Meinhart v. Louisville Metro Gov't

627 S.W.3d 824

Chris MEINHART, Administrator of the Estate of Demetra Boyd; Junenean Huston, as Parent, Next Friend and on Behalf of Demetrick Boyd, Jr., a Minor; Tosca Bell, as Parent, Next Friend and on Behalf of Lynn-Asia Bell, a Minor; Tosca Bell, as Parent, Next Friend and on Behalf of Kei-Vontez Bell, a Minor; Tosca Bell, as Parent, Next Friend and on Behalf of Cortez Moore; Lynn Tillman and Darnell Boyd, as Parents, Next Friends and on Behalf of Demetrius Boyd, a Minor; Demetrick Boyd, Sr.; and Aireca Smith, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Louis Simmons, III, a Minor, Appellants

v.LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT ; Thomas Pugh, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Police Officer; Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. ; and Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Kentucky, Appellees

2019-SC-0237-DG

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

AUGUST 26, 2021

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS CHRIS MEINHART, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DEMETRA BOYD; JUNENEAN HUSTON, AS PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF DEMETRICK BOYD, JR., A MINOR; TOSCA BELL, AS PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF LYNN-ASIA BELL, A MINOR; TOSCA BELL, AS PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF KEI-VONTEZ BELL, A MINOR; TOSCA BELL, AS PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF CORTEZ MOORE; LYNN TILLMAN AND DARNELL BOYD, AS PARENTS, NEXT FRIENDS AND ON BEHALF OF DEMETRIUS BOYD, A MINOR: Chadwick Neal Gardner, Louisville, Gardner Law, PLLC.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS, AIRECA SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF LOUIS SIMMONS, III, A MINOR: Timothy James Byland, Fort Wright, Kummer Dilts Collins & Byland PLLC.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, DEMETRICK BOYD, SR.: Andrew John Horne, Horne Law Office.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT AND THOMAS PUGH, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO POLICE OFFICER: Michael J. O'Connell, Jefferson County Attorney, Kristie B. Walker, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, EMPIRE FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO. AND ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY OF KENTUCKY: Jay Richard Langenbahn, Lindhorst & Dreidame.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

The question presented in this appeal is whether a police officer is entitled to qualified official immunity from liability for the decision to initiate a police pursuit that ended in a fatal automobile accident. After years of litigation and multiple interlocutory appeals, the Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the trial court's determination the officer's actions were ministerial rather than discretionary. The Court of Appeals, therefore, concluded the officer was shielded from liability. We granted discretionary review and, following a careful review of the record, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On January 6, 2007, Louisville Metro Police Department ("LMPD") Officer Thomas Pugh engaged in a pursuit of Donta Jones who was a suspect in an assault and purse snatching which had occurred near Fourth Street Live in downtown Louisville. Officer Pugh had been alerted by a "frantic" victim she had just been robbed and "felt lucky to be alive." As he was speaking to the victim, Jones drove past, and the victim identified him as her assailant. Officer Pugh began maneuvering his cruiser behind Jones’ vehicle and activated his emergency lights. Jones came to a stop and the officer stepped from his cruiser. However, as Officer Pugh reached the rear bumper of the stopped car, Jones started his vehicle and drove away. Officer Pugh returned to his cruiser, activated his siren in addition to his emergency lights, and initiated a pursuit.

Less than two minutes after the pursuit began, with Officer Pugh trailing approximately a block away, Jones entered an intersection against a red traffic light and collided with a vehicle being operated by Demetrick Boyd, Sr. ("Boyd"). Tragically, Demetra Boyd, an unrestrained minor passenger in Boyd's vehicle, was ejected from the vehicle and died from her resulting injuries. It was her twelfth birthday. Boyd and his other six unrestrained minor passengers sustained injuries. Officer Pugh was not involved in the collision. Jones subsequently pled guilty to multiple criminal charges and received a prison sentence of fifteen years.

In January 2008, Demetra's estate and the parents of the other injured children initiated civil actions against Jones, Boyd, Officer Pugh,¹ Louisville Metro Government ("Metro"), Enterprise Rent-A-Car, and Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co.² Shortly thereafter, Officer Pugh and Metro moved to dismiss the actions against them on immunity grounds. In denying Officer Pugh's motion, the trial court relied on Jones v. Lathram , 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2004),³ to conclude he was not entitled to immunity. The trial court did not rule on Metro's motion. Officer Pugh filed an interlocutory appeal from the adverse decision. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals concluded Jones was highly distinguishable and reversed the trial court. The matter was remanded for further discovery to obtain sufficient evidence regarding LMPD's pursuit policies and Officer Pugh's compliance therewith to enable the trial court to properly rule on the immunity issue.

Nearly two years later, after extensive discovery had occurred related to LMPD's Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs") for pursuits,⁴ Officer Pugh moved for summary judgment, again arguing he was entitled to qualified official immunity. The motion was held in abeyance at Appellants’ request for over three years, during which time more discovery was undertaken. In December 2016, the trial court entered an order finding Officer Pugh had not violated any of LMPD's pursuit policies and was required to employ discretion as to the means and method of pursuing Jones. Nevertheless, the trial court denied Officer Pugh's motion upon concluding the SOPs created a ministerial duty rather than a discretionary one, and whether Officer Pugh acted negligently in performing the ministerial act was a question for a jury to resolve. This decision was based on the repeated use of the word "shall" in the SOPs which the trial court believed rendered compliance merely the execution of specific acts arising from certain and fixed facts.

Officer Pugh filed an interlocutory appeal seeking review of the trial court's second denial of qualified official immunity. While Officer Pugh's appeal was pending, the trial court denied Metro's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, and Metro filed an interlocutory appeal of the adverse ruling. The two cases were consolidated for consideration by a single panel of the Court of Appeals. On March 29, 2019, the Court of Appeals rendered its Opinion⁵ wherein it explicitly rejected the trial court's ruling the SOPs created a ministerial duty. It concluded while the SOPs required an officer to consider various factors in determining whether a pursuit was warranted, the officer is left to balance the facts and assess whether to institute or terminate a pursuit. Concluding the amount of deliberation and personal judgment involved in weighing the circumstances created a discretionary duty, the Court of Appeals held Officer Pugh was shielded by qualified official immunity. Further concluding Metro was entitled to summary judgment contrary to the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for entry of orders dismissing both parties. This Court granted discretionary review.

In seeking reversal, Appellants raise four allegations of error. First, they assert parties claiming qualified official immunity should not be entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal when factual disputes exist. Next, they contend the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's conclusion Officer Pugh's duties were ministerial, thereby precluding his entitlement to qualified official immunity. Third, Appellants alternatively argue Officer Pugh did not act in good faith, removing his entitlement to qualified official immunity, and the Court of Appeals erred in not so holding. Finally, Appellants maintain the Court of Appeals erred in finding Officer Pugh and Metro are entitled to sovereign immunity protections.

Appellants’ first argument essentially asks us to eliminate interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases. This we decline to do. Appellants contend qualified official immunity cases are inappropriate for interlocutory appeals because the determination of the applicability of such immunity involves fact-based exceptions which require completion of the litigation process. Citing CR ⁶ 56.03 and Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991), they suggest the existence of disputed facts acts as a prohibition on a trial court's ability to grant summary judgment on the immunity question. Appellants assert discovery must be completed and all disputed facts must be resolved by a jury before a trial court can rule on the issue of qualified official immunity. Accepting Appellants’ argument would eviscerate the fundamental purposes of immunity.

We recognize trial courts must make certain factual findings when deciding a party's entitlement to qualified official immunity, and a modicum of discovery may be necessary before the court can reasonably make the determination. Those findings should be complete enough to enable adequate appellate review but must necessarily be limited to the very narrow issues required to determine if immunity is applicable, including the actor's status as a government official; the ministerial/discretionary distinction; if the act was ministerial, was the actor negligent; and, if the act was discretionary, was it done in good faith and within the scope of the officer's authority. However, the question of immunity is one of law that involves no disputed facts. Thus, examining the pertinent rule, policy, or regulation governing the challenged conduct is all that is necessary to make the characterization. Compliance...