Medrano-Alvarez v. CoreCivic Inc.

LAMBERTO MEDRANO-ALVAREZ, Plaintiff, v. CORECIVIC, INC., WARDEN CHAD MILLER, in his individual capacity, and OFFICER PINE, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. CIV 22-00151 RB/LF

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

December 13, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. BRACK, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Lamberto Medrano-Alvarez, an inmate at the Cibola County Correctional Center (CCCC), alleges that Defendant Officer Pine used excessive force on him without cause, resulting in injuries. He brings federal and state claims against Pine CoreCivic, Inc., and Warden Chad Miller. Defendants move to dismiss some of the claims. Medrano-Alvarez opposes the motion and also moves to amend his Complaint. The Court will grant the motion to dismiss and grant the motion to amend in part.

I. The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A. Statement of Facts^[1]

Medrano-Alvarez is an inmate at CCCC. (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 1.) CoreCivic is a private contractor that manages CCCC. (Id. ¶ 2.) At all times relevant to this Complaint, Miller was the Warden and Pine an employee of CCCC. (Id. ¶ 3.) On March 1, 2019, Pine escorted Medrano-Alvarez from the recreation yard to his cell in the Special Housing Unit (SHU).^[2] (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9-11.)

Medrano-Alvarez “was handcuffed with his arms behind his back.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Once inside the SHU, Pine ordered Medrano-Alvarez to shower. (Id. ¶ 13.) Medrano-Alvarez declined, stating he would shower after he used the restroom. (Id. ¶ 14.) Pine became upset at Medrano-Alvarez's refusal to shower and told him to face the wall. (Id. ¶ 17.) Pine then allegedly pushed Medrano-Alvarez, performed a leg sweep and slammed him to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Pine put his knees and bodyweight on Medrano-Alvarez's body and moved his handcuffed arms upwards. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Staff separated the two and took Medrano-Alvarez to his cell. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) Medrano-Alvarez went to the hospital three days later and was assessed with a fractured right clavicle, a concussion, lacerations to the wrists, and a spine injury. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Pine allegedly wrote a false report stating that Medrano-Alvarez had tried to headbutt him, which necessitated the use of force, and that Medrano-Alvarez did not sustain any injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)

Medrano-Alvarez brings the following claims:

Count I: Violations of the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. ¶¶ 32-43);

Count II: State law claim for battery against Pine and against CoreCivic under a theory of respondeat superior (id. ¶¶ 44-50); and

Count III: State law claim for negligent hiring, supervision training, and retention against CoreCivic and Miller (id. ¶¶ 51-57).

Defendants move to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Miller and CoreCivic; the Fourteenth Amendment claim against all Defendants; and the negligent hiring, supervision, training and retention claim. (Doc. 6.) Medrano-Alvarez responds in opposition and, separately, moves to amend his complaint. The Court turns first to the motion to dismiss.

B. Motion to Dismiss Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Emps.' Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. Williams Cos., 889 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court will “accept as true ‘all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).

C. Medrano-Alvarez concedes that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is improper.

Medrano-Alvarez brings a claim for excessive force under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. ¶¶ 32-43.) Defendants assert that “because the Eighth Amendment provides an explicit textual source for Plaintiff's claims, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . as duplicative.” (Doc. 6 at 7 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).) Medrano-Alvarez agrees that the Eighth Amendment applies and that the identical claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed. (Doc. 9 at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count I with prejudice to the extent that it is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. The Court dismisses without prejudice the Eighth Amendment claims against Miller and CoreCivic.

Medrano-Alvarez does not allege that Miller “personally participated in an underlying constitutional violation[,]” so any claim he brings against the warden is “predicated on his maintaining a policy or custom that resulted in the underlying violation.” See Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 999 (10th Cir. 2019). As a result, “the elements for supervisory and municipal liability are the same in this case.” See id. To hold CoreCivic or Miller liable under the Eighth Amendment, Medrano-Alvarez must show: (1) a policy or custom; (2) “a causal relationship between the policy or custom and the underlying violation[;] and ([3]) deliberate indifference.” See id. (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has found that a policy or custom may take one of five forms:

(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions-and the basis for them-of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.

Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)). The second and fifth forms are at issue here.

In the Complaint, Medrano-Alvarez alleges that CoreCivic and Miller have a policy or custom that allows officers to “escalate situations and use excessive force . . . where such force is unwarranted” and to later “falsely, incorrectly, and/or misleadingly report situations in an attempt to justify the use of excessive force . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 41-42.) He alleges only one incident to support a showing of these informal policies or customs-the one involving himself and Pine. (See Compl.) Defendants argue that this single incident is not sufficient to show a policy or custom. (See Doc. 6 at 6.) The Court agrees.

“Establishing an informal policy or custom requires the plaintiff to show that the misconduct was ‘widespread'-i.e., that it involved a ‘series of decisions.'” Griego v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.Supp.3d 1192, 1212 (D.N.M. 2015) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). To make allegations sufficient to show an informal policy, custom, or practice,

the plaintiff can plead either a pattern of multiple similar instances of misconduct- no set number is required, and the more unique the misconduct is, and the more similar the incidents are to one another, the smaller the required number will be to render the alleged policy plausible-or use other evidence, such as a police officers' statements attesting to the policy's existence.

Id. at 1213. Here, Medrano-Alvarez does not plead multiple similar instances of excessive force or of falsified reports, but only vaguely asserts that CoreCivic and Miller have policies or customs that enable excess force and falsified reports. (See Compl. ¶¶ 41-42.)

Medrano-Alvarez asserts that there is precedent to show that a single incident may be sufficient to demonstrate a policy or custom. (Doc. 9 at 10.) He cites two cases in support: Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) and Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003). In Pembaur, the Supreme Court found that “municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” 475 U.S. at 480. The holding is inapplicable here, where Medrano-Alvarez alleges no conduct or decisions made by a policymaker, but by Pine. The Dubbs decision is also inapposite. There, the Tenth Circuit examined municipal liability against the Tulsa Community Action Project (CAP) on the basis of direct, not vicarious, liability. 336 F.3d at 1216. “The constitutional violation alleged in [Dubbs was] the performance of medical examinations on Head Start children on the basis of forms that would not be understood by a typical reasonable person as constituting parental consent.” Id. The plaintiffs alleged that CAP's use of the forms constituted an unconstitutional municipal policy and practice and “that, by arranging the examinations without [knowing] consent, CAP directly violated the children's Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 1216-17. Medrano-Alvarez does not allege that CoreCivic or Miller directly violated his constitutional rights. Without additional, specific supporting facts, Medrano-Alvarez's vague allegations of customs or policies are insufficient to show an informal practice that will withstand a motion to dismiss.

In his response brief, Medrano-Alvarez summarily asserts that his Eighth Amendment claim against CoreCivic and Miller is also premised on a failure to train and...