Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett

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MEMPHIS A. PHILLIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRE HARGETT, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-00374

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

February 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation from the Magistrate Judge recommending that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees (Doc. No. 158, “Motion”) be granted. (Doc. No. 166, “R&R”). Via the Motion, Plaintiffs seek, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 an attorney's fee award in the amount of $99, 222.13 (Doc. No. 158 at 1). Defendants responded to the Motion. (Doc. No. 163). Plaintiffs thereafter replied. (Doc. No 164). Plaintiffs also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. No. 165). Defendants objected to the R&R. (Doc. No. 167, “Objections”). Plaintiffs responded to the Objections. (Doc. No. 168).

LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R Civ. P. 54 provides that the district court “may refer a motion for attorney's fees to a magistrate judge under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.” When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition, review further evidence, or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2) provides that a party may file “specific written objections” to a report and recommendation, and Local Rule 72.02(a) provides that such objections must be written and must state with particularity the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's report or proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made.^[1] Objections must be specific; a general objection to the report and recommendation is not sufficient and may result in waiver of further review. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).

The failure to properly, specifically, and timely object to a report and recommendation releases the Court from its duty to independently review the matter. Frias v. Frias, No. 2:18-cv-00076, 2019 WL 549506, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2019). “The filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object. Moreover, an objection that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an objection as that term is used in this context.” Frias, 2019 WL 549506, at *2 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Ashraf v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., 322 F.Supp.3d 879, 881 (W.D. Tenn. 2018); Benson v. Walden Security, No. 3:18-cv-0010, 2018 WL 6322332, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2018). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge's findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3), the Court has reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation, the Objections, and the file. For the reasons set forth below, the Objections of Defendants are overruled, and the Report and Recommendation is adopted and approved.

BACKGROUND

The full factual background is sufficiently recited in the R&R and needs not be repeated here in full (Doc. No. 166 at 2-4). Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in May 2020 challenging aspects of Tennessee's statutory provisions governing absentee voting. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to add a claim challenging the requirement that voters vote in person in their first election if they registered to vote by mail or online (the “first-time voter claim”). (Doc. No. 39 at 33). On September 9, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the first-time voter provision. (Doc. Nos. 79, 80). This Court thereafter denied Defendants' subsequent motion for reconsideration of this ruling and for a stay of the injunction, and Defendants' motion in the Sixth Circuit requesting a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal likewise was denied. (Doc. Nos. 103, 107, 163, see also Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2020) [Hargett I]). Thus, the preliminary injunction remained in force for the November 2020 election, allowing first-time voters who had registered by mail or online to cast mail-in votes.

On June 22, 2021, the Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the particular first-time voter claim supporting Article III jurisdiction had become moot. More specifically, it held that the claim of Corey DeWayne Sweet, the individual (a member of Plaintiff Tennessee NAACP) on whose standing Plaintiffs relied for so-called associational standing, had become moot. Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 2 F.4th 548, 558-561 (6th Cir. 2021) [Hargett II]. Plaintiffs then dismissed their claims without prejudice, and this Court entered final judgment on July 9, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 151, 155, 156). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) and Local Rule 54.01(b), Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to request an award of attorney's fees incurred in securing and defending the preliminary injunction for the November 2020 election. (Doc. No. 158). The Magistrate Judge has recommended that Plaintiffs' Motion be granted. (Doc. No. 166).

DISCUSSION

Defendants' Objections to the R&R raise two primary arguments: 1) that “Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties entitled to recover their attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988”; and 2) that “even if this Court concludes that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties, their requested fees should be reduced.” (Doc. No. 167 at 2). The Court will review de novo both aspects of the R&R.

1. Prevailing parties

Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees incurred only in securing the preliminary injunction that allowed first-time voters to vote by mail during the November 2020 election. (Doc. No. 159 at 1). Defendants argue in their Objections that the R&R erroneously concluded that the relief sought by Plaintiffs was a preliminary injunction applicable only to the 2020 election rather than a permanent injunction to “enjoin the first-time-voter provision and to have that provision declared unconstitutional”-a form of relief that was never obtained by Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 167 at 5). Defendants go on to argue that because the R&R was based on this “factual error, ” its “legal conclusion that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties” is also flawed (relying primarily on the Sixth Circuit's denial of attorney's fees in McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 2010)). (Id. at 6-8).

42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides for the recovery of attorney's fees to a “prevailing party” in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As this Court has explained:

Under the so-called “American Rule, ” fees to prevailing parties must be grounded in explicit statutory authority. McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2010). In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress explicitly empowered the courts to award fees to parties who win actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[Section] 1988 fees are available for a party succeeding on any type of § 1983 claim.”); Miller v. Davis, 267 F.Supp.3d 961, 976 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (same). Accordingly, a court, in its discretion, may allow a prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The idea behind § 1988 is to award fees to deserving parties, not to generate satellite disputes over fees. McQueary, 614 F.3d at 598.

[ ] To “prevail” and thus become eligible for attorney's fees, a party must have obtained a judicially-sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. Toms v. Taft, 338 F.3d 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2003). Usually, only enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 528-29. Stated differently, a plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party when the plaintiff wins relief on the merits in the form of a court order, consent decree, or judicially-enforced settlement that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 82, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry... is the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.”); Kiser v. Reitz, Case No. 2:12-cv-00574, 2018 WL 2937898, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2018) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)). Whatever relief the plaintiff receives must benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. Kiser, 2018 WL 2937898, at *2.

Jones v. Haynes, 350 F.Supp.3d 691, 694-95 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (footnotes omitted).

Citing Farrar, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), Plaintiffs argue that they are a prevailing party because they obtained “at least some relief on the merits of [their claim.]” (Doc. No. 159 at 3). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has held that an award of a preliminary injunction may render a plaintiff a “prevailing party” for purposes of obtaining attorney's fees under § 1988, even if the plaintiff's claims are later mooted and even...