Méndez-Fradera v. Vázquez-Collazo, CIVIL NO. 14-1875 (GAG)

NORBERTO MÉNDEZ-FRADERA Plaintiff, v. JAVIER VÁZQUEZ-COLLAZO Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 14-1875 (GAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 8, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Norberto Méndez-Fradera ("Méndez") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging that Defendant Javier Vázquez-Collazo ("Vázquez") demoted him because of his political affiliation in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Docket No. 26 ¶ 54.) Plaintiff also brings state law claims pursuant to Article II, §§ 1 and 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 146-151 et seq. ("Law 100"), and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142 ("Article 1802 and 1803"). Id.

Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 28.) After reviewing the parties' submissions and pertinent law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 28.

I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Vázquez, a member and activist of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), became the Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Capitol in December, 2012, after the defeat of the New Progressive Party ("NPP") in the November, 2012 general election. (Docket No. 26 ¶¶ 15-17.) The Office of the Superintendent ("the Superintendence"), established by Law No. 4 of July 21, 1977, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 2, §§ 651-60 et seq., is responsible for the maintenance, conservation and repairs of the Puerto Rico Capitol Building. (Docket No. 26 ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff Méndez has been an employee of the Superintendence since April 1, 2001. Id. ¶¶ 1; 21. Plaintiff has a bachelor's degree in Business Administration and Accounting and a master's degree in Human Resources. Id. ¶ 22. He began as a cabinetmaker and gradually worked his way up to become the Main Accounting Officer¹ in charge of contracts in the Finance and Accounting Department. Id. ¶¶ 25-29.

At the time he was hired, Plaintiff was affiliated with the PDP. (Docket No. 26 ¶ 24.) However, Plaintiff's political affiliation changed after developing a close professional and personal relationship with Defendant's predecessor, former Superintendent Eliezer Velázquez ("Velázquez"), who is affiliated with the NPP. (Docket No. 26 ¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff began attending NPP activities with Velázquez. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff alleges that his recent affiliation with the NPP became widely known in the Superintendence because he actively participated in Velázquez's NPP campaign for the Puerto Rico Senate and he accompanied Velázquez to a highly publicized local activity for then Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff contends that as soon as Defendant assumed office, he personally engaged in reviewing the personnel records ofemployees in order to identify their respective political affilations to target NPP supporters for reprisal. Id. ¶ 20. Additionally, Defendant appointed another employee to serve as Plaintiff's subordinate, allegedly to familiarize himself with Plaintiff's work so he could replace Plaintiff in the future. Id. ¶ 36.

On December 9, 2013, the Deputy Superintendent Alvaro Vazquez-Ramos called Plaintiff to the Human Resource Office and told him that he "had been reclassified from Main Accounting Officer to Executive Officer" and that his monthly compensation would be reduced by $500. Id. ¶¶ 37-39. Plaintiff was transferred to the Security Department to perform security guard duties. Id. ¶¶ 40; 42. Plaintiff maintains that he had not been charged with any misconduct before the transfer and the salary reduction. Id. ¶ 41. Defendant subsequently appointed a PDP-affiliated employee as the new Main Accounting Officer, with an increased salary of $950. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). First, the court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the court must then "take the complaint's well-[pleaded] (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing allreasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, 'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,' the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. Legal Analysis

A. Political Discrimination Claim

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's political discrimination claim arguing Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to show Defendant knew of his political affiliation or that such knowledge motivated Plaintiff's reclassification at the Superintendence. (Docket No. 28 at 5-13.)

The First Amendment prohibits government officials from taking "adverse employment action against public employees on the basis of political affiliation, unless political loyalty is an appropriate requirement of the employment." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 13. To state a prima facie case of political discrimination based on the First Amendment Plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: "(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action occurred,and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action." Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Vélez, 630 F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010). The Court evaluates the cumulative effect of all factual allegations instead of analyzing each of them in isolation. Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14.

At this stage, Defendant only challenges two elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case: (1) whether it is plausible that Defendant knew of Plaintiff's political affiliation and (2) whether Defendant's knowledge of this fact motivated Plaintiff's reclassification.² (See Docket No. 28 at 4.) The Court will discuss each element in turn.

1. Knowledge of Plaintiff's Political Affiliation

Defendant claims Plaintiff failed to support his allegations that Defendant knew or that he affirmatively inquired into his political affiliation. (Docket No. 28 at 6-7.)

The First Circuit has recogznied that political discrimination often turns on an employer's cloaked motives that can be hard for the employee to prove. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Martínez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's NPP affiliation based ontestimony that the plaintiff "spoke openly about her political views and sat in the NPP portion of the de facto segregated cafeteria."). While knowledge is not imputed to defendant when a plaintiff merely alleges that his political affiliation is well known, Rivera Feliciano v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 652 F. Supp. 2d 170, 186-87 (D.P.R. 2009) (citations omitted), courts are willing to infer defendants knew of a plaintiff's political affiliation when the defendant engages in a "witch-hunt" to obtain such information. See Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013).

In the present case, the Court can infer from Plaintiff's factual allegations that Defendant knew of Plaintiff's political affiliation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, a PDP activist, became the Superintendent one month after the PDP gained the majority in the Puerto Rico legislature. (Docket No. 26 ¶¶ 15-17.) Plaintiff asserts that as Defendant prepared for the transition to the new PDP administration, Defendant personally identified employees with any connection to the NPP by reviewing employee personnel records. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff also maintains he became an active supporter of the NPP after developing a close relationship with former superintendent Velázquez, participating in Velázquez's campaign for the Senate and attending political events with him. Id. ¶¶ 31-34. Plaintiff's friendship with Velázquez and his involvement in a highly publicized tour with Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney became widely known within the Superintendence. Id. ¶ 34.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff's political activism...