Menchillo v. State

350 So.3d 136

Walter Stephen MENCHILLO, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D21-3466

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 2, 2022

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

After the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence, a jury found Walter Stephen Menchillo guilty of leaving the scene of a crash involving damage to unattended property. See § 316.063(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). Mr. Menchillo now challenges his judgment and sentence. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Utilizing the factors set forth in Ramirez v. State , 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999), the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Menchillo was not in custody when he made incriminating statements to law enforcement officers.¹ Therefore, we affirm.

Background

Late one rainy evening Mr. Menchillo was driving his Ford sport utility vehicle (SUV) on a highway. Suddenly, the SUV veered off the road and crashed into a fence. Mr. Menchillo was unharmed. The fence, however, sustained much damage. Mr. Menchillo summoned a tow truck, left his SUV by the roadside, and continued home by other means.

Sometime after the tow truck arrived on scene, deputies from the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office showed up. After obtaining Mr. Menchillo's phone number from the tow truck driver, Deputy Guetler called Mr. Menchillo, who reported that he had crashed into the fence due to a blown tire; he left the scene and went home. Deputy Guetler asked Mr. Menchillo to furnish a sworn statement.² Mr. Menchillo agreed to meet the deputy at Mr. Menchillo's house. So, Deputy Guetler and another deputy proceeded to the residence.

Mr. Menchillo met the deputies in his driveway. He invited them into his living room. He spoke with them briefly; he gave a four-minute-long sworn statement. Effectively, he admitted every element of the crime with which he was later charged. See generally § 316.063(1) ; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.4(b). At no point did the deputies handcuff or otherwise restrain Mr. Menchillo.

Believing that they were conducting a civil investigation to complete the civil crash report, the deputies did not Mirandize Mr. Menchillo. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Deputy Guetler testified that they spoke "[a]bout the crash itself, why was the vehicle damaged, why was the fence damaged, why was [Mr. Menchillo] not at the scene. Basically, the things [Deputy Guetler] needed to know for the crash report."

Deputy Guetler testified that Mr. Menchillo was free to leave. He conceded, however, that the deputies never told him so. Deputy Guetler informed Mr. Menchillo that his SUV had broken a fence and "that there was [sic] cattle on the property and they could have gotten out."

Mr. Menchillo testified that when the deputies arrived, he "thought [he] was under arrest." More specifically, Mr. Menchillo affirmed that he "was under the impression [he] was getting a ticket, which pretty much is being arrested." Mr. Menchillo explained to the deputies that "because there was [sic] no injuries," he believed he could leave the crash scene.

After speaking with Mr. Menchillo, the deputies issued him a criminal citation for leaving the scene of a crash involving damage to unattended property, a misdemeanor offense.

Mr. Menchillo filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his statements to the deputies were made involuntarily without the protections against self-incrimination required by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. McAdams , 193 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 2016) ("Failure to provide the Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation generally requires exclusion from trial of any post-custody statements given." (citing Missouri v. Seibert , 542 U.S. 600, 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) )).

At the suppression hearing the trial court assessed the Ramirez factors, 739 So. 2d at 574, and concluded that Mr. Menchillo was not in custody during his encounter with the deputies. Thus, the trial court found that Mr. Menchillo was not entitled to Miranda warnings. See Miranda , 384 U.S. at 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The trial court denied the suppression motion. After the jury found Mr. Menchillo guilty, the trial court sentenced him to six months’ probation with a suspended sentence of forty-five days in jail.

On appeal, Mr. Menchillo maintains that "[t]he evidence shows that [he] was in custody at the time he was questioned by law enforcement"; in the absence of Miranda warnings, the trial court "erred in denying [his] motion to suppress." See Bell v. State , 201 So. 3d 1267, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("In Miranda ... the United States Supreme Court established a procedural safeguard to protect an individual's [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination from the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation." (quoting Caso v. State , 524 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1988) )).

Analysis

As an initial matter, we observe that

when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional rights should be reviewed by appellate courts using a two-step approach." We defer to a trial court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo a trial court's application of the law to the historical facts.

Ross v. State , 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Connor v. State , 803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 2001) ).³ We are mindful that "[a] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and, as the reviewing court, we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Murray v. State , 692 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1997) (citing McNamara v. State , 357 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1978) ).

Law enforcement officers must provide Miranda warnings to a suspect subject to custodial interrogation. State v. Pitts , 936 So. 2d 1111, 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ; cf. State v. Shepard , 658 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (explaining that reading Miranda rights resolves any self-incrimination problem regardless of whether the statements were made during an accident or criminal investigation). "For Miranda purposes, custodial interrogation means ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ " Ross , 45 So. 3d at 415 (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 )). Thus, the right against self-incrimination implicates two issues: first, whether a suspect is in custody, and second, whether the suspect is being interrogated. "Absent one or the other, Miranda warnings are not required." State v. Thompson , 193 So. 3d 916, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Davis v. State , 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1997) ).

Generally, "[i]nterrogation takes place ... when a person is subjected to express questions, or other words or actions, by a state agent, that a reasonable person would conclude are designed to lead to an incriminating response." Traylor v. State , 596 So. 2d 957, 966 n.17 (Fla. 1992). In our view, the deputies interrogated Mr. Menchillo. Consequently, the crux of this case is whether Mr. Menchillo was in custody when speaking to the deputies in his house. We review this legal determination de novo. See State v. Vazquez , 295 So. 3d 373, 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Where the facts are undisputed or the trial court's factual findings are supported, whether a person was in custody such that Miranda warnings were necessary is a legal determination that we review de novo." (first citing State v. Herrera , 201 So. 3d 192, 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ; and then citing State v. Figueroa , 139 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) )).

"Custody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only formal arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest." Ramirez , 739 So. 2d at 573. Moreover, "[a] person is in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest." Id . ; Connor , 803 So. 2d at 605 ("In order for a court to conclude that a suspect was in custody, it must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police.").

In Ramirez , the supreme court approved a four-factor test to

provide[ ] guidance in making the determination whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider himself in custody: (1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning.

Id . at 574.

We acknowledge that "[a]lthough the four [ Ramirez ] factors provide the structure of our analysis, the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the ‘circumstances surrounding the interrogation’; and (2) ‘given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ " Ross , 45 So. 3d at 415 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ); Yarborough , 541 U.S. at 663, 124 S.Ct. 2140 ("Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the...