Mehari v. Dist. of Columbia

268 F.Supp.3d 73

Alehegn MEHARI, Plaintiff,

v.The DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nico Alfredo Scott, Blake Edward Johnson, Bryan Francis Christian, and Unknown Officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, Defendants.

Civil Case No. 16–1889 (RJL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed July 28, 2017

Signed July 27, 2017

Matthew August LeFande, Matthew August LeFande Attorney at Law PLLC, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff.

Philip Alexander Medley, Robert A. DeBerardinis, Jr., Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for the Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff, Alehegn Mehari ("Mehari" or "plaintiff"), brings this action alleging that defendants, the District of Columbia ("the District"), Nico Alfredo Scott ("Scott"), Blake Edward Johnson ("Johnson"), Bryan Francis Christian ("Christian"), and Unknown Officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (collectively, "the Officers"), violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleges various violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as several other claims. This matter is now before the Court on defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 14]. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's complaint paints a picture of an overarching and interconnected scheme on the part of all defendants to deprive immigrants in the District of Columbia of their constitutional rights. The story begins in the early morning of September 24, 2015, when Mehari—an immigrant and non-native English speaker—had just completed his workday as a licensed taxicab driver in the District of Columbia and was returning home to Maryland. Id. at ¶¶ 24–29. Mehari alleges that he pulled into a gas station in Northeast D.C. at the end of his shift and went into the store to purchase a lottery ticket. Id. at ¶¶ 30–31. When he returned to his cab, an undercover female officer of the Metropolitan Police Department's ("MPD") Prostitution Unit walked up to his cab. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33. She approached the window and attempted to speak to him, but Mehari alleges he was confused by her "unfamiliar lingo." Compl. at ¶¶ 34–36. Indeed, he claims that he attempted to drive away from her, but she leaned into the partially opened window to prevent him from leaving. Id. at ¶¶ 37–38. It later became clear to Mehari that the officer was soliciting him for sex, and he claims that he told her he was married and tried to leave. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff alleges that the officer persisted in soliciting him until he was able to drive away. Id. at ¶ 40.

Once plaintiff reached the street, he alleges that he was cut off by two marked police cars with emergency lights flashing. Id. at ¶ 42. Mehari claims that several "unidentified uniformed officers with firearms displayed rushed [his] taxicab and removed him from the vehicle." Id. at ¶ 43. The officers then arrested him for sexual solicitation. Id. at ¶ 44. Mehari claims that the officers then fabricated a false police report in which they stated that plaintiff had accepted the undercover officer's advances and solicited her for prostitution. Id. at ¶ 45. Before he was released, Mehari was held in custody for several hours, and his personal possessions were seized from him. Id. at ¶¶ 46–47.

On October 7, 2015, the Officers filed a sworn complaint with the U.S. Attorney's Office of the District of Columbia in order to initiate criminal proceedings against Mehari. Id. at ¶ 48. As a result, plaintiff claims he was required to appear in court on at least four occasions and was "subjected to burdensome limitations on his freedom as a condition of his pretrial release[,] including drug testing and an obligation, under threat of arrest, to appear at the Pretrial Services Agency." Id. at ¶¶ 50–51. Mehari claims he was offered a form of probation as a "diversion" from the United States Attorney, but Mehari refused and demanded a trial. Id. at ¶¶ 52–52. On January 4, 2016, the date of Mehari's trial, the prosecution abandoned its case against him. Id. at ¶ 54.

Plaintiff claims that he suffered several injuries as a result of his wrongful arrest and detention, including "substantial humiliation and emotional distress." Id. at ¶ 56. He also claims that he was denied an apartment application after the rental agency discovered his recent prostitution-related arrest, and he incurred substantial expense in defending against the false criminal charge. Id. at ¶¶ 55, 57. Although Mehari attempted to obtain information regarding the identities of the officers involved in his arrest, his Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request was unsuccessful. Id. at ¶ 58.

Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant action on September 21, 2016. In his complaint, Mehari advances the following claims for relief: (1) Fifth Amendment deprivation of his property interest; (2) Fourth Amendment deprivation of his property interest; (3) Deprivation of equal protection of the law; (4) Negligent supervision or retention; (5) Conspiracy to deprive Mehari of his civil rights; (6) § 1983 malicious prosecution; (7) Common law malicious prosecution; (8) Abuse of process; and (9) Injunctive relief. Compl. at ¶¶ 59–120. From the face of plaintiff's complaint, it appears that he alleges Count IV and Count IX against only the District; the seven remaining counts appear to be alleged against all defendants. See id.

On December 5, 2016, defendants moved for partial dismissal of the complaint, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. for Partial Dismissal of the Complaint or in the Alternative for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."). Specifically, they seek dismissal of: (1) Count I as to all defendants for failure to state a violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) Count IV as to the District for failure to state a claim for negligent supervision or negligent retention; (3) Count V as to all defendants for failure to state a claim for conspiracy; (4) Count VI as to all defendants for failure to state a claim for Section 1983 malicious prosecution; (5) Counts I, II, III, IV and VI as to the District for failure to state a claim for municipal liability for violation of plaintiff's civil rights; (6) Count VII as to all defendants for failure to state a claim for common law malicious prosecution; (7) Count VIII as to all defendants for failure to state a claim for abuse of process; and (8) Count IX as to the District, on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief as to Superior Court records. See id. at 1–2. The District of Columbia also seeks summary judgment as to Counts IV (insofar as it is construed as a common law claim), VII, and VIII, on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with D.C. Code § 12–309. See id. at 2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss

To survive defendants' motion for partial dismissal of his claims, Mehari's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a trial court generally must consider a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the court should first "identif[y] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Once this Court has satisfied itself that plaintiff has asserted "well-pleaded factual allegations," id. , I must determine that the allegations are plausible. That is, Mehari's factual allegations must allow this Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged," if the factual allegations are proven true. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano , 563 U.S. 27, 45–46, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 179 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court should render summary judgment in favor of defendants unless the pleadings, and any attachments to the pleadings, establish a "genuine issue as to any material fact." The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant here, defendants—makes that showing, the burden shifts to plaintiff to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial ." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Unless plaintiff can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact—which requires him to "cast more than metaphysical doubt" on the evidence—defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doe v. Gates , 981 F.2d 1316, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Fifth Amendment Violation

In his complaint, Mehari alleges that his property was seized without lawful cause and for an unlawful purpose, and that his property was intentionally damaged or destroyed without due process of law. Compl. at ¶¶ 60–63. He asserts that his property was seized as part of an official policy of the District "intended to target immigrants who were particularly vulnerable to criminal proceedings and less likely to be able to defend themselves." Id. at ¶¶ 66. It is not immediately clear from the face of Mehari's complaint whether he is asserting a violation of procedural due process, substantive due process, or both. But because "a complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs' favor, and the Court should grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged," I assume for the sake of analysis that ...