Mendoza v. Inslee

CRISTINA MENDOZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JAY INSLEE, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:19-cv-06216-BHS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA

March 17, 2020

ORDER STRIKING PROPOSED COMPLAINT AND RENOTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to Amended General Order 02-19. The matter is before the Court on plaintiff's amended proposed complaint in support of her IFP application. See Dkt. 3.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, seeks to bring claims on behalf of herself, her deceased husband, and their three children against various state officials and employees and private individuals in this civil rights matter. Plaintiff alleges that the portion of the worker's compensation system that is self-administered by employers disadvantages Hispanic workers. She contends that as a result of this discriminatory system, a worker's compensation claim filed by her husband, who was Hispanic, was denied, leading to his untimely death.

Because plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, her complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's amended proposed complaint fails to state a viable claim under the civil rights statutes that she cites, which require plausible allegations of intentional discrimination. Her complaint does not plausibly allege intentional discrimination by any particular defendant, fails to explain how most defendants participated in the alleged events at issue, relies upon criminal statutes that do not provide for private causes of action, and, for her § 1986 claims, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Because plaintiff is pro se, the Court will offer her another opportunity to amend the proposed complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's amended proposed complaint (Dkt. 3) is dismissed without prejudice, her IFP application will be re-noted for April 14, 2020, and she must provide this Court with a second amended proposed complaint if she wishes to proceed with this matter.

BACKGROUND

I. Original Proposed Complaint

In December 2019, plaintiff initiated this matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. 1. Plaintiff requested to proceed IFP, and the undersigned reviewed plaintiff's proposed complaint as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Dkt. 2. Finding that plaintiff had not stated a plausible claim of entitlement to relief, the Court dismissed plaintiff's proposed complaint without prejudice, re-noted her IFP application for February 14, 2020, and ordered her to provide an amended proposed complaint if she wished to proceed with this matter. See Dkt. 2, at 1-2.

II. Amended Proposed Complaint

Plaintiff has timely filed an amended proposed complaint with the Court. See Dkt. 3. She brings suit against the Governor of Washington State (Jay Inslee), the Washington State Attorney General (Bob Ferguson), the Director of Washington State's Department of Labor and Industries ("L&I") (Joel Sacks), L&I's medical director (Gary Franklin), and thirteen others—L&I staff, various medical providers, and a private attorney. See Dkt. 3, at 6. Her claims are under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245; and 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and for "outrageous government action." Dkt. 3, at 14-15. Plaintiff requests damages, judicial oversight of defendants (including oversight of L&I), and a change to worker's compensation law. See Dkt. 3, at 10.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination that caused her husband's death. See Dkt. 3, at 2. The crux of her claim relates to Washington State's Industrial Insurance Act, which provides for worker's compensation for injured workers and their families. See Dkt. 3, at 6. She alleges that a portion of the worker's compensation system that allows for employers to participate in self-administered worker's compensation program effectively discriminates against Hispanic workers. See Dkt. 3, at 7. She alleges that under this privately managed worker's compensation program "employers and businesses form and run their own worker[']s compensation programs[,] which are constitutionally unequal and relatedly discriminatory in how they treat their assigned injured workers compared to those" in the State-administered worker's compensation program. Dkt. 3, at 8.

According to plaintiff, employers in the self-administered program "contract with private claim management companies who hire or contract with private nurse consultants" who act with the goal of denying claims and minimizing compensation. Dkt. 3, at 8. Plaintiff alleges thatwithin this system, "there is an element of racial and ethnic discrimination" since "a great majority of self-insured programs are associated with huge agri-business entities whose workforces are significantly Hispanic and more often than not Spanish-speaking only, and of recent immigration, as well as with limited or no education and of indigent status." Dkt. 3, at 10. "These demographics make the Hispanic injured worker population much more vulnerable to worker[']s compensation denial of due consideration for services and benefits under the [self-administered] program[.]" Dkt. 3, at 10.

Plaintiff alleges that her husband was one such worker subjected to racial discrimination by defendants when he applied for worker's compensation and that after his claim was denied, he could not afford to protest his denial, resulting in his wrongful death from illness caused by an on-the-job injury. See Dkt. 3, at 9-10. Plaintiff alleges that medical care "would have prevented his injury-related medical condition from progressing beyond an initial point of still-functional level of physical capacity and employability to" his ultimate death. See Dkt. 3, at 11.

Plaintiff only briefly summarizes the alleged events. See Dkt. 3, at 12-13. She states that her husband's "work injury-related medical condition . . . manifested" on May 1, 2014. Dkt. 3, at 12. At some point, his worker's compensation claim was denied. See Dkt. 3, at 12. A doctor completed a medical evaluation report to have his case re-opened for treatment in September, 2016. Dkt. 3, at 12. However, re-opening was denied by the L&I medical director's office, and plaintiff's husband passed away in December 2016. Dkt. 3, at 12.

Plaintiff attaches to her complaint the 2016 doctor's report, which the Court will consider in determining whether the complaint plausibly states a claim entitling her to relief. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). As documented in the report, on May 1, 2014 while lifting heavy rolls of wire at work, plaintiffinjured his back. Dkt. 3, at 18. After his symptoms worsened, he visited a chiropractor, who opened his L&I claim. Dkt. 3, at 18.

The report summarizes plaintiff's medical records from 2014 to 2016, a period during which plaintiff's back condition allegedly worsened to the point that by September 2016, he was quadriplegic. Dkt. 3, at 18. Shortly after plaintiff's initial injury, he developed severe symptoms, including leg numbness. Dkt. 3, at 19. Plaintiff was treated by a variety of providers over the next two years, including defendants John Zambito (an emergency room doctor), Linda Seamen (a provider at an occupational medicine clinic), and Hoan Phan Tran (a neurologist). See Dkt. 3, at 19-22. These providers attributed plaintiff's symptoms to a "syrinx" (a spinal abnormality) and/or a "spinal myelitis" and were unable to resolve plaintiff's symptoms. Dkt. 3, at 20-22. Dr. Sloop, a neurologist, also opined that there was no causal relationship between plaintiff's paralysis and his workplace injury and recommended denying plaintiff's claim. See Dkt. 3, at 22.

The doctor writing the 2016 report opined that the level of deterioration in plaintiff's condition was "disturbing" and recommended re-opening plaintiff's claim. Dkt 3, at 29. He disagreed with plaintiff's medical providers and opined that his workplace injury had caused the syrinx, which had, in turn, produced plaintiff's symptoms. Dkt. 3, at 25.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, the Court has authority to sua sponte dismiss her complaint if it "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint "must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, plaintiff must go beyond an "unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation[s]," "labels and conclusions," and "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although the Court liberally interprets a pro se complaint, even a liberal interpretation will not supply essential elements of a claim that plaintiff has not pleaded. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). In addition to setting forth the legal framework of a claim, there must be sufficient factual allegations undergirding that framework "to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

II. Lack of Allegations against Nine Defendants

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that plaintiff's complaint, including the attached report, lacks allegations of how nine defendants acted—defendants Braid, Partlow, Graham, Cuevas-Ramirez, Campbell, Duke, Bennett, Wetsch-Betts, and Delatorre. See Dkt. 3, at 6. Although the complaint concludes that "all defendants" are liable (Dkt. 3, passim), such conclusions are inadequate. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff must go beyond concluding that these defendants "are employed or associated agents of L&I, [the Attorney General's office], or other...