Case Law Mendoza v. State

Mendoza v. State

Document Cited Authorities (20) Cited in (15) Related

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Faculty Director, Bradford H. Coates, Student Director, and Brian Conklin, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

[¶ 1] Santana Mendoza pled guilty to manslaughter and aggravated battery and was sentenced to twelve to eighteen years for manslaughter and eight to ten years for aggravated battery, to run concurrently, with a recommendation for boot camp. Mr. Mendoza successfully completed boot camp and moved for a sentence reduction to probation. The district court denied that motion, but reduced his sentence by two years. Mr. Mendoza appeals, claiming that the district court applied the wrong standard, considered improper evidence, and that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement and engaged in misconduct during the hearing on his motion. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] 1. What is the proper standard for a motion for sentence reduction following the successful completion of the Youthful Offender Program (boot camp)?

2. Is the nature of the underlying crime a factor that may be addressed by the parties and considered by the district court in a motion for sentence reduction?

3. Did the prosecutor violate the terms of the plea agreement when he argued against a sentence reduction?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Mr. Mendoza and another juvenile assaulted two people along a path outside of Riverton. One of the victims was killed and the other sustained serious injuries. Mr. Mendoza was sixteen at the time.

[¶ 4] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Mendoza pled guilty to charges of manslaughter, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2015), and aggravated battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2015). The plea agreement provided that "[t]he State shall take no position on boot camp."

[¶ 5] At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Mendoza's counsel recommended he participate in the Youthful Offender Program (boot camp) and that his sentences run concurrently. The prosecutor made no mention of boot camp. The district court imposed a sentence of twelve to eighteen years for manslaughter and eight to ten years for aggravated battery, to run concurrently. In the Judgment and Sentence, the court recommended that Mr. Mendoza "serve his sentence at" boot camp, if deemed appropriate by the Wyoming Department of Corrections.

[¶ 6] In March of 2015, anticipating his completion of boot camp, Mr. Mendoza filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction, in which he requested that his sentence be reduced to probation. After a hearing, the district court reduced Mr. Mendoza's manslaughter sentence to ten to eighteen years, but denied his request for probation. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
I. What is the proper standard for a motion for sentence reduction following the successful completion of the Youthful Offender Program (boot camp)?

[¶ 7] In determining whether to grant Mr. Mendoza's request for the suspension of his sentence and to be placed on probation, the district court conducted a review identical to that which would be applied under a motion for sentence reduction filed pursuant to W.R.Cr.P 35(b).1 In so doing, the district court reviewed the evidence and testimony submitted at the hearing, including evidence of the nature of the underlying crimes, the arguments of counsel, and the entire file. The district court denied Mr. Mendoza's request for probation, but did reduce his sentence by two years.

[¶ 8] Mr. Mendoza argues that because the denial of a motion for reduction under the Youthful Offender Program statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7–13–1001 to 7–13–1003 (LexisNexis 2015), defeats the rehabilitative purpose of boot camp, it mandates a different review than review under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b). Under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), the trial court is afforded considerable deference in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for sentence reduction. "The purpose of Rule 35(b) is to give a convicted defendant a second opportunity to reduce his sentence by presenting additional information and argument to the sentencing judge." Chapman v. State, 2015 WY 15, ¶ 11, 342 P.3d 388, 392 (Wyo.2015). In considering a Rule 35(b) motion, the sentencing court is "free to accept or reject such information at its discretion." Id. (citation omitted). Mr. Mendoza urges us to adopt a different rule when a sentence reduction is sought pursuant to the Youthful Offender Program statutes. He contends the district court's discretion is limited when a youthful offender has successfully completed boot camp.

[¶ 9] The nature of a court's discretion in its consideration of a sentence reduction under the Youthful Offender Program statute is a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. Marshall v. State, 2014 WY 168, ¶ 6, 340 P.3d 283, 286 (Wyo.2014).

In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of the statute to determine the legislature's intent. We examine the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature to determine whether the statute is ambiguous.
A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.

In re Estate of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, ¶ 17, 367 P.3d 629, 634 (Wyo.2016) (citations omitted).

[¶ 10] The statute governing sentence reduction upon an inmate's completion of the Youthful Offender Program provides:

(a) The sentencing court may reduce the sentence of any convicted felon who:
(i) Is certified by the department as having successfully completed the youthful offender program under W.S. 7–13–1003 ; and
(ii) Makes application to the court within one (1) year after the individual began serving a sentence of incarceration at a state penal institution.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–1002 (emphasis added). The statute also states that " [r]eduction of sentence’ includes changing a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–1001 (emphasis added).

[¶ 11] Mr. Mendoza concedes that the decision to grant a reduction is discretionary but contends that the program must operate as we summarized in Wilson v. State, 2003 WY 59, ¶ 8, 68 P.3d 1181, 1185–86 (Wyo.2003), when we quoted the district court judge as he advised a youthful defendant:

I understand that under this plea agreement, you would plead guilty to the crime of burglary and that the state would recommend a sentence of two to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The Court would be asked to recommend that you go to the Youthful Offender treatment part of the prison system. That's commonly called the "boot camp"; and if you successfully complete the boot camp, then the Court would be asked to give you a sentence reduction that suspends the rest of your prison sentence and puts you on probation of some sort. It might be in a halfway house. It might be in a treatment facility. It might be under intensive supervision. It might be regular probation.
If you successfully completed that probation, then that will be the end of your sentence; but if you violated that probation, then you can still be brought back to Court and required to serve the rest of your two to five sentence.

Mr. Mendoza argues that this "typical" operation of the boot camp program creates an inherent ambiguity in the statute which otherwise calls for the discretion of the court in reducing a sentence. He argues that the discretion of the court is limited because of the notion that typically the completion of boot camp results in probation. He contends that the district court should be required to modify a prisoner's sentence to probation upon successful completion of boot camp, absent some unusual factor.

[¶ 12] The language of the Youthful Offender Act, however, is not ambiguous. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–1002(a) states: "The sentencing court may reduce the sentence" of an offender upon successful completion of boot camp. (Emphasis added.) When used in a statute, the word "may" is permissive, "meaning that it authorizes the proposed action but does not require it." State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Clements, 2014 WY 68, ¶ 11, 326 P.3d 177, 181 (Wyo.2014) ; see also Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 34, 209 P.3d 563, 574 (Wyo.2009). The statute also provides that a " [r]eduction of sentence’ includes changing a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–13–1001 (emphasis added). The word "include" is "ordinarily used as a word of extension or enlargement" and is not a word used to connote limitations. Yager v. State, 2015 WY 139, ¶ 22, 362 P.3d 777, 784 (Wyo.2015) ; see also RT Commc'ns, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo.2000). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not look beyond its plain language to seek further legislative intent. NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo.1989).

[¶ 13] The Youthful Offender Act is capable of only one interpretation: the sentencing court has discretion to reduce the sentence of an applicant upon completion of boot camp; and that discretion allows a reduction in sentence which could include probation, but could also include a number of other possibilities. "Once an inmate qualifies for [boot camp] and is admitted into the program, he is not guaranteed a reduced sentence. ...

5 cases
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2018
Davis v. State
"... ... State , 720 P.2d 894, 896 (Wyo. 1986). "Sentencing judges are given broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors about the defendant when imposing sentences." Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 24, 368 P.3d 886, 894 (Wyo. 2016), quoting Deeds v. State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 22, 335 P.3d 473, 479 (Wyo. 2014). [¶121] This Court upholds the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous: Because the trial court heard and weighed the evidence, ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2017
Bohling v. State
"... ... Mraz v. State , 2016 WY 85, ¶ 71, 378 P.3d 280, 296 (Wyo. 2016). A statute is clear and unambiguous if the words are such that reasonable minds are able to agree on its meaning in a consistent and predictable fashion. Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 886, 891 (Wyo. 2016). Ambiguity arises if the statute is vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Id. Divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity, but the fact that opinions may differ as to ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2016
Barela v. State
"..."
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2016
Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One
"... ... The Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Number One, State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant). S-16-0059 Supreme Court of Wyoming. November 30, 2016 Representing Appellant: Bruce T. Moats, Law Office of Bruce ... 2000) (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County v. Bassett , 8 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 2000) ); see also Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 886, 892 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Yager v. State , 2015 WY 139, ¶ 22, 362 P.3d 777, 784 (Wyo. 2015) ) (“The ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2017
Nicodemus v. State, S-16-0186
"... ... Nicodemus' contention that article 1, section 15 limits the objectives that may be served by a sentencing statute and precludes objectives such as retribution, deterrence, and removal from society. Our decisions have, in fact, repeatedly recognized the validity of such objectives. See Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 18, 368 P.3d 886, 893 (Wyo. 2016) (recognizing rehabilitation, punishment, deterrence, and removal as appropriate sentencing purposes); Croy v. State , 2014 WY 111, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 564, 568 (Wyo. 2014) (same); Cohee v. State , 2005 WY 50, ¶ 15, 110 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo ... "

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5 cases
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2018
Davis v. State
"... ... State , 720 P.2d 894, 896 (Wyo. 1986). "Sentencing judges are given broad discretion to consider a wide range of factors about the defendant when imposing sentences." Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 24, 368 P.3d 886, 894 (Wyo. 2016), quoting Deeds v. State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 22, 335 P.3d 473, 479 (Wyo. 2014). [¶121] This Court upholds the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous: Because the trial court heard and weighed the evidence, ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2017
Bohling v. State
"... ... Mraz v. State , 2016 WY 85, ¶ 71, 378 P.3d 280, 296 (Wyo. 2016). A statute is clear and unambiguous if the words are such that reasonable minds are able to agree on its meaning in a consistent and predictable fashion. Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 886, 891 (Wyo. 2016). Ambiguity arises if the statute is vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Id. Divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity, but the fact that opinions may differ as to ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2016
Barela v. State
"..."
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2016
Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One
"... ... The Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Number One, State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant). S-16-0059 Supreme Court of Wyoming. November 30, 2016 Representing Appellant: Bruce T. Moats, Law Office of Bruce ... 2000) (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County v. Bassett , 8 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 2000) ); see also Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 886, 892 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Yager v. State , 2015 WY 139, ¶ 22, 362 P.3d 777, 784 (Wyo. 2015) ) (“The ... "
Document | Wyoming Supreme Court – 2017
Nicodemus v. State, S-16-0186
"... ... Nicodemus' contention that article 1, section 15 limits the objectives that may be served by a sentencing statute and precludes objectives such as retribution, deterrence, and removal from society. Our decisions have, in fact, repeatedly recognized the validity of such objectives. See Mendoza v. State , 2016 WY 31, ¶ 18, 368 P.3d 886, 893 (Wyo. 2016) (recognizing rehabilitation, punishment, deterrence, and removal as appropriate sentencing purposes); Croy v. State , 2014 WY 111, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 564, 568 (Wyo. 2014) (same); Cohee v. State , 2005 WY 50, ¶ 15, 110 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo ... "

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