Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale

323 Cal.Rptr.3d 354

552 P.3d 420

David MEINHARDT, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CITY OF SUNNYVALE, Defendant and Respondent;

Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

S274147

Supreme Court of California.

July 29, 2024

Fourth Appellate District, Division One, D079451, Santa Clara County Superior Court, 19CV346911, Peter H. Kirwan, Judge

Messing Adam & Jasmine, Gregg McLean Adam; Kirkland & Ellis, Michael Shipley and Nathaniel Haas, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kimberly E. Leefatt, Los Angeles, Jaclyn H. Prange, San Francisco; Chatten-Brown, Carstens & Minteer and Douglas P. Carstens, Santa Monica, for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club and Planning and Conservation League as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Venskus & Associates, Sabrina D. Venskus, Jason R. Sanders; Law Offices of Brian Acree and Brian Acree, Oakland, for Ballona Wetlands Land Trust as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Brian P. Walter, Suzanne Solomon and David A. Urban, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

[1] California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1),¹ provides that "a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry' of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment." This time limit is jurisdictional: "no court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal" (rule 8.104(b)), and relief cannot be conferred by stipulation, waiver, or estoppel (Hollister Convalescent Hosp. Inc, v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666–667, 125 Cal. Rptr. 757, 542 P.2d 1349). "If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal." (Rule 8.104(b).)

We granted review in this case to resolve uncertainty about when the time to appeal starts to run in writ of administrative mandate² proceedings pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.³ Some Courts of Appeal, including that in this case which dismissed the appeal as untimely, hold that the time starts to run" with the filing of an "order" that disposes of all issues in the case and contemplates no further action, not with subsequent entry of a "judgment." (E.g., Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43, 50–51, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 250 (Meinhardt); City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 182–183, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 (City of Calexico).) Other Courts of Appeal hold that the time starts to run with the entry of a "judgment," not with the filing of a prior "order" (E.g., Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 368, fn. 2, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 (Protect Our Water)) or "minute order" (Hadley v. Superior Court (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 389, 392, 105 Cal. Rptr. 500).

[2] "The time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear." (Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co. (1988) 486 U.S. 196, 202, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178.) "[B]right lines are essential in this area, to avoid both inadvertent forfeiture of the right to appeal and excessive protective appeals by parties afraid they might suffer such a forfeiture." (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 248 P.3d 681 (Baycol).) " 'Neither parties nor appellate courts should be required to speculate about jurisdictional time limits.' " (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 905, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 152 P.3d 1109 (Alan).)

Given these considerations, and for the reasons set forth below, we adopt a "bright line[ ]" rule (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 761, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 248 P.3d 681) that the time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings starts to run with entry of "judgment" or service of notice of entry of "judgment," rather than with the filing of, or service of notice of the filing of, an "order," minute order, or other ruling. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary.

Factual and Procedural Background

In May 2019, the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety (Department) imposed a 44-hour suspension on Officer David Meinhardt (Meinhardt), and the City of Sunnyvale Personnel Board (the Board) upheld the suspension. Meinhardt challenged the suspension by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, naming the Board as a defendant and the Department as real party in interest (together, the City). On August 6, 2020, after briefing and a hearing, the court filed a document entitled "ORDER" (the August 6 Order) containing factual findings and legal rulings and concluding, "the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is DENIED." The clerk of the court served the August 6 Order on the parties by mail the same day. On August 14, 2020, the City served Meinhardt with a judicial council form CIV-130 entitled "Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order," along with a file-stamped copy of the August 6 Order.

On September 4, 2020, the parties signed and submitted to the court a document entitled "JUDGMENT" that stated, "On August 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Petitioner David Meinhardt’s Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus …. For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against Petitioner David Meinhardt, who shall take nothing by this action. [¶] IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED." The court signed this document on September 17, 2020, and Meinhardt served on the City a "Notice of Entry of Judgment" on September 22, 2020. The trial court entered the judgment on its docket on September 25, 2020 (the September 25 Judgment).⁴

On October 15, 2020, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from the September 25 Judgment. The Court of Appeal requested briefing on the appeal’s timeliness and thereafter dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding the August 6 Order was the "final judgment" from which Meinhardt should have appealed because it "denied" his mandate petition "in its entirety and did not contemplate any further action in the case." (Meinhardt, supra, 76 Cal. App.5th at p. 63, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 250.) In so concluding, the Court of Appeal acknowledged a split in published authority on the timeliness issue but chose to follow Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School District (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 213 (Laraway) and City of Calexico, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 278 Cal. Rptr.3d 470, which held that the time to appeal in writ proceedings⁵ starts from the filing of — or service of a file-endorsed copy of (together with a document reflecting the date of service of) — an order or ruling that is sufficiently final to constitute the judgment, not from a subsequent entry of judgment. (Meinhardt, at pp. 51, 67–68, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 250.) We granted Meinhardt’s petition for review, which asserted that his notice of appeal was timely filed, within 60 days of service of notice of entry of the September 25 Judgment.

Discussion

I. Appealability of "Judgments" in Administrative Mandate Proceedings

[3, 4] The right to appeal in California is "entirely statutory and subject to complete legislative control." (Trede v. Superior Court (1943) 21 Cal.2d 630, 634, 134 P.2d 745 (Trede); see Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 23 P.3d 43 (Griset) [whether a trial court’s order is appealable is determined by statute].) Although the Judicial Council, in the California Rules of Court, has prescribed procedural rules governing the appellate process, it "does not have power to" promulgate rules that "restrict the statutory right of appeal." (In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 704, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 921.) Consequently, a rule "construed to define a right of appeal more restrictive than the right of appeal afforded by" statute "would be ‘to that extent void.’" (Ibid.)

[5–8] Reviewing courts likewise must remain true to statutes. "Though the rules governing appealability have common law roots," courts "are not at liberty to modify those [common law] contours in ways at odds with the statutory language." (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 759, fn. 5, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 248 P.3d 681.) "A reviewing court’s obligation to exercise the appellate jurisdiction with which it is vested, once that jurisdiction has been properly invoked, is established and not open to question." (Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 669, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61, 995 P.2d 191.) Similarly, an appellate court generally lacks jurisdiction to decide an appeal from an order unless the order is one that is expressly made appealable by statute. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 23 P.3d 43; Garau v. Torrance Unified School Dist. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 192, 198, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 108.)

[9–11] Section 904.1, which provides a list of appealable judgments and orders, permits an appeal in any unlimited civil action⁶ to be taken from any of 14 enumerated filings. The first such filing, with exceptions not relevant here, is "a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment." (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) This means an appeal must be taken "from a judgment that is not intermediate or nonfinal but is the one final judgment." (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143 (Morehart); Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1112, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 394 P.3d 1048 (Dhillon) ["As a general rule, a litigant...