Mendez v. City of Chicago

JUAN MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, CHRISTIAN SZCZUR, and DAVID COOK, Defendants.

No. 18-cv-6313

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Honorable Marvin E. Aspen, United States District Judge.

Before us is Plaintiff Juan Mendez's motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 145, Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File 4th Am. Compl. (“Mot.”).) Defendants Christian Szczur and David Cook (collectively “the Officers”) and the City of Chicago (“the City”) oppose the motion. (Dkt. No. 157 Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. (“Opp'n”).) For the following reasons Mendez's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Mendez alleges that on May 26, 2018, the Officers responded to a report of gunshots fired and appeared at or near Mendez's property pursuant to the Chicago Police Department's official “Shot Spotter Policy.” (Dkt. No. 91, 3d Am. Compl. (“3AC”), ¶¶ 5-9.) The Officers then entered Mendez's property without authorization and approached Mendez and his friend. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) After the Officers began issuing commands, Mendez fled. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) The Officers chased him and during the chase, Szczur shot Mendez several times in the back, paralyzing him for life. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16.)

In his original complaint, filed September 16, 2018, Mendez brought suit against the City and Szczur (who Mendez incorrectly identified as Christopher Szczurs), asserting claims for excessive force (Count I); unconstitutional search and seizure (Count II); deprivation of liberty without probable cause (Count III); deprivation of bodily integrity (Count IV); liability for an unconstitutional policy, custom, or usage under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) (Count V);^[1] battery (Count VI); indemnification (Count VII); and respondeat superior liability (Count VIII). (Dkt. No. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 5, 16-53.) Shortly thereafter, Mendez filed an amended complaint, which correctly identified Szczur but did not add any new defendants or claims. (Compare Dkt. No. 4, 1st Am. Compl. (“1AC”), with Compl.)

On May 23, 2019, Mendez filed a second amended complaint, which added allegations to support Count V, Mendez's Monell claim. (Compare Dkt. No. 51, 2d Am. Compl. (“2AC”), ¶¶ 32-50, with 1AC ¶¶ 32-42.) These allegations referred to an April 2016 report by the Police Accountability Task Force, a January 2017 investigation of the City's Police Department by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and a January 2019 consent decree from another case involving the City-all of which purportedly evince instances of police misconduct similar to those alleged by Mendez. (2AC ¶¶ 35-42.)

The City moved to dismiss 2AC Count V, and the City and Szczur jointly moved to dismiss 2AC Counts II, III, and IV. (Dkt. Nos. 52, 55.) On October 7, 2019, we dismissed 2AC Count II to the extent it alleged an unlawful seizure before the shooting and restated Mendez's excessive force claim based on the shooting; dismissed 2AC Counts III and IV in their entirety; and dismissed 2AC Count V to the extent it alleged a pattern of unlawful searches. (Dkt. No. 73, Oct. 7, 2019 Mem. Op. & Order (“Oct. 7, 2019 Op.”), at 7-8, 10-11, 13, 16-17.) We allowed 2AC Count II to proceed on the theory that Szczur's entry onto Mendez's property constituted an unreasonable search and 2AC Count V to proceed on the theory that the City's practices and customs have resulted in the use of excessive force. (Id. at 4-10.)

Mendez then requested and received permission to file a third amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 89, 90.) Mendez's third amended complaint added Cook as a defendant; identified Counts II, III, IV, and V without restating their underlying allegations; and purported to replead 2AC Counts II and V as Counts IX and X, respectively. (3AC at 1, 5.) The Officers moved to strike 3AC Counts II, III, IV, and V, as well as portions of 3AC Count IX. (Dkt. No. 97.) On August 14, 2020, we struck 3AC Counts III, IV, and X in their entirety and struck portions of 3AC Counts II, V, and IX consistent with our October 7, 2019 Opinion. (Dkt. No. 107, Aug. 14, 2020 Mem. Op. & Order (“Aug. 14, 2020 Op.”), at 1, 3-5.) Based on the reasoning set forth in our October 7, 2019 Opinion, we struck 3AC Count IX's “allegations that a seizure occurred before Mendez was shot.” (Id. at 4-5.) We also sua sponte struck 3AC Count X in its entirety because there were no material differences between this count and 2AC and 3AC Count V. (Id. at 5.)

On December 9, 2020, Mendez moved for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 145.) At this time, fact discovery was set to close on December 31, 2020, just twenty-two days later.^[2] (Dkt. No. 124.) The magistrate judge subsequently extended the December 31 deadline, but only for limited purposes. (Dkt. No. 172 (extending deadline for the limited purpose of conducting certain depositions); Dkt. No. 185 (extending deadline for the sole purpose of deposing the City's Civilian Office of Police Accountability investigator).) Even with these extensions, fact discovery closed in all respects on July 30, 2021. (Dkt. No. 185.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court should freely allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Accordingly, a district court must allow a requested amendment unless there is a good reason to deny the request. Liebhart v. SPX Corp., 917 F.3d 952, 964 (7th Cir. 2019). Good reasons for denying a request to amend include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962).

ANALYSIS

Mendez's proposed fourth amended complaint alleges “Facts Common to All Counts” and then sets forth eight counts. (Dkt No. 145-1, Proposed 4th Am. Compl. (“Proposed 4AC”).) The differences between the alleged common facts in the proposed fourth amended complaint and the operative third amended complaint are minor, and proposed Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII do not materially differ from their counterparts in the third amended complaint (compare Proposed 4AC ¶¶ 1-20, 86-96, with 3AC ¶¶ 1-20, 51-61), so we do not discuss these aspects of the proposed fourth amended complaint further. Rather, our analysis focuses on the four remaining proposed counts: proposed Count II, which alleges an unconstitutional search; proposed Count III, which alleges a Monell claim based on policies that result in the use of excessive force; proposed Count IV, which alleges a Monell claim based on the City's ShotSpotter policy; and proposed Count V, which alleges a Monell claim based on the City's failure to have a policy governing when and how police officers should pursue criminal suspects on foot. (Proposed 4AC ¶¶ 21-85.)

I. Proposed Count II

We begin with proposed Count II, which is titled “42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983: Unconstitutional Search.” (4AC at 5.) Although Mendez's proposed Count II is similar to 3AC Count IX, which has the same title (3AC at 8), the allegations in proposed Count II differ from the allegations in 3AC Count IX in three ways. First, in identifying the actions that violated Mendez's right to be free from unreasonable searches, proposed Count II replaces 3AC Count IX's allegation that the Officers shot him with an allegation that the Officers conducted or attempted to conduct a pat-down search. (Compare 4AC ¶ 22, with 3AC ¶ 63.) Second, proposed Count II replaces 3AC Count IX's allegation that the Officers did not have “just cause” for their actions with an allegation that they lacked “warrant, consent, [or] exigent circumstances.” (Compare 4AC ¶ 22, with 3AC ¶ 63.) Third, proposed Count II includes the following paragraph, which 3AC Count IX does not include: “As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional conduct set forth in the preceding paragraph, PLAINTIFF suffered injuries and damages as set forth within Paragraphs 15 and 16 above.” (4AC ¶ 23.)

We see no issue with the second and third proposed amendments. The second change simply defines “just cause” with more particularity, and the third change merely makes explicit what should already be apparent to Defendants-that Mendez contends that the Officers' unconstitutional conduct injured him. Although it is unclear why Mendez did not include these allegations earlier in the case, they do not prejudice Defendants in any way. In fact, Defendants do not even mention these proposed amendments in their opposition. (See generally Opp'n.)

That leaves the first proposed amendment, which alleges that the Officers conducted or attempted to conduct a pat-down search. We deny Mendez's request to include this allegation. Mendez obviously has known about any pat-down since May 2018, and nothing precluded him from including a corresponding allegation in any of his four previous complaints. Especially with fact discovery now closed, Defendants would be unduly prejudiced if we allow Mendez to base his unconstitutional search claim on an additional, previously unidentified search that he has known about (if it occurred) since before the onset of this litigation. See Johnson v. Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867, 872-73 (7th Cir. 2011).

Other allegations carried over from 3AC Count IX should not be in the proposed fourth amended complaint either. Proposed Count II, like 3AC Count IX, alleges that the Officers approached Mendez, stopped him, and detained or attempted to detain him. (4AC ¶ 22; 3AC ¶ 63.) These actions all indicate that the Officers seized Mendez before he was shot, even though we already struck...