Mendez v. FMC Facility Section

Raphael Mendez, Plaintiff, v. FMC Facility Section, Warden S. Kallis, Associate Warden Kris Goldey, Unit 1/2 Correctional Manager C. Orum, Unit 1/2 Correctional Officer Mr. Beadling, Unit 1/2 Correctional Officer Mr. Kreye, Associate Warden Program G. Cooper, and Captain J. Wades, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-2820 (NEB/TNL)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

August 5, 2021

Raphael Mendez, (pro se Plaintiff); and

Andrew S. Tweeten, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, (for Defendants).

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

TONY N. LEUNG UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants FMC Facility Section, Warden S. Kallis, Associate Warden Kris Goldey, Unit 1/2 Correctional Manager C. Orum, Unit 1/2 Correctional Officer Mr. Beadling, and Unit 1/2 Correctional Officer Mr Kreye's^[1]“Motion to Dismiss, ” ECF No. 36, and pro se Plaintiff Raphael Mendez's “Motion for Abeyance and Immediate Investigation on [sic] the Defendants et al[.], ” ECF No. 49. These motions have been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation to the district court, the Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. LR 72.1.^[2]

Based upon the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion be GRANTED; Plaintiff's motion be DENIED; and this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. ALLEGATIONS^[3]

Plaintiff has been civilly committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.^[4] Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is currently being held at the Federal Medical Center located in Rochester, Minnesota (“FMC Rochester”). Compl. ¶ 1. Following the dismissal of Plaintiff's false-imprisonment claim, see generally ECF No. 9, the sole remaining claim challenges the conditions of Plaintiff's cell.

In early October 2019, Plaintiff sent an “electronic message complaint” to Defendant FMC Facility Section, stating that outside air was coming into his cell and a cold front was expected. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff did not hear back. Compl. ¶ 8.

The next day, October 8, Plaintiff cut a piece of cardboard “to fit the window in his cell as a Temporary measure until Facilities c[ould] get to the Window problem.” Compl. ¶ 9. That same day, Plaintiff also attempted to get permission from Defendant Warden S. Kallis to use the cardboard in this manner “without Correctional interference.” Compl. ¶ 10. Kallis responded on October 10, and instructed Plaintiff to raise his concerns with Defendant C. Orum, the unit manager. Compl. ¶ 11; see ECF No. 1-1 at 15. Plaintiff forwarded Kallis's response to Orum, and received no response. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.

On October 11, Plaintiff approached Defendant Associate Warden Kris Goldey “in the chow hall” regarding the use of the cardboard. Compl. ¶ 14. Goldey pointed to a lieutenant, and told Plaintiff to “get with this Lieutenant here.” Compl. ¶ 14. “The [lieutenant] told Plaintiff to eat first then see him.” Compl. ¶ 15. The lieutenant had to leave, however, before Plaintiff finished eating to attend to an “incident, ” which left Plaintiff's request “unaddressed.” Compl. ¶ 15.

That same day, which was the Friday before a Monday holiday, Defendant Beadling^[5], a correctional officer, instructed Defendant Kreye^[6], another correctional officer, to remove the piece of cardboard. Compl. ¶ 14. Kreye subsequently removed the piece of carboard. Compl. ¶ 14.

Over the next two days, Plaintiff alleges that the removal of the cardboard caused him to be exposed to the cold as temperatures outside were in the low to mid-30s with winds up to 33 miles per hour, resulting in windchill temperatures in the high-teens and low-20s. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff put on multiple articles of clothing, including a jacket, and used two blankets in an effort to keep warm, but “still could not get any sleep.” Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that Beadling and Kreye removed the only protection he had from the cold. Compl. ¶ 17.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.^[7]

A. Screening

As an initial matter, Plaintiff asserts that the Court has already determined he has “a viable claim” when this matter was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) in connection with his application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Pl.'s Resp. at 3. According to Plaintiff, this determination was reflected in the Court directing that summonses be issued and service be made. See generally ECF No. 4.

“The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to all persons proceeding IFP and are not limited to prisoner suits ....” Carter v. Schafer, 273 Fed.Appx. 581, 582 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also Pendleton v. Sanders, 565 Fed.Appx. 584, 584-85 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Among other things, § 1915(e) directs the Court to “dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

But, “a court's decision allowing some claims to go forward at the initial screening stage does not insulate those claims from later review on a motion to dismiss.” Hendrix v. Pactiv LLC, 488 F.Supp.3d 43, 50-51 (W.D. N.Y. 2020). To conclude otherwise “would deprive Defendants of the basic procedural right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings.” James v. Perez, No. 2:08-CV-01857-RRC, 2012 WL 5387676, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012); accord Braun v. Hanson, No. 18-cv-3355 (JNE/ECW), 2020 WL 1496580, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1493884 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2020); Jackson v. Dayton, No. 15-cv-4429 (WMW/TNL), 2016 WL 11198354, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2016), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2017 WL 499596 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2017). Accordingly, “[a]n initial screening decision permitting some claims to proceed does not amount to a judicial imprimatur endorsing the validity of those claims.” Hendrix, 488 F.Supp.3d at 51. Therefore, the fact that this Court previously recommended dismissal of portions of Plaintiff's lawsuit and directed service on his conditions-of-confinement claim, see generally ECF Nos. 3-4; see also generally ECF No. 9, does not preclude Defendants from arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

B. Legal Standard

In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 5 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, [courts] hold a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). But, “[a]lthough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, ‘they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.'” Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). Stated differently, “this standard does not excuse pro se complaints from ‘alleg[ing] sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.'” Gerstner v. Sebig, LLC, 386 Fed.Appx. 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Stone, 364 F.3d at 914). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,

[w]hen we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.

Stone, 364 F.3d at 915.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. No Relief Specified

Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff “is silent as to the relief sought.” Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 5, ECF No. 38. Under Rule 8, in order to state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3). Here, Plaintiff does not specify what sort of relief he seeks from Defendants or the Court based on the events in question. Plaintiff has demanded a jury trial, but has not articulated whether he is seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, or something else entirely.

D. Conditions of Confinement

As previously stated, as best as this Court is able to tell, the thrust of Plaintiff's lawsuit is a constitutional claim based on the conditions of his cell under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

1. Availability of Bivens Questionable

Bivens claims are for...