Melendez v. Cnty. of Westchester

MICHELLE MELENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENTOF CORRECTIONS SUPERIOR OFFICE, and KEVIN CHEVERKO,individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

17-cv-9637 (NSR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 16, 2019

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

On or about December 7, 2017, Plaintiff Michelle Melendez ("Plaintiff"), a former Correctional Officer trainee at the Westchester County Department of Corrections Superior Office ("DOC"), commenced this action under: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17, the American Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New York State Human Rights Law Executive Law § 296, and Tortious Interference under New York State Tort Law. (See Complaint ("Compl."), ECF No. 1; Amended Complaint, ("AC"), ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff alleges that while a trainee, she was subject to sex/gender discrimination, disability discrimination, sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, retaliation, and wrongful termination by the County of Westchester, Westchester County Department of Corrections Superior Office, and KEVIN CHEVERKO (collectively, "Defendants"). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 37.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.¹

In or around September 2015, Defendants hired Plaintiff for a Correctional Officer position at Defendants' correctional facility located at 10 Wood Road, Valhalla, New York 10595. (AC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was a State Corrections Officer for approximately seven years prior to her employment with Defendants. (Id. ¶ 14.) Around September 14, 2015, Plaintiff began employment as a Correctional Officer trainee, with a condition of completing one year of training ("probationary period.") (Id. ¶ 15.) Around March 28, 2016, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff returned to work on April 21, 2016. (Id. ¶ 16.) Upon Plaintiff's return to work, Plaintiff requested disability-based accommodation and submitted medical documentation to Defendants. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was granted a "light duty" restriction, which required Plaintiff to have limited inmate contact. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was the only female Correction Officer serving a probationary period at that time. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Around June 16, 2016, Defendants assigned Plaintiff to Defendants' 1-K Control Room ("Control Room"), which is located before the entrance of the 1-K Cell Block in the section of the correctional facility identified as "Old Jail." (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant's Control Room does not fully limit inmate contact, as a corrections officer is required to maintain traffic control through the 1-K Block hallway gate. (Id. ¶ 19.)

On or about June 15, 2016, one of Plaintiff's inmates ("Inmate") "aggressively grabbed Plaintiff's buttocks." (Id. ¶ 20.) Immediately after, officers restrained Inmate. (Id. ¶ 21.) While Plaintiff was waiting for Defendants' Emergency Response Team's arrival, Inmate shouted profanity and lewd comments at Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff, upset and emotional, screamed profanity back at the inmate and threw her latex gloves in Inmate's face. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendants' employee and Sergeant witnessed Plaintiff's behavior and verbally counseled Plaintiff, who immediately apologized for her "impetuous and unexpected reaction." (Id. ¶ 24.)

Around June 16, 2016, Plaintiff filled paperwork to file outside charges against Inmate; however, Plaintiff admits that she is uncertain as to whether those documents were ever processed. (Id. ¶ 25.) Around August 22, 2016, Defendants interrogated Plaintiff on her supposed use of force in response to Inmate's conduct in grabbing her buttocks. (Id. ¶ 27.) In response, Plaintiff asked Defendants if she was being penalized "for the inmate sexually assaulting her." (Id. ¶ 28.) On or about that same day, Defendants purportedly denied Plaintiff a salary increment that would have been due on October 1, 2016 because she was under investigation for the use of force when Inmate sexually assaulted her. (Id. ¶ 29.) Male corrections officers, who were supposedly also under investigation for the use of force, did not have their salary increment denied. (Id. ¶ 30.) For this reason, Plaintiff believes that she was discriminated and retaliated against. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)

On September 1, 2016, Defendants terminated Plaintiff before the end of her probationary period. (AC ¶ 33.) Plaintiff's Union Representative discussed with Plaintiff the possibility of ending her employment with Defendants by resignation instead of termination, explaining that if Plaintiff ended her employment by resignation, she would be able to receive a law enforcement position in the future. (AC ¶ 33.) Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's conversation with her Union Representative and allowed Plaintiff to resign on September 2, 2016 instead of terminating her. (Id. ¶ 34.) During that general time, a male corrections officer, who was also completing his probationary period, supposedly responded to an inmate with force by pushing the inmate. (Id. ¶ 35.) In that case, the male correction officer did not file charges against the inmate and passed his probationary period, obtaining permanent status. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff was the only female on "light duty" that did not pass her probationary period. (Id. ¶ 36.) For this reason, Plaintiff believes that she was discriminated against based on sex and disability and was retaliated against for requesting a reasonable accommodation. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Around March 12, 2018, an interviewer from the New York State Office of Court Administration ("OCA")² informed Plaintiff that Defendants sent him a letter explaining the details surrounding Plaintiff's investigation against Inmate and Plaintiff's termination before the expiration of her probationary period. (Id. ¶ 38.) The letter further explained that due to this information, the interviewer had to disqualify Plaintiff from the selection process, even though Plaintiff had passed other rounds of the process. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff believes that Defendants sent this information to OCA in retaliation for her filing a lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff therefore believes that Defendants tortuously interfered with her opportunity to attain employment. (Id. ¶ 40.)

To date, Plaintiff has been unable to attain employment in a law enforcement position within the state of New York and believes that Defendants may have circulated the same letter, which falsely states that Defendants investigated and terminated Plaintiff's employment prior to the expiration of her probationary period. (Id. ¶ 41.) Consequently, Plaintiff has felt extremely humiliated, degraded, victimized, embarrassed, and emotionally distressed and has allegedly suffered (and continues to suffer) emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. (Id. ¶¶ 42-44.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry for motions to dismiss is whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'" or to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678.

For motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1), "[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). "In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint (or petition) as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction." Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014). "[T]he court may resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits, and if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing." Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000). Though a court "may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue, [it] may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that, as a preliminary matter, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's ADA and Title VII claims because Plaintiff did not allege such claims in her EEOC charge. (Defendants' Memorandum, ("Def. Mem.") at 6, ECF No. 38.) As a second threshold issue, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's retaliation claims are barred by her signed release. (Id. at 7.) Third, on the merits, Defendants argue that P...