Mendoza v. Cornell Univ.

MILUSKA MENDOZA, Plaintiff, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY a/k/aWEILL CORNELL MEDICAL COLLEGE, Defendant.

1:20-cv-02110 (MKV)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 10, 2021

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, United States District Judge:

In this action, Plaintiff Miluska Mendoza asserts claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA"), and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), premised on allegations that she was not paid for overtime and "gap time" while employed by Defendant Cornell University ("Cornell"). Defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Mendoza's Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to assert a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts as stated herein are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11 ("AC"), and are assumed to be true for the purpose of the Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Plaintiff Miluska Mendoza was employed for approximately thirteen years as a housekeeper at Defendant's hospital in Manhattan. AC ¶¶ 7-8. Her employment ended in approximately April 2019. AC ¶ 8. During her thirteen years of employment, Plaintiff was paid hourly, including $20 per hour "during the last few years of her employment." AC ¶ 9. However, Plaintiff claims that she was not paid for "extra time" that she worked outside her normal shifts and for the time she worked through her scheduled lunch breaks. AC ¶ 10.

Specifically, Plaintiff explains that her "standard" workweek consisted of five, eight-hour-shifts with one unfixed, unpaid lunch break during each shift. AC ¶ 11. But, Plaintiff further claims that she "worked through lunch about 80% of the time and when she did take a lunch break, it was generally approximately 30 minutes and never exceeded 45 minutes." AC ¶ 13. Plaintiff also notes that she worked an extra shift on weekends "between 20% and 40% of the weeks she worked for the Defendant." AC ¶ 12. Thus, while Plaintiff's "standard" workweek was supposed to consist of 35 hours, she claims that she regularly worked 39 to 40 hours, but was only ever paid for the standard amount. AC ¶¶ 12, 14. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is spare on specific examples of these issues. She alleges only that during the week of June 11, 2018, she "worked approximately 48 hours but was paid for only 43."¹ AC ¶ 15. Plaintiff states that she complained to the Director of Housekeeping Services about her underpayment and extra work, "but nothing was done." AC ¶ 17.

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in this action on March 10, 2020. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court's Local Rules, Defendant thereafter submitted a pre-motion letter in anticipation of a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. See Letter to Court from Mark Siegmund, ECF No. 8. Plaintiff filed a letter in opposition. See Letter to Court from David Abrams, ECF No. 9.

In response to the letters, the Court issued an order granting Defendant leave to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, but first granting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint in response to Defendant's arguments. See Scheduling Order, ECF No. 10.Specifically, the Court noted that "[t]his will be Plaintiff's last opportunity to amend the complaint in response to arguments raised in the parties' letters." Id. Plaintiff thereafter filed her Amended Complaint and Defendant moved to dismiss. See Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11; Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12.

In support of its Motion, Defendant filed a Notice of the Motion [ECF No. 12] and a Memorandum of Law [ECF No. 13] ("Def. Br."). Plaintiff opposed the Motion with a three-page Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 14] ("Opp."). Defendant thereafter submitted a Reply in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 15] ("Def. Reply").

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff only needs to allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must "'accept[] all of the complaint's factual allegations as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.'" Siegel v. HSBC North America Holdings, Inc., 933 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Giunta v. Dingman, 893 F.3d 73, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2018)). However, the Court is "'not bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.'" Id. (quoting In re Facebook Initial Public Offering Derivative Litig., 797 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 2015)).

In cases asserting violations of the FLSA, "a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours." Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs must "provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week." Nakahata v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013). Allegations that anemployee "occasionally" or "typically" missed breaks are not sufficient. Lundy, 711 F.3d at 115. Similarly, allegations that an employee "regularly worked" more than forty hours per week are merely legal conclusions that constitute "little more than a paraphrase of the statute" and cannot, standing alone, establish a plausible claim. DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2013). These pleading standards equally apply to claims under the NYLL. Jian Cheng Liu v. Kueng Chan, No. 18-cv-05044-KAM-SJB, 2020 WL 978857, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2020) ("'[T]he relevant portions of New York Labor Law do not diverge from the requirements of the FLSA ,' and the pleading standards for FLSA overtime claims 'apply equally to . . . NYLL state law claims.'" (quoting Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 89 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original)). "Determining whether a plausible claim has been pled is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's FLSA claim for failure adequately to plead that she worked in excess of 40 hours a week. See Def. Br. at 8-13. Then, assuming Plaintiff has stated no FLSA claim, Defendant urges the Court to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYLL claim, and otherwise seeks dismissal of the NYLL claim for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a three page, bare-bones opposition resisting the dismissal of the FLSA claim and stating that the NYLL claim should survive "for the same reasons." See Opp. at 1-3. Plaintiff does not specifically respond to Defendant's arguments regarding supplemental jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff has failed adequately to plead an FLSA overtime claim, and because the Court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the absence of the federal claim, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed.

A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege an FLSA Claim

A Plaintiff may bring a claim under the FLSA only for failure to pay minimum wages and for overtime wages. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19. To the extent Plaintiff alleges facts related to "gap time," those allegations are relevant only to the NYLL claim. Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201. Thus, when considering whether Plaintiff has alleged an FLSA claim, the Court is limited to considering the allegations related to overtime, since Plaintiff makes no claim related to failure to pay minimum wages. To be clear, Plaintiff's allegations must plausibly state that she worked in excess of 40 hours per week without overtime compensation for the hours in excess of 40 in order to state a claim. Id. at 201-02.

Plaintiff's allegations regarding overtime worked are largely conclusory and do not establish with any plausibility that Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours a week. First, Plaintiff alleges that in a "standard workweek," she would "actually work 39 to 40 hours but be paid for only 35 hours." AC ¶ 14. As discussed, this allegation cannot support a plausible FLSA claim because Plaintiff needs to allege that she worked in excess of 40 hours a week. See Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201-02. The only other allegations in the Amended Complaint concerning Plaintiff's hours are an off-hand remark that she "sometimes" worked an extra shift on weekends—between 20 and 40 percent of the time—and her allegations related to a single week, June 11, 2018. AC ¶¶ 12, 15. A general statement that Plaintiff "sometimes" worked more than a standard workweek is not sufficient to plausibly allege that Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours a week without overtime compensation. Id. at 201. Indeed, the Second Circuit reviewed a nearly identical circumstance in Lundy and determined that similar pleadings did not state a claim for relief. Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114-15 (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff's overtime claims where complaint only alleged that plaintiff "typically" worked 37.5 hours a week and "occasionally" worked amounts in excess of 40 hours per week); see also Bonn-Wittingham v. Project OHR,Inc., 792 Fed. App'x 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2019) ("Allegations that an employee 'occasionally' or 'typically' missed breaks provides 'nothing but low-octane fuel for speculation, not the plausible claim that is required.'" (quoting Lundy, 711 F.3d at 115)).

As a result, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint ultimately depends on the single specific detail it contains, that she "worked approximately 48 hours but was paid for only 43" during the week of June 11, 2018. AC ¶ 15. The Court agrees with Defendant that after reviewing P...