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").

Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that sametime, i.e., the record before the state court.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Medlin bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Medlin asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain. "[T]he cases in which...