Mendoza v. Matteson

1

JOHN GILBERT MENDOZA, Plaintiff, v. G. MATTESON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-CV-1136-DMC-P

United States District Court, E.D. California

July 24, 2023

ORDER

DENNIS M. COTA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's original complaint. See ECF No 1.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) G. Matteson, Warden; (2) T. Tyler, Chief Deputy Warden; (3) Popovits, Chief Deputy Warden; (4) Martinez, Lieutenant; (5) S. Deberry, Correctional Officer; (6) Stewart, Correctional Officer; (7) Peterson, Correctional Officer; (8) Buckner, Correctional Officer; (9) Khim, Correctional Officer; (10) Burns, Correctional Officer; and (11) Muhammed, Sergeant. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 3-4. All named Defendants were employed at Solano State Prison, where the alleged violations occurred. See Id. Plaintiff does not indicate whether the named Defendants are being sued in their individual or official capacity. See id. Plaintiff alleges six claims for relief. See generally id. at 5-14. At times, Plaintiff's allegations are rambling and difficult to decipher as Plaintiff provides irrelevant factual allegations. The facts alleged appear to indicate allegations by Plaintiff of various violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. Telephones

Generally, Plaintiff alleges that his freedom to communicate with family members was restricted because Defendant Deberry denied Plaintiff access to the phones. See id. pg. 5. Plaintiff states Defendant Deberry said it is “under his discretion to limit phone access even if there are two hundred (200) capable phone time slots available.” Id. Plaintiff contends he was afraid to exercise his rights because Defendant Deberry threatened Plaintiff with disciplinary action and Plaintiff was concerned it would “influence a denial of parole at parole suitability hearings.” Id. As a result, Plaintiff contends he was denied his right to freedom of speech and was treated differently from other inmates, violating due process protections. See id. at 5-6.

Mail

Further, Plaintiff alleges that on December 16, 2020, Defendant Deberry violated Plaintiff's First Amendment right to mail because Defendant Deberry refused to process Plaintiff's legal mail to Senator Nancy Skinner as confidential. See id. at 7. As a result, Plaintiff “could not correspond with lawmakers regarding conditions of confinement and pending legislation” until a later date. Id. Cleaning Supplies

According to Plaintiff, on November 13, 2020, Defendant Stewart and Defendant Peterson denied Plaintiff's right to equal access to cleaning supplies under Defendant Buckner's order. Id. at 8. Plaintiff contends Defendant Khim and Defendant Stewart told Plaintiff that officers “can take [cleaning supplies] away because it's a privilege” and another inmate caused the right to be revoked. Id. Plaintiff asked Defendant Burns why he was being punished for another inmate's actions and Defendant Burns responded with: “It's Buckner's trip . . . you know how it is.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends his wife emailed Defendant Matteson, the prison Warden, and Plaintiff filed a staff complaint, which Defendant Matteson rejected. See id. Plaintiff claims that as a result, he contracted Covid-19 and “suffered extreme anxiety and fear for his safety as staff acted with deliberate indifference to his health.” Id. at 8.

Social Distancing

Next, Plaintiff alleges that from November 2020 to June 2022 he was denied the right to socially distance himself six feet from other inmates because Defendant Matteson formed cohorts that were considered “safe zones” within dormitories, but Defendant Matteson permitted transfers of inmates between zones. Id. at 10. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of the transfers, on December 25, 2020, and January 4, 2021, inmates from Covid-19 dormitories were transferred into Plaintiff's safe zone without quarantining prior to the transfer and that Plaintiff tested positive for Covid-19 on January 5, 2021. See id. at 11.

Cell Conditions

Plaintiff also claims that, because he tested positive for Covid-19, he was transferred to a Covid-19 unit where he was subject to an HVAC unit blowing cold air on him, and that “[t]wo blankets were insufficient to keep warm causing Plaintiff to shake and shiver.” Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Muhammed “refused to assist the situation.” Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges there was an inadequate supply of hot water in the showers and overall unequal access to health care that is provided to society. Id. at 12-14. Plaintiff alleges he consequently suffered from sleep deprivation, mental health declination, partial loss of taste, majority loss of smell, mind fog, and anxiety surrounding Covid-19 because of Defendant Matteson's “lack of concern for human dignity and health.” Id. at 12-13.

II. DISCUSSION

In considering whether a complaint states a claim, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The mere possibility of misconduct will not suffice to meet this standard. See id. at 679.

Consistent with these standards, the Court identifies the following legal theories implicated by the facts alleged: (1) denial of freedom of speech; (2) retaliation; (3) interference with legal mail; (4) equal protection claims; and (5) conditions of confinement claims. The Court below discusses each category of legal theories, as well as various pleading defects with respect to the individual defendants named.

A. Freedom of Speech

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[p]risoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable security limitations.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cr. 2000) (per curiam) (concluding no right to a specific phone rate). The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of an inmate's right to telephone access in Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047 123 S.Ct. 2110, 155 L.Ed.2d 1087 (2003). In Valdez, the plaintiff argued that restricting their telephone access violated their rights to due process and freedom of speech. The Ninth Circuit found that previous assertions in dicta of a ...