Meehan v. Med. Info. Tech., Inc.

177 N.E.3d 917

Terence MEEHAN

v.MEDICAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.¹

SJC-13117

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued November 1, 2021

Decided December 17, 2021

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Robert S. Mantell, Boston (James A. Kobe, Newton, also present) for the plaintiff.

Scott J. Brewerton, for the defendant.

Gavriela M. Bogin-Farber, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others.

James P. McKenna, for Pioneer Institute.

Maura Healey, Attorney General, David C. Kravitz, Deputy State Solicitor, & Alex Sugerman-Brozan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

KAFKER, J.

The issue presented in this case is whether an employer can terminate an at-will employee simply for exercising the right to file a rebuttal to be included in his personnel file as provided by G. L. c. 149, § 52C. We conclude that such a termination would violate the public policy exception to at-will employment. We therefore reverse the decision of the Superior Court allowing the motion, filed by the employer, Medical Information Technology, Inc. (Meditech), to dismiss the complaint brought by the plaintiff, Terence Meehan.²

Background. The facts are drawn from the complaint and, along with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, are assumed to be true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676, 940 N.E.2d 413 (2011). In November of 2010, Meehan began working for Meditech as a sales representative. In 2017, Meditech undertook a revision of its then twelve-person regional sales department, keeping nine employees as sales representatives and moving three, including Meehan, to a newly created "sales specialist" position. The sales specialist position greatly changed Meehan's job responsibilities, and his ability to earn commissions was significantly diminished by this change. According to Meehan, the structure of the sales specialist role created little incentive for those leading sales efforts to utilize sales specialists, and even if they did so, the potential for sales specialists to earn commission income was quite limited.

Early in July of 2018, Meehan and the other two sales specialists were placed on "performance improvement plans" (PIPs). Approximately two weeks later, on July 17, 2018, Meehan sent his supervisor a lengthy rebuttal to having been placed on a PIP. Members of Meditech's management team met that same day to discuss his rebuttal.³ The president and chief executive officer of Meditech decided that Meehan's employment should be terminated immediately. On the day of the meeting, Meehan's employment was terminated. In October of 2018, the PIP requirements for the other two sales specialists were discontinued with one or both of them being told that the PIP was "wrong" by a Meditech representative.

After obtaining an attorney, Meehan protested his termination to Meditech. Meehan thereafter filed a one-count complaint in the Superior Court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. A Superior Court judge allowed Meditech's motion to dismiss. The motion judge recognized that Meehan had a statutory right pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 52C, to submit a rebuttal; the judge nonetheless ruled that the right to submit a rebuttal was "not a sufficiently important public policy" to support Meehan's claim for wrongful discharge because it merely "involves matters internal to an employer's operation." She also concluded that if any employee who submitted a written statement disagreeing with any information contained in a personnel record was protected from termination, this would convert the at-will employment rule into one for just cause.

In a split decision, with an expanded panel, the Appeals Court affirmed the decision allowing the motion to dismiss. Meehan v. Medical Info. Tech., Inc., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 96, 100, 163 N.E.3d 436 (2021). We granted Meehan's application for further appellate review.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo" (citation omitted). Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 848, 138 N.E.3d 347 (2020). For the purposes of Meditech's motion, "we accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff." Suburban Home Health Care, Inc. v. Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., Office of Medicaid, 488 Mass. 347, 351, 173 N.E.3d 344 (2021).

2. The public policy exception to employment at will. In general, "employment at will can be terminated for any reason or for no reason." Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 478, 744 N.E.2d 622 (2001). Massachusetts courts have, however, recognized limited exceptions to the general rule, when "employment is terminated contrary to a well-defined public policy." Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 472, 589 N.E.2d 1241 (1992). In carving out these exceptions, the court has emphasized that the public policy exception should be narrowly construed to avoid converting the general at-will rule into "a rule that requires just cause to terminate an at-will employee." King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 582, 638 N.E.2d 488 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1, 673 N.E.2d 859 (1996), quoting Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 150, 533 N.E.2d 1368 (1989).

More specifically, the public policy exception to at-will employment has been recognized "for asserting a legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing a worker's compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)" (emphasis added). Smith-Pfeffer, 404 Mass. at 149-150, 533 N.E.2d 1368. See DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 209-210, 496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (public policy protected employee from wrongful termination where employee refused to heed employer's instructions to give false testimony). In addition to these three categories, this court subsequently created a fourth category to protect those "performing important public deeds, even though the law does not absolutely require the performance of such a deed." Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 810-811, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991). Such deeds include, for example, cooperating with an ongoing criminal investigation. Id.

The court has also stated that "the internal administration, policy, functioning, and other matters of an organization cannot be the basis for a public policy exception to the general rule that at-will employees are terminable at any time with or without cause." King, 418 Mass. at 583, 638 N.E.2d 488 (employee not wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy where he participated in shareholder derivative action). As a further illustration of this point, in Wright, 412 Mass. at 474, 589 N.E.2d 1241, a plaintiff nurse reported internal problems to high-level hospital officials and thereafter was terminated. This court determined that because the nurse's reports concerned the organization's internal matters, there was no basis for a public policy exception to the at-will termination rule. Id. at 475, 589 N.E.2d 1241. See Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (no liability for discharge stemming from employer requiring employee to work overtime, even though such schedule interfered with employee's childcare responsibilities); Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 558 n.3, 560-561, 524 N.E.2d 105 (1988) (no public policy violated where employee fired for reporting noncriminal wrongdoing by other employees).

In determining whether to create a common-law public policy exception to employment at will, we must also consider whether the Legislature has prescribed a remedy for the public policy violation at issue, including a remedy for a discharge of the employee for exercising that right. See Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 265, 172 N.E.3d 737 (2021) ; Mello, 402 Mass. at 557, 524 N.E.2d 105. This is particularly true when the legally guaranteed right that has been exercised is defined by statute, as it is in the instant case.

With these general principles in mind, we turn to the specific public policy at issue.

3. General Laws c. 149, § 52C. The plaintiff alleges that, by filing the rebuttal, he was exercising a statutory right under G. L. c. 149, § 52C. The statute provides:

"An employer shall notify an employee within [ten] days of the employer placing in the employee's personnel record any information ... that ... negatively affect[s] the employee's qualification for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation or the possibility that the employee will be subject to disciplinary action....

"If there is a disagreement with any information contained in a personnel record, removal or correction of such information may be mutually agreed upon by the employer and the employee. If an agreement is not reached, the employee may submit a written statement explaining the employee's position which shall thereupon be contained therein and shall become a part of such employee's personnel record....

"...

"Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than [$500] nor more than [$2,500]. This section shall be enforced by the attorney general."

G. L. c. 149, § 52C. There is also a records retentions provision in the statute:

"An employer of twenty or more employees shall retain the complete personnel record of an employee as required to be kept under this section without deletions or expungement of information from the date of employment of such employee to a date three years after the termination of employment by the employee with such employer. In any cause of action brought by an employee against such employer of twenty or more employees in any administrative or judicial proceeding,

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