Melgoza v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr.

499 F.Supp.3d 552

Norma MELGOZA, Plaintiff,

v.RUSH UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-6819

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed November 9, 2020

Ashley Lauren Orler, Rebekah Susan Mintzer, Melanie Elysia Baker Analo, Golan Christie Taglia LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Amanda A. Sonneborn, King & Spalding LLP, Jane M. McFetridge, Sabreena Torez El-Amin, Jackson Lewis P.C., James Charles Goodfellow, Jr., Thomas M. Horan, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARY M. ROWLAND, United States District Judge Norma Melgoza brings this employment discrimination action against Rush University Medical Center. Rush has moved for summary judgment on all of Melgoza's claims. For the reasons stated below, Rush's motion for summary judgment [150] is granted in part and denied in part.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a "properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court "consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. , 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court "must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence." Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp. , 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party "the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor." White v. City of Chi. , 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). "The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Id. (citation omitted).

BACKGROUND¹

I. Melgoza's Career at Rush

Melgoza is a Mexican-American female. (DSOF ¶ 1). She is currently employed as a Director at Rush. (Id. ). Rush is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that is part of a multifaceted non-profit health care organization. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 20). Melgoza began her employment at Rush in 2006 as Assistant Vice President. (Id. ¶ 33). That year she was appointed cancer conference coordinator for Rush's Cancer Committee. (PSOF ¶ 10). According to Melgoza's former supervisor, she was the first woman executive leader since Rush's founding in 1837. (Id. ¶ 14).

In November 2010, Melgoza was promoted to Associate Vice President ("AVP"). (DSOF ¶ 33). As an AVP, Melgoza had various managerial duties and was responsible for various departments. (Id. ). Melgoza reported to Robert Clapp from 2006 to 2012. (Id. ¶ 34). She then reported to Michael Mulroe, who was a Vice President. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 34). As an AVP, in addition to benefits, Melgoza had a base salary as well as management incentive compensation ("MICP"). (Id. ¶ 40). The MICP was 15% of base salary at target, and 22.5% at max of base salary. (Id .). Since 2006, Melgoza has expressed her interest in advancing her career at Rush. (PSOF ¶ 25).

II. Elimination of Melgoza's Position

On or about July 14, 2016, Rush eliminated Melgoza's position as Associate Vice President. (DSOF ¶ 35). Rush explained the decision as a result of a restructuring of cancer services under a "cancer service line" (although Melgoza disputes both the existence of a cancer service line and the reason for her position elimination). (Id. ¶ 36; Dkt. 167 at 18). Melgoza thereafter became a Director, reporting to Leo Correa until January 2017. (DSOF ¶¶ 38, 39). She continued her oversight of cancer-related services as a Director under Correa. (PSOF ¶ 38). As Director, Melgoza was no longer eligible for the MICP but Rush provided her with a different type of incentive pay, although she disputes that incentive was comparable to the MICP. (DSOF ¶ 44; Dkt. 167 at 23). As AVP, Melgoza was "grade 28" and as Director she was given the highest grade for that position, "grade 9." (PSOF ¶ 69).

III. Melgoza's Claims

On May 8, 2017, Melgoza filed a Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (DSOF ¶ 96). She received an EEOC "right to sue" letter on August 24, 2017. (Id. ¶ 97). She filed this lawsuit on September 21, 2017. (Dkt. 1). In her Amended Complaint (or "complaint") (Dkt. 43), Melgoza brings claims against Rush for violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) (Count I), retaliation for exercising her rights under the EPA (Count II), violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (Counts III and IV), retaliation for exercising her rights under Title VII (Count V), and violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) (Count VI).

ANALYSIS

I. Local Rule 56.1 and Melgoza's Affidavit

The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 statements is to "streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed material facts and cite the supporting evidence." Laborers' Pension Fund v. Innovation Landscape, Inc., 2019 WL 6699190, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019) (citation omitted). Here neither party fully complied with Local Rule 56.1, unfortunately making the Court's task more difficult. For example, while the Court agrees with Rush that Melgoza at times misrepresented the evidence, Rush also sometimes responded to Melgoza's statement of facts by arguing that the documents did not support the statement when in fact they did. While the Court can require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1, it has discretion in that regard. Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc. , 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019). Accordingly particular evidence is addressed in the opinion as is necessary.

Melgoza has filed a motion for leave to file her affidavit [198]. She seeks to authenticate certain exhibits including her "handwritten notes, summaries and timelines of events authored and complied by [her], and her description of her job duties and claims." (Id. at 6). Some of these documents the Court did not need to rely on either because they lacked relevance or because the facts were supported by evidence elsewhere in the record. However, the Court will not permit Melgoza to rely on her own handwritten notes and her timelines if these notes are being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in them. See Alexander v. Cit Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 867, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2002). She does not argue that these are present sense impressions that constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. See id. Instead these notes appear to have been created at a variety of times, as recently as 2019, and she sometimes broadly states that they were created from her "memory."

Moreover, Melgoza's reliance on these documents contravenes the purpose of Local Rule 56.1. For example she relies on "Group Exhibit MMM" throughout her statement of facts sometimes without citation to any particular page number. Group Exhibit MMM is a nearly 300 page document. This is not appropriate on summary judgment. The Court is not obligated "to scour the record looking for factual disputes." Zoretic v. Darge , 832 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583-84 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (parties’ Rule 56.1 statements must cite specific references to the record); Gray v. Ghosh, 2013 WL 5497250, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) ("facts may be considered on summary judgment only if they are presented in a compliant Local Rule 56.1 statement or response."). Melgoza's motion [198] is denied.

II. Equal Pay Act

Melgoza claims that Rush paid her less than male employees for substantially equal work and retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the EPA.² "The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from discriminating between its employees by paying an employee lower wages than the employer pays an employee of the opposite sex." Terry v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. , 910 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) ). "Because a plaintiff's burden of proof is different for Equal Pay Act claims than it is for Title VII and § 1983 claims, we review [plaintiff's] Equal Pay Act claim first, then address her claims brought under Title VII." Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs. , 876 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2017).

A. Relevant Time Period

Rush seeks to limit the relevant time period for Melgoza's EPA claim based on the allegations in her complaint and the statute of limitations. Rush argues that Melgoza's EPA claim is limited to her time as AVP from September 2014 to July 2016 (Dkt. 194 at 6, 9) (although as discussed below Rush argues it should be even more narrow because of the statute of limitations). The Court agrees with Rush that Melgoza's EPA claim should be limited to her time as AVP but does not agree that the two year statute of limitations applies as a matter of law.

Melgoza alleged in her complaint that "[t]hroughout [her] tenure as an Associate Vice President " she was paid "$100,000.00 to $250,000.00 less per year than her male and/or non-Mexican-American colleagues performing substantially equal work."...